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Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and 
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets 
Kevin Outterson, J.D., LL.M.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The price of prescription drugs lies at the heart of two major public 
health issues: distributing antiretroviral medicines for use against the 
global AIDS epidemic and purchasing medications from Canada by U.S. 
consumers using the Internet. Both situations highlight the need to reduce 
financial barriers to access to medications, while maintaining incentives to 
promote pharmaceutical innovation. 
For better or worse, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)1 is a global nexus for drug access issues.2 In TRIPS-related 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. Special thanks 
to the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics September 2003 Health Law Young 
Scholars Workshop and the West Virginia University College of Law Faculty Workshop for 
helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by a Hodges Research 
Grant from the West Virginia College of Law. An early draft of this Article was prepared 
during my tenure as a Visiting Fellow at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International 
Law at the University of Cambridge. Helpful comments were received from many people, 
including Frances Miller, Ben Moulton, Charity Scott, Ana Iltis, Timothy D. McBride, 
Thomas Greaney, Jesse Goldner, Sidney Watson, Sandra Johnson, Nicolas Terry, Aidan 
Hollis, and Andrew Farlow, as well as from participants at the New Economic Windows 2004 
conference in Salerno, the symposium at the University of Connecticut School of Law 
(October 2004), The Canadian Conference on International Health (October 2004), and 
the Global Forum for Health Research Forum 8 Conference in Mexico City (November 
2004). 
 1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 
27.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement]. The United States implemented the WTO 
agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). 
 2. The story of how the WTO TRIPS Agreement became the de facto forum for these 
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discussions, two sets of arguments are usually forwarded. Some argue that 
pharmaceutical prices are necessarily high because innovation is 
expensive.3 They posit that the research and development (R&D) 
enterprise must be nurtured by high prices to yield the next generation of 
breakthrough therapies.4 Others counter that much of the profits going to 
pharmaceutical companies5 are used for marketing and other expenses 
 
issues has been told by many authors. Among the best accounts are books by  Peter Drahos 
and John Braithwaite, Susan Sell, and an article by Laurence Helfer. PETER DRAHOS WITH 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); 
SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ANTITRUST (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS 
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1 (2004).  
 3. See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale Jr., Patents, Patients and Developing Countries: Access, Innovation 
and the Political Dimensions of Trade Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 100, 
102-04 (Brigitte Granville ed., 2002) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES]. Dr. 
Bale is the Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association. 
 4. ANDY SCHNEIDER, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, REDUCING MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID FRAUD BY DRUG MANUFACTURERS: THE ROLE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 47 
(2003) (“Pharmaceutical manufacturers have long maintained that government price 
controls will thwart the development of vital new drugs with the potential to cure diseases 
and relieve human suffering. The desired alternative, they argue, is a vigorous free market, 
with prices set through negotiations between buyers and sellers. For this market to work 
effectively, manufacturers contend, they must retain the right to keep their prices 
confidential from competitors.”). 
 5. In this Article, the terms “pharmaceutical companies” and “PhRMA companies” 
refer to the research-based pharmaceutical companies that are members of the PhRMA 
trade association. Pharmaceutical companies have traditionally been categorized as either 
research companies (e.g., Pfizer, Merck) or generic companies without significant research 
programs (e.g., Mylan Labs, Cipla Ltd.). The United States trade association of research 
pharmaceutical companies is the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA). See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, at http://www. 
phrma.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). The international trade association of PhRMA 
company groups is the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Associations (IFPMA). See International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, at 
http://www.ifpma.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). Generic drug companies have their own 
trade associations, such as GPhA, at http://www.gphaonline.com (last visited Oct. 20, 
2004). In recent years, these distinctions have blurred as research companies have invested 
in generic subsidiaries and as generic companies have begun substantial research programs. 
It may sometimes be more accurate to describe research or generic lines of business, rather 
than companies per se. 
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rather than for R&D6 and that without affordable access, innovation is a 
cruel taunt.7 New wonder drugs will not improve health unless patients are 
actually able to receive them. A pill you cannot afford is neither safe nor 
effective. Medicines, according to this argument, are not normal market 
goods to be distributed primarily to the wealthy.8 
Nowhere are the arguments for the equitable distribution of 
medicines made with more force than in the AIDS treatment crisis. 
Differential pricing is one response to the tension between innovation and 
access with regard to AIDS medications: It permits antiretroviral drugs to 
be sold cheaply or donated in low income countries, while maintaining 
high prices in markets like the United States.9 In theory, high prices in 
high income countries can support innovation, while lower prices in low 
income countries improve access. However, differences in pricing—and 
thus opportunities for arbitrage—do not always reflect direct or voluntary 
efforts to facilitate access in developing countries;10 they may also result 
from diverse systems of government regulation and intervention and 
corporate efforts to maximize profit. The price of drugs is affected by 
domestic intellectual property (IP) laws, pharmaceutical reimbursement 
systems, and other legal systems specific to each country. As a result, for 
example, patented pills in Australia are often cheaper than their 
equivalents in Canada, which are in turn often cheaper than those in the 
United States. These pricing gaps create the demand for cross-border 
pharmaceutical parallel trade, or pharmaceutical arbitrage. It is alleged 
that if such trade is left unchecked, it will significantly reduce the financial 
gains reaped in certain countries, most prominently the United States, 
 
 6. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 
2004, at 51.  
 7. See, e.g., Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: 
A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 29-30 (2002). 
 8. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, MSF CAMPAIGN BROCHURE 5 (2004), http://www.access 
med-msf.org/documents/campaignbrochure2004.pdf (“Medicines aren’t just any 
consumer goods.”). 
 9. A joint workshop was conducted in 2001 on differential pricing for essential drugs 
by the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization, with substantial 
participation from global drug companies. The final report is published as WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL 
DRUGS: A WHO/WTO SECRETARIAT WORKSHOP (2001), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/ 
2001/a73725.pdf. A more concise summary of the final report was published in 2002. 
WHO-WTO, Differential Pricing and the Financing of Essential Drugs, in ECONOMICS OF 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 209-31. 
 10. This is sometimes referred to in this Article as voluntary differential pricing. 
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which provide financial support for global R&D innovation11 and, thus, 
may undermine voluntary differential pricing schemes (e.g., AIDS 
initiatives) that benefit low income countries.12 So long as R&D costs 
continue to be partially funded by sales revenues,13 the conventional 
wisdom holds that pharmaceutical arbitrage is a major threat to both 
differential pricing and innovation. Preventing pharmaceutical arbitrage 
from low income markets into high income markets is generally viewed as 
the linchpin of this analysis. 
Thus, in the context of differential pricing, pharmaceutical arbitrage is 
becoming an increasingly prominent subject of debate; in particular, fear 
of arbitrage is being used to justify expanding pharmaceutical IP rights and 
related powers of appropriation.14 This Article explores key functions of 
pharmaceutical arbitrage, including its impact on access and innovation 
and its implications for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and 
other government interventions affecting pharmaceutical prices and 
distribution.  
Part I of the Article establishes a theoretical framework for 
understanding pharmaceutical markets and innovation, using the heuristic 
device of optimal pharmaceutical rents to explore pharmaceutical arbitrage.15 
 
 11. Tom Blackwell, Canada’s Drug Pricing Unfair, U.S. Alleges: Pharma Companies Back Plan 
To Restrict Cross-Border Sales, NAT’L POST (TORONTO), May 3, 2004, at A6; Gardiner Harris, 
Cheap Drugs from Canada: Another Political Hot Potato, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at C1. But see 
ALAN SAGER & DEBORAH SOCOLAR, DO DRUG MAKERS LOSE MONEY ON CANADIAN IMPORTS? 
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health, Data Brief No. 6, 2004), http://www.healthreform 
program.org. 
 12. PATRICIA M. DANZON & ADRIAN TOWSE, DIFFERENTIAL PRICING FOR PHARMACEUTICALS: 
RECONCILING ACCESS, R&D AND PATENTS 28-29 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory 
Studies, Working Paper No. 03-7, 2003). 
 13. A prominent alternative formulation would be the Hubbard-Love R&D Treaty, 
which does not rely on retail sales to recover R&D costs. Tim Hubbard, Alternatives to the 
Price System, Presentation at Columbia University (Dec. 4, 2003), at http://www. 
earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html; James Love, A New 
Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, Presentation at Columbia University (Dec. 4, 
2003), at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html. 
 14. Powers of appropriation are those mechanisms, including legal rights and 
entitlements, that allow individuals or entities to control the distribution of (and thus to 
capture) the value created. See, e.g., David Ellerman, Introduction to Property Theory (Apr. 
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and 
Ethics), http://www.economics.ucr.edu/seminars/spring04/Intro-to-Prop-Theory.pdf . 
 15. In this Article, the term rents is generally used in lieu of patent rents because in 
pharmaceutical markets, many legal tools are utilized to make returns on investment 
appropriable to the innovator in addition to patent law. See infra Section I.C. The phrase 
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In the absence of definitive data on pharmaceutical R&D, the heuristic can 
offer a guide to policymakers attempting to balance access and innovation. 
Part II of the Article applies this framework to two situations: the global 
pricing of antiretroviral drugs and the issue of Canadian-U.S. cross-border 
arbitrage. 
The primary conclusions of this Article fall into two clusters. First, the 
heuristic indicates that several forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are 
beneficial, delivering lower prices to consumers without harming 
innovation. Arbitrage within and between high income markets, such as 
the Canadian Internet sales to the United States, will not harm innovation 
if pharmaceutical rents remain supra-optimal. Pharmaceutical industry 
claims of sub-optimality must be backed with full transparency to allow for 
public evaluation of pricing, production cost, and profitability data 
throughout the world. 
More broadly, the heuristic indicates that optimal economic incentives 
for innovation can be maintained while providing low income populations 
with greatly expanded access to patented medicines. Unlike physical 
property, pharmaceutical innovation is generally nonrival.16 Therefore, in 
markets which are unlikely to contribute importantly to global 
pharmaceutical rents, the shackles of intellectual property law and other 
forms of appropriation are both unnecessary and dangerous; such laws 
should be set aside in these circumstances, permitting the broadest 
possible dissemination of pharmaceutical innovation. Practical experience 
suggests that voluntary differential pricing is unlikely to deliver needed 
medications at the lowest possible marginal cost.17 Low transaction cost 
compulsory licenses are preferable and are consistent with the needs for 
innovation.18 
Furthermore, while much of the current debate is focused on AIDS 
(and to a lesser extent on tuberculosis and malaria), the analysis in this 
Article is not limited to these conditions. Consistent with global optimal 
pharmaceutical rents, access can be expanded to all categories of global 
diseases, including cancer and heart disease, without damaging innovation. 
 
pharmaceutical rents is thus meant to capture all of the various ways, including regulation-
based market exclusivity, in which pharmaceutical innovators appropriate rents. When the 
term patent rents is used herein, the narrower meaning is intended. 
 16. Nonrival goods can be utilized simultaneously by multiple users without risk of 
exhaustion. See JOHN B. TAYLOR & IMAD MOOSA, MACROECONOMICS (2d ed. 2002). For further 
discussion of this term, see infra text accompanying note 24. 
 17. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 18. The need to improve compulsory licensing procedures is discussed in Part II. 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS V:1 (2005) 
198 
In the second cluster of conclusions, I determine that the threat of 
pharmaceutical arbitrage is overstated and rarely observed empirically. 
This Article describes the legal and commercial frameworks which 
generally obstruct arbitrage, and argues that the most dangerous threat to 
innovation and public health comes from counterfeit medications, not 
from arbitrage. Resources now being expended to limit diversion in donor 
programs and differential pricing schemes could be more profitably 
reallocated to anti-counterfeiting initiatives within high income markets. A 
prime example of a misdirected anti-arbitrage effort is the initiative within 
the President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to 
establish its own supply chain and procurement policies. 
I. THE THEORY OF PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE 
A. The Innovation Theory of IP Law 
From ancient times, law and social conventions have supported the 
right to exclude—a fundamental component of the concept of personal 
and real property.19 Persons investing in the production of goods are able 
to reap a reward for their efforts because, in part, the law creates a 
property right in the goods produced. This property right is somewhat 
exclusive, meaning that other persons cannot take the property without 
consent, due process, or some important public policy.20 In the language of 
economics, goods and services are “appropriable.”21At common law, 
knowledge was not considered personal property,22 perhaps because the 
 
 19. See, e.g., Exodus 20:15 (NRSV) (“You shall not steal.”). The right to exclude others 
from an individual’s or group’s real property developed much later and is not yet fully 
ascendant in some communities. 
 20. In physical property, the right to exclude is subject to many exceptions and 
conditions; critiques of analogies to intellectual property are yielding some interesting 
research. See, e.g., MARK A. LEMLEY, PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND FREE RIDING 3-17 
(John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 291, 2004); STEWART E. STERK, 
WHAT’S IN A NAME? THE TROUBLESOME ANALOGIES BETWEEN REAL AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 1-3 (Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper No. 88, 2004). 
 21. Use of the term “appropriable” can be found in an array of works. See, e.g., James J. 
Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of 
Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1994).  
 22. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834). The first English 
copyright statute was the Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710), and the first English 
“patent” statute was the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624). See also Carle Hesse, 
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use of information is subject to at least two peculiar characteristics. First, 
knowledge is generally inappropriable or nonexcludible: It is typically 
more difficult to exclude other persons from using knowledge than 
physical property.23 Second, knowledge is nonrival: While physical goods 
like corn or wheat are exhausted when used, knowledge may be used 
without exhaustion.24 
The nonrival nature of knowledge permits its widest possible 
dissemination without creating shortages, a potential boon for humanity.25 
But, the fly in the ointment is appropriation. If homo econimus understands 
that the fruits of research will not be appropriable, then the market offers 
no financial incentive to innovate. Others will gladly use the innovation 
without compensating the innovator. The economic model predicts that 
when the innovator cannot capture the positive externality (or consumer 
surplus), the incentive to innovate is undermined. 
However, this model is overly pessimistic. Inventive knowledge grew in 
the centuries prior to the adoption of patent law; important books were 
 
The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C. – A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring 
2002, at 26-45 (tracing the epistemological foundations of intellectual property). The 
innovation theory is not the sole justification for patent law, but it is the dominant one in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Another possible ground for patent law is the contract or 
disclosure theory, which posits that patents are socially preferable over trade secrets due to 
the socially useful disclosure function. See Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The 
Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365, 366-68 (2004). In pharmaceuticals, 
the marketing approval process requires disclosure in any event, making the contract 
theory less applicable. 
 23. This Article uses the terms inappropriable and nonexcludible interchangeably. 
 24. While knowledge is not destroyed through use, it may lose value because it is 
inappropriable. For example, market-moving financial information loses its value quickly, 
particularly as market participants act on the information. This is a function of 
inappropriability, rather than exhaustion or rivalry. From a societal perspective, knowledge 
does not lose value through use, but adds to the public domain. 
 25. The point is occasionally overlooked. In his critique of the consequences of the 
TRIPS Agreement, for example, Alan Sykes underemphasizes the nonrival nature of 
pharmaceutical patents by analogizing compulsory licensure to physical expropriation. Alan 
O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 47, 56 (2002); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 484-86 (2003) (arguing that some forms of IP are rival, 
particularly trademarks and personal likenesses). Trademarks and personal likenesses 
indicate origin rather than being knowledge per se. Pharmaceutical knowledge is nonrival 
in the classic sense, although nonrival use will certainly undercut monopoly pricing and 
affect ex ante innovation incentives. 
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written before the Statute of Anne.26 This can at least be partially explained 
by non-economic motives for research, such as curiosity or personal 
achievement.27 In most industries, patents play a relatively minor role in 
promoting innovation.28 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical research companies strongly embrace 
this neo-classical innovation model.29 They argue that without IP laws first 
 
 26. The British Statute of Anne is considered the first copyright law. Statute of Anne, 
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). Today’s industrialized countries are relatively recent converts to 
the cause of strong IP laws. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 29-38. 
 27. The open source movement in science is built upon such factors, as articulated by 
several leading scientists. Tim Hubbard & James Love, Medicines Without Barriers: From the 
Human Genome Project to Open Development Models for Medical R&D, NEW SCIENTIST, June 14, 
2003, at 29; Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an 
Answer?, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: ESSAYS FROM ITS HEARTLAND 33-37 (Lynn Yarris ed., 2004), 
http://www.salilab.org/publications; Sir John Sulston, Open and Collaborative Movements 
in Science, Presentation at the Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Future of WIPO 
Workshop, Geneva (Sept. 13, 2004). 
 28. For most industries, it appears that patents play a relatively modest role in making 
invention non-appropriable by free riders. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., R&D AND THE 
PATENT PREMIUM 4, 34-35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003) 
(“Empirical work also suggests that the inducement provided by patents for innovation is 
small.”); WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY 
CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 2, 24-25 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7552, 2000) (finding that forty years of empirical 
data demonstrates that patents do not improve innovation, with exceptions in 
pharmaceuticals, and concluding that patents are not the most significant mechanisms for 
appropriating returns to innovation in most industries, with secrecy, lead time, and 
complimentary capabilities leading); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 
(Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987); Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent 
System, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 199, 200-01 (1986); Edwin J. Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An 
Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986). In pharmaceuticals, secrecy is not an option with 
the public drug application process, and the evidence strongly suggests a link between 
patents and innovation. ARORA ET AL., supra, at 4-5, 35. Arora’s study found a significant 
patent premium (i.e., a positive return on investment), particularly in biotechnology, 
medical instruments, and drugs. Id. at 30, 34-35. 
 29. One prominent source on R&D expenditures by PhRMA companies is Joseph A. 
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 151 (2003). These claims are defended vigorously by PhRMA and its members. See, 
e.g., ERNST & YOUNG LLP, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY R&D COSTS: KEY FINDINGS ABOUT THE 
PUBLIC CITIZEN REPORT (2001), http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/release//2001-
08-11.277.pdf; Sidney Taurel, Hands Off My Industry, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at A14. 
Sidney Taurel is the president, chairman, and chief executive officer of Eli Lilly. 
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movers would incur all research costs (including failed programs), while 
free riders (subsequent movers such as generic drug companies) would 
benefit from significantly lower cost structures. 
IP law offers an allegedly second-best solution30 to this impasse—the 
Constitution’s favorite monopolies “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”31 Currently, 
under U.S. federal law and the TRIPS Agreement, the patent period is not 
less than twenty years after filing.32 
The social costs of making pharmaceutical knowledge appropriable 
are generally three-fold. First, the cumulative effect of these laws allows the 
 
 30. See, e.g., TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & STÉPHANE MECHOULAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & 
EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION EFFECTS: GENERALIZATIONS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9598, 2003) (“In the private case, it is well-
understood that efficient competition ex-post leads to insufficient R&D incentives ex-ante, 
which is of course the common second-best rationale for patents.”); id. at 8, 14-15. For a 
timely recognition that a bare patent does not equal the clear right to exclude, see Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript 
at 19, on file with author). Lemley and Shapiro’s analysis is not specific to pharmaceuticals, 
where multiple patents and other appropriation strategies heighten the degree of 
exclusion. See infra Part I. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. Of course, a bare patent does not grant market power if 
the invention is unimportant or easily substitutable. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic 
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247-51 (1994). Pharmaceutical patents of 
blockbuster drugs are a strong case of patents creating market power and may be more 
appropriately denominated as a monopoly. The pharmaceutical industry eschews the 
monopoly label, but nevertheless defends the patent system as essential to encourage R&D. 
One cannot have it both ways. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000); TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 33. TRIPS permitted many 
developing countries to implement on a delayed basis. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 65-66. 
After extensions, most developing countries must implement the TRIPS Agreement by 
January 1, 2005, but the thirty “least developed countries” may defer full implementation 
for pharmaceutical products until 2016. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 7 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS]. Despite these concessions, all but three of Africa’s Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) have already adopted patent laws for pharmaceuticals. PHIL THORPE, 
STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 
(Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 7 (circa 2004). TRIPS merely sets 
minimum periods of IP protection; the United States can still unilaterally extend patent 
protection, and has done so with copyright. WTO Members are also free to negotiate so-
called “TRIPS-plus” agreements with additional provisions requiring protections in excess 
of the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards. 
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innovator to charge a higher price under monopolistic conditions. James 
Love, Director of the Center for Consumer Project on Technology, 
estimates the deadweight cost at $400 billion per year.33 Second, these 
higher prices hinder medical access, directly impacting the health of many 
low income people globally.34 Finally and most generally, appropriation, by 
necessity, delays the entry of knowledge into the public domain and thus 
may hinder cumulative innovation.35 
The perceived tension between the development and dissemination of 
knowledge permeates the most compelling issues in pharmaceutical IP 
policy. Patent doctrines such as scope,36 experimental use,37 and fair use38 
are also battlegrounds in the struggle between innovation and the public 
domain.39 This Article locates additional laws in the policy battleground as 
well. If too many laws support appropriation (i.e., excessive IP rights and 
other excessive restrictions on nonrival use), the system needlessly raises 
costs and restricts access to important pharmaceuticals.40 Too few might 
throttle the R&D enterprise, and society might forgo valuable qualitative 
improvements. It is far from clear that current policy strikes an appropriate 
balance. At the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the TRIPS 
 
 33. James Love, Statement of Essential Inventions, Inc. to the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (Apr. 5, 2004).  
 34. See infra Subsection II.A.1. 
 35. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. 
 36. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (examining the potential role of patent breadth in fine tuning 
the efficiency of the patent system). Many economic studies examine elements of this 
question. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70-90 (1969) [hereinafter NORDHAUS, INVENTION, 
GROWTH & WELFARE]; William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 428 (1972) [hereinafter Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent]; F.M. Scherer, 
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422-27 
(1972) [hereinafter Scherer, Optimal Patent Life]. For a recent example, see PHILIPSON & 
MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 8-13. 
 37. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of 
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987). 
 38. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1177 (2000). 
 39. Dam, supra note 31, at 261-68. 
 40. This point assumes that increased consumption of patented pharmaceuticals creates 
net positive externalities, i.e. that society benefits from increased access and consumption 
of the drug. PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 9. 
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Agreement, Pascal Lamy, Director of DG-Trade, noted: 
 
IPRs are justified by their societal purpose: they constitute a public policy 
tool to encourage innovation and creativity. These are the ends, and the 
patents and copyrights granted to innovators and creators are the means 
to achieve it. But the hierarchy of ends and means does not end here. 
Indeed, the encouragement of innovation and creativity is itself serving 
higher purposes: economic, social and cultural development that should 
benefit all. 
 
So, international intellectual property policy is a question of striking the 
right balance between private interests, their public policy objective 
(access to knowledge) and other public goods. Should this 
public/private bargain be struck in the same way in all WTO Members? 
Not necessarily. Here the level of development and the national public 
policy objectives come into play.41  
B. Differential Pricing and Pharmaceutical Arbitrage 
1. Differential Pricing 
In simple economic models, goods are sold at a single market-clearing 
price. In reality, clever selling firms realize that some customers will pay 
more than the market-clearing price. The selling firm increases its profit by 
selling each item at the highest price each particular buyer will pay. The 
economic literature identifies this process as price discrimination, which is 
synonymous with differential pricing for our purposes.42 
Indeed, differential pricing is common: The same product is 
frequently sold at different net prices to various buyers.43 The seller charges 
 
 41. Pascal Lamy, The TRIPs Agreement 10 Years On, Speech to the International 
Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPs Agreement (June 23, 2004), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla233_en.htm.  
 42. Price discrimination is the term generally utilized in the economic literature but 
should not be confused with price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2000). This Article follows the usage most common in the essential 
medicines literature: differential pricing. Tiered pricing, equity pricing, and price 
segmentation are other terms occasionally used for pharmaceutical differential pricing. See, 
e.g., DG TRADE, EUROPEAN UNION, TIERED PRICING FOR MEDICINES EXPORTED TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, MEASURES TO PREVENT THEIR RE-IMPORTATION INTO THE EC MARKET AND TARIFFS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (EU Working Document, 2002). 
 43. This particular definition is found in LOUIS PHILIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS V:1 (2005) 
204 
what each market segment will bear.44 A selling firm might attempt to 
differentiate its prices on an individual sale basis, a pure form of 
differential pricing which Pigou labeled first-degree price discrimination.45 
First-degree price discrimination is also known as perfect price 
discrimination, since it fully extracts all consumer surplus for the benefit of 
the producer.46 In the case of pharmaceuticals, this would provide cash 
flow for innovation but would impair access through higher consumer 
cost. In reality, transaction costs almost always make first-degree 
differential pricing untenable: The seller’s marginal costs of collecting and 
understanding all of the relevant factors for each buyer usually outweigh 
the gains in marginal revenue.47 If the number of market segments is kept 
relatively small, however, the marginal revenue may exceed the marginal 
cost, resulting in second- or third-degree price discrimination.48 In second-
degree price discrimination, purchasers segment themselves into price 
levels. For example, railroad passengers choose either first, second, or 
third class seats and coupon clippers segment themselves into distinct 
markets. In third-degree price discrimination, the producer segments the 
market, generally using monopolistic power to distinguish the different 
prices customers are willing to pay. Global sales of patented 
pharmaceuticals offer examples of both second- and third-degree price 
discrimination.49  
 
DISCRIMINATION 6, 17 (1983). 
 44. The airline industry provides an oft-cited example. On almost every flight, 
passengers will have paid many different prices for the same service. The market has been 
segmented into multiple buyer groups, including business travelers, vacation travelers, 
frequent flyers, and last minute purchasers. See, e.g., ERNST R. BERNDT, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 
FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, UNIFORM PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-6, 
9-10 (1994). However, it is worth noting that some, like Louis Philips, argue that the airline 
example is not technically an example of price discrimination, concluding that reserving a 
seat weeks in advance and buying a last minute ticket are different services. PHILIPS, supra 
note 43, at 9. 
 45. The classic description of first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination is 
found in ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 321-47 (4th ed. 1920). A helpful 
summary of Pigouvian price discrimination may be found in PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 11-14. 
 46. It is perfect from the perspective of the selling firm, rather than the consumer. 
PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 158. 
 47. PIGOU, supra note 45, at 280. 
 48. See PIGOU, supra note 45; PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 12-13. 
 49. Examples of second-degree price discrimination include consumer selection of 
branded or unbranded drugs, the opportunity to apply for patient assistance programs, and 
monopsonistic price controls. Examples of third-degree price discrimination include 
voluntary differential pricing programs by manufacturers. 
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The primary focus of this Article is third-degree price discrimination, 
although I typically employ the more general term, differential pricing. 
The term “voluntary differential pricing” in this Article refers specifically to 
third-degree price discrimination, as distinguished from second-degree 
price discrimination such as price controls imposed by monopsonistic 
payor governments. 
Differential pricing is endemic to pharmaceutical markets.50 
Pharmaceutical companies segment markets for differential pricing 
purposes, generally along efficient boundaries such as political borders or 
payor classes, with the support of legal institutions. Voluntary differential 
pricing exists among different countries51 and among different buyers or 
payor classes within countries.52 Second-degree differential pricing occurs 
when price controls are imposed.53 
2. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage 
Pharmaceutical arbitrage is the theoretical nemesis of differential 
pricing.54 While differential pricing assumes that the first purchaser is the 
 
 50. This is true, at least, in recent years. See infra Part II. But at least one Wall Street 
Journal editor is calling on PhRMA companies to abandon voluntary price discrimination 
for a single price in all developed countries. See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Two CEOs, Two 
Trials, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at A15 (“A better idea would be for Pfizer and fellow drug 
makers to publish and stick to a single price at which each drug will be sold to customers in 
the developed countries. Price discrimination may be socially beneficial; [i]t may allow 
more people to benefit from a new drug than would be possible if each had to pay an equal 
share of research costs. Politically, however, price discrimination has become an albatross 
around the industry’s neck, because other developed nations use price controls to force 
R&D costs back onto American consumers.”). 
 51. For example, in many African countries pharmaceutical companies charge less for 
certain drugs in than they do in the United States. See, e.g., John S. James, Merck, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Announce Major Price Reductions in Poorest Countries, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Feb. 
26, 2001, http://www.aids.org/atn/a-361-03.html. 
 52. Examples in the United States include Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Affairs, federal 
employees, private health plans, and individuals. 
 53. See, e.g., infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing Australia’s scheme).  
 54. For a classic account of the interplay between arbitrage and differential pricing, see 
PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 14-16. A recent study from the London School of Economics does 
not find any evidence of the predicted price convergence in pharmaceutical parallel 
trading markets in Europe. PANOS KANAVOS ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PARALLEL TRADE IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: A STAKEHOLDER 
ANALYSIS 15-16 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Special Research Paper, 2004), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEHealthAndSocialCare/documents/otherpaperseries.
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ultimate user, arbitrage occurs when buyers in a lower-priced market re-sell 
the product to consumers in a higher-priced market. Pharmaceuticals sold 
for five dollars in India may be identical to products sold for one hundred 
dollars in the United States, creating the opportunity for arbitrage. When 
arbitrage involves IP and crosses an international border, it is called 
parallel trade.55 Absent other constraints, neo-classical economic theory 
predicts that arbitrage will erode price-differentiated markets, moving all 
sales towards an equilibrium price. As a result, arbitrage redirects 
consumer surplus away from the producer and into the hands of the 
consumer,56 improving access through lower cost. Arbitrage is in fact a 
normal function of a competitive capitalistic economy, a key component of 
the invisible hand. Arbitrage loses favor when it threatens innovation by 
hindering appropriation by pharmaceutical companies. As will be seen 
later, the empirical reality of pharmaceutical arbitrage departs from the 
neo-classical model in significant ways.57 This Article recognizes that 
pharmaceutical arbitrage may be either helpful or dysfunctional to 
consumer welfare. 
C. Laws Affecting Pharmaceutical Arbitrage 
Successful pharmaceutical price discrimination requires market 
segmentation and must minimize arbitrage by customers and 
intermediaries. Several tools may be employed, including contract, 
product differentiation supported by trademarks, and regulatory 
structures.58 Each affects the degree of appropriation in pharmaceutical 
markets, and thus, the balance between access and innovation. 
 
htm. 
 55. Parallel trade, “also called grey-market trade, is the act of taking goods placed into 
circulation in one market, where they are protected by a trademark, patent or copyright, 
and shipping them to a second market without the authorization of the local owner of the 
intellectual property right.” Keith E. Maskus & Mattias Ganslandt, Parallel Trade in 
Pharmaceutical Products: Implications for Procuring Medicines for Poor Countries, in ECONOMICS OF 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 57. The practice is not necessarily illegal, depending 
upon the country’s laws concerning exhaustion of IP rights. See supra Subsection I.A.1.  
 56. PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 18. 
 57. See infra Subsection II.A.1; see also supra note 54 (citing study finding no empirical 
evidence of price convergence in EU pharmaceutical arbitrage). 
 58. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1251 (2004). 
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1. Contract 
Private ordering may support differential pricing: The contract 
between a buyer and seller may expressly or implicitly forbid arbitrage.59 If 
the customer breaches the agreement, the seller can pursue contractual 
remedies. The effectiveness of contractual remedies will in many cases 
depend upon whether the seller has privity with every arbitrageur and on 
the monitoring costs required to ensure compliance. In pharmaceutical 
markets, manufacturers are likely to lack privity with the multiple layers of 
pharmaceutical distributors and retailers, and contracts of adhesion in the 
style of shrink-wrap licensing are impractical since pharmaceutical goods 
are sold rather than licensed. Contractual restrictions on subsequent trade 
may run afoul of competition law. The European Court of Justice, for 
example, is generally skeptical of contractual provisions preventing intra-
European arbitrage.60 Any relaxation of these competition law principles, 
or a novel expansion of licensing-style restrictions on subsequent transfer, 
would decrease the potential for arbitrage and expand the appropriation 
powers of pharmaceutical innovators. 
2. Product Differentiation 
Successful arbitrage requires that the lower priced product be the 
same as, or easily substituted for, the more expensive product. When the 
product is fungible and easily transferable, consumers can cross the price 
discriminating market segments by choosing the lowest price.61 However, 
producers rarely concede strict fungibility; marketing efforts are deployed 
to influence consumers and reduce their willingness to make substitutions, 
thus supporting differential pricing.62 This process generally occurs 
 
 59. Airlines, for example, forbid the transfer of tickets. Some firms refuse to sell 
equipment, but only lease it with sub-leasing forbidden. The famous example of leased 
Xerox equipment is described in PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 151-53. A more recent example 
is the software industry’s widespread use of non-transferable licenses. These are most often 
clickwrap or shrink-wrap licenses—contracts of adhesion. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. 
Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with 
Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999). Firms may also contractually 
prohibit parallel trade of their products. 
 60. Case C-306/96, Javico Int’l v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983, 
[1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 172 (1998). 
 61. BERNDT, supra note 44, at 8-10; PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 27. 
 62. Aspirin might be considered a fungible commodity. The active ingredient is well 
known and unprotected by patents. Yet, the aspirin market is filled with differentiated 
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between similar products from competing companies, but parallel traders 
force companies to confront movements of differentially priced products 
between geographic markets. Trademarks and laws constraining parallel 
trade support product differentiation. Granting patents for modest 
variations in dosage and formulations also supports product 
differentiation. 
Laws regulating pharmaceutical marketing also affect the potential for 
arbitrage. Drug companies target both consumers and physicians63 with 
their marketing efforts: Overall, U.S. promotional spending on 
prescription drugs in 2000 totaled $15.7 billion.64 Even after generic entry, 
these marketing efforts are remarkably effective in retaining market 
share.65 Finally, transaction costs also influence the ease of substitution. If 
laws raise arbitrage transaction costs, product differentiation is supported, 
and arbitrage is hindered. 
 
products. Some aspirins are marketed with brand names as proxies for safety and reliability. 
Others are compounded with other ingredients such as caffeine or buffering agents. 
Aspirin may be purchased in particular sizes, shapes, and delivery methods, such as pills, 
capsules, or gel caps. Despite this product differentiation, at some level all aspirins are 
subject to substitution. If the preferred brand or form of aspirin is unavailable, or priced 
too high, some consumers will substitute another form of aspirin, or may even substitute 
with another class of analgesic, such as ibuprofen or acetaminophen. 
 63. Companies spend billions of dollars to employ product representatives, who meet 
with doctors in various venues. In 2000, the industry employed 83,000 drug representatives 
at a cost of $4 billion. NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH & EDUC. FOUND., 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING 5 (2001) [hereinafter NIHCM]. Free 
samples valued at $7.9 billion were given to doctors in 2000, and $1.9 billion was spent on 
educational conferences for doctors. Id. These efforts encourage particular prescribing 
habits and shift demand between drugs through substitution. Id. at 7; see also SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 4, at 26-36 (fraud cases); Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 3,731, 23,735-38 (May 5, 2003). The industry has also taken 
steps to suppress negative research. See Angell, supra note 6, at 62; NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST POLICIES 1-5 (2004), http://www.nih.gov/about/ethics_COI_panelreport.pdf 
[hereinafter NIH, CONFLICT OF INTEREST]. 
 64. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 4. Approximately one-third related to one-on-one 
meetings with doctors, visits to hospitals, or conferences, and only a portion of that could 
be considered educational. The largest marketing expense is for free drug samples ($7.9 
billion in 2000). Id. at 4. In 2000, U.S. unit sales of the fifty most heavily advertised drugs 
rose at six times the rate of other drugs. Id. at 7. 
 65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii-xiii (1998) 
[hereinafter CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION]. 
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3. Government Regulation of Pharmaceuticals  
Pharmaceutical regulation influences substitution, transaction costs, 
and arbitrage. Two major legal categories are particularly relevant to 
pharmaceutical arbitrage: IP laws and national drug regulatory agencies 
(NDRAs). 
i. Intellectual Property (IP) Laws 
IP laws facilitate pharmaceutical differential pricing by creating legally 
enforceable rights, which in turn support the appropriation of rents. 
Pharmaceutical patents prevent substitution by identical compounds 
during the patent period. Trademarks support brand identification and 
differentiation of products to consumers, hindering consumer confusion 
or unintended substitution.66  
In many countries, the first sale of a patented product exhausts the 
public law rights of the patent holder for that item.67 This exhaustion rule 
is a necessary condition68 to legal domestic arbitrage, as it permits domestic 
resale by the purchaser without the permission of the patent holder.69 
Exhaustion may be applied on a domestic or an international basis. The 
domestic exhaustion rule renders parallel imports illegal while the 
international exhaustion rule removes patent law barriers to international 
 
 66. TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 151-57 (1994) 
(discussing the consumer confusion theory underlying the exclusion of parallel imports 
under trademark law); WARWICK A. ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 101-05 (1993) (discussing 
the role of distinct domestic goodwill to successfully exclude parallel goods under 
trademark law). 
 67. ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 125-42 (Anglo-Commonwealth patent law); id. at 143-50 
(U.S. patent law). 
 68. It is necessary, but not sufficient: Significant price differentials and relatively low 
transaction costs are also required. The power of other factors is demonstrated by the 
persistence of pharmaceutical pricing differentials within the EU, despite a strong internal 
exhaustion rule and EU firms specializing in pharmaceutical arbitrage. ROTHNIE, supra note 
66, at 477, 494-97. See generally DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3. 
 69. Domestic parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is legal within the EU and the United 
States. See, e.g., Case 187/80, Merck v. Stephar, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463 
(holding that parallel drug trade is legal in the EU); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 
§ 16.03[2] (2003) (explaining the U.S. domestic exhaustion rule). But see Case T-41/96, 
Bayer A.G. v. E.C. Commission, [2001] 4 C.M.L.R. 4 (holding that unilateral acts by 
pharmaceutical company to choke off supply of drugs to parallel exporters is not actionable 
under EU law); Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ. 129 (requiring 
repackaging in some cases to protect the trademark). 
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parallel trade.70 United States law only recently rejected the international 
patent exhaustion rule,71 and the extent of the rejection may not yet be 
clear,72 although the recent Free Trade Agreement with Australia commits 
 
 70. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3.1 (“A country providing for international exhaustion 
effectively makes parallel imports legal, while a country (or regional group) that provides 
for national (or regional) exhaustion enables rightholders to act against such imports.”). 
TRIPS does not commit to a position on exhaustion, specifically reserving the issue to 
domestic law. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6. Some commentators writing on the economics of 
essential medicines mention in passing that U.S. patent law rejects the international 
exhaustion rule. See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, DIFFERENTIATED PRICING OF PATENTED PRODUCTS 
(WHO, Comm’n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. 2, 2001); JEAN O. 
LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN POOR 
COUNTRIES 19 n.29 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 5, 2002), reprinted in 3 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2002) [hereinafter LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY]. 
 71. One distinguished commentator states, without discussion, that the 1994 
amendments reject international exhaustion for U.S. patents, which might imply that the 
Uruguay Round required this result. CHISUM, supra note 69, § 16.05[3]. The amendment 
was included as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act by which the United States 
joined the WTO. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). Section 533 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act amended 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to 
expand the definition of infringement to include importation into the United States of a 
patented product. The legislative history of this provision is obscure. The House Reports on 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act do not include an analysis of Section 533, and the only 
mention in the summary description is: “amends the definition of infringing activity to 
include offers for sale and importation of a patented good.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-826(I), at 8 
(1994). The unofficial summary by the Congressional Research Service merely states: “(Sec. 
533) Deems offering to sell or import a patented invention into the United States to be 
patent infringement.” Cong. Research Serv., Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 5110 (Pub. L. No. 
103-465), 103d Cong. (Sept. 27, 1994). 
 72. Four points are important. First, prior to the 1994 amendments, U.S. patent law was 
leaning in favor of the international exhaustion rule, a trend which resulted in the 1995 
U.S. Supreme Court case, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). See also CHISUM, 
supra note 69, § 1605[3]; ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 183. Second, it is not clear at all that 
Congress intended to overturn the international exhaustion exception by the enactment of 
§ 533. One may declare importation an act of infringement and yet retain the narrower 
exception for authorized sales abroad being imported legally under international 
exhaustion. But see CHISUM, supra note 69, § 16.05[3]. Third, the provision, enacted as part 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, was not required, as WTO Members retain domestic 
flexibility to choose any exhaustion rule. Finally, the heuristic of optimality, see infra Section 
I.D, suggests that any provision which strengthens drug patent rights will enhance 
beneficial innovation only if rents are sub-optimal. This issue was not demonstrated to 
Congress in the legislative history to the 1994 amendment. 
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both parties to the domestic exhaustion rule.73 
If the United States does follow the domestic exhaustion rule for 
pharmaceutical patents, drugs sold in the United States, exported to 
Canada, and then re-imported back into the United States arguably qualify 
for domestic exhaustion.74 However, the Prescription Drug Marketing Act 
of 1987 blocks reimportation by anyone other than the manufacturer, 
forbidding this form of arbitrage.75 
ii. National Drug Regulatory Agencies  
The TRIPS Agreement generally leaves the drug approval process to 
individual countries.76 The global diversity of regulatory actors creates the 
possibility that each country will have a unique drug regulatory 
environment, with different approaches to issues such as generic 
substitution, drug approval, reimbursement, parallel trade, advertising, 
and pharmaceutical arbitrage. In addition, each country’s market may 
differ due to other significant factors such as economic development and 
demand elasticity. The net result is that law assists in the creation of unique 
market characteristics in each country, which may result in differentiated 
prices either by facilitating voluntary differentiation and impeding 
conditions necessary for arbitrage, or by taking actions, such as price 
controls, that essentially demand a differentiated scheme. 
To begin, a country’s regulatory conditions may uniquely affect the 
potential for product differentiation—an impediment to arbitrage—by 
allowing or disallowing certain marketing efforts or dictating transactions 
costs. For example, in 1997, the United States’s national drug regulatory 
 
 73. In 2004, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement committed both parties to the 
domestic exhaustion rule for patents. Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl. § 
17.9.4, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/ 
Section_Index.html.  
 74. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug 
Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFF. 119, 129-32 (2001). Re-imported patented drugs are produced 
in the United States under proper authority, legally exported to a second country (such as 
Canada) and then re-imported by a third party, arguably exhausting U.S. patent rights over 
the pills themselves. There is no evidence that the 1994 modifications to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
were intended to waive the domestic exhaustion rule on re-imported goods. See supra notes 
71-72. As discussed infra Section II.B, Canadian pharmaceutical arbitrage has recently 
exploded despite this restriction.  
 75. Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 381(d) (2000). 
 76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1, § 1. 
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agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),77 modified its 
regulations to permit direct to consumer (DTC) advertising for 
pharmaceutical drugs.78 Virtually no other countries permit the practice.79 
The creation of the DTC rule by the FDA modifies information costs 
related to substitution.80 
Other government regulations also influence pharmaceutical 
marketing. For example, federal law prohibits the sale of a drug sample81 
or the domestic resale of deeply-discounted drugs sold to certain 
hospitals,82 hindering arbitrage of these products and thus supporting their 
provision at differential prices. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services applies Medicare fraud and abuse laws to the practices of 
drug representatives, forbidding remuneration to encourage particular 
prescribing practices within federal programs.83 
Regulatory postures can alter manufacturing costs of potential 
competitors. The current de facto global standard for quality 
pharmaceutical manufacturing is the Standard of Good Manufacturing 
 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
 78. The regulations are now found at 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004). 
 79. In recent years, only the United States and New Zealand permit DTC broadcast ads. 
NIHCM, supra note 63, at 16. In 2002, Canada permitted restricted DTC advertising and is 
affected by spillover from American media. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., DRUG 
EXPENDITURE IN CANADA: 1985-2002, at 41 (2003). In the 2004 U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, web-based DTC advertising is permitted. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 73, 
Annex 2-C, ¶ 5.  
 80. PHILIPS, supra note 43, ch. 12. DTC campaigns build consumer demand, 
encouraging the patient to ask for a prescription by name. Advertising shifts the demand 
curve for prescription drugs to the right. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that DTC 
advertising increases consumer sales of patented pharmaceuticals); CBO, INCREASED 
COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 20. Spending for DTC advertising grew at an annual rate of 
44.9% from 1995 to 2000 and is now growing at an annual rate of 9.4%. Stephen Heffler et 
al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 7, 2003 (Web Exclusive), at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.54v1/DC1. Product shift, 
increased unit prices, and increased volumes each account for about a third of the growth 
in prescription drug spending. C. Daniel Mullins et al., The Impact of Pipeline Drugs on Drug 
Spending Growth, 20 HEALTH AFF. 210, 213 (2001). In 2000, the most heavily advertised drugs 
accounted for 47.8% of the $20.8 billion increase in U.S. retail spending on prescription 
drugs. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 2. 
 81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 353(d) (2000). 
 82. Id. § 353(c)(3). 
 83. SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 26-36 (reviewing False Claim Act litigation against drug 
companies, particularly involving marketing related fraud); Compliance Program Guidance 
for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,733-39 (May 5, 2003). 
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Practice (GMP). PhRMA companies are now cooperating with the United 
States, the EU, and Japan to develop a higher global standard, known as 
the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH).84 Imposition of 
ICH would discourage substitution of drugs manufactured by less-
expensive non-OECD85 pharmaceutical companies. This effort could be 
viewed as rent-seeking behavior through technical standards. Likewise, 
donor agencies often face substitution choices during the procurement 
process, which may be subject to regulation or political intervention.86 
Furthermore, international arbitrage may simply be proscribed by 
NDRAs. Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, drugs cannot be 
imported unless approved by the FDA,87 creating a non-tariff barrier to 
international trade. Some drugs are produced in the United States and 
exported to countries with price controls such as Canada.88 Since the drugs 
are produced in the United States, they arguably comply with FDA rules, 
and could be re-imported back into the United States by arbitrageurs. 
However, the U.S. Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 prohibits the 
reimportation of a prescription drug by anyone other than the 
manufacturer.89 The law was ostensibly intended to address safety concerns 
for the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain,90 but its effect is to prevent 
 
 84. GRAHAM DUKES, UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT OF TASK FORCE 5 
WORKING GROUP ON ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 32 (2004). 
 85. The OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; its 
membership consists almost exclusively of high income countries. See OECD, Information 
by Country, at   http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_2_ 
1,00.html; World Bank, Data & Statistics: Country Group, at http://www.worldbank.org/ 
data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). Non-OECD pharmaceutical 
companies are essentially those based outside of Japan, North America, and Europe, such as 
India’s Cipla and Ranbaxy. These companies are typically best known for their production 
of generic products. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Selling Cheap ‘Generic’ Drugs, India’s 
Copycats Irk Industry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1.  
 86. The United States’s unilateral effort on AIDS (PEPFAR) has chosen to ignore the 
WHO prequalification process, as well as all recipient country drug regulatory agencies, and 
now imposes a supplementary FDA approval process for AIDS drug procurement. Sarah 
Lueck, White House Aims To Answer Critics of Its AIDS Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2004, at A9; 
Sarah Lueck, White House Gets Pressure on AIDS Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2004, at A4. This 
decision, ostensibly made on quality grounds, also supports the product line of PhRMA 
companies by imposing additional regulatory requirements on their generic competitors 
located in India, South Africa, Thailand, and Brazil. 
 87. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(i), 381(a) (2000). 
 88. See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 89. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t), 381(d) (2000). 
 90. H.R. REP. No. 100-76, at 7 (1987). 
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international pharmaceutical arbitrage or parallel trade.91 
Finally, PhRMA companies generally do not enjoy unconstrained 
monopoly power to set prices on patented drugs. In high income 
countries, regulatory systems, as well as payor monopsony, will likely yield 
countervailing pricing power. In some countries, the government sets 
pharmaceutical prices by regulatory process, including reference pricing92 
and rate setting.93 In others, price regulation occurs when the government 
enters the market as a purchaser and acts with monopsony power.94 Private 
payors (health plans or their agents such as pharmacy benefit managers) 
may either mimic the government prices, or utilize their own market 
power to negotiate prices.95 Moreover, most third-party payors have 
pharmaceutical substitution agendas of their own which are subject to 
government regulation. Many health plans now require prescriptions to be 
filled with generic equivalents whenever medically appropriate. In the 
United States, state and federal laws generally support these efforts.96  
 
 91. The government also has the power to seize counterfeit or improperly diverted 
drugs. For an interesting story on the diversion of Serostim within the United States, see 
Christopher Windham, Cracking Down on Illicit Use of AIDS Drugs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2004, 
at B1. 
 92. PATRICIA DANZON & JOHATHAN D. KETCHAM, REFERENCE PRICING OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
FOR MEDICARE: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND NEW ZEALAND (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10007, 2003) (discussing reference price systems 
in Germany, The Netherlands, and New Zealand). 
 93. House of Commons Select Comm. on Health, Minutes of Evidence (Jan. 23, 2002), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhealth/515/2012321.
htm (examination of Dr. John Patterson, President-elect, Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry) (“Prices almost never go up on medicines in this country 
[England], as you saw from the report to Parliament in December. In brief, the PPRS is a 
scheme which caps profits and profitability in our industry at a level equivalent to the 
average return on capital of the FT 100.”). The United States effectively sets rates for 
government purchase of services from physicians and hospitals, but generally not for 
pharmaceuticals. 
 94. In the United States, the recently-enacted Medicare Act disabled federal 
monopsony power in the purchase of outpatient prescription drugs under Medicare. 
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 301 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395). 
 95. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at xi. 
 96. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-5-12 (2004) (allowing pharmacists to substitute generic 
medicines for brand name medicines without approval from the prescriber); id. § 23-4-3 
(requiring generic substitution within the Workers’ Compensation program). But see 
DANZON & KETCHAM, supra note 92, at 7 (noting that Germany restricts generic 
substitution). 
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iii. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Traditionally, IP law regulates the economic incentives of innovation 
while NDRA regulations and related laws control drug efficacy and safety. 
However, the patent system is not the only source of exclusive, or 
monopoly, rights. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act97 and other legislation 
such as the Orphan Drug Act,98 the FDA may grant additional exclusive 
marketing periods under an array of circumstances—for example, 
rewarding first-mover generic drugs,99 certain drugs for uncommon 
conditions (so-called orphan drugs),100 or compliance with social goals 
such as testing drugs for efficacy and safety on children.101 Indeed, when 
examining the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation, it is not the 
length of the patent period that matters most but the duration of this 
exclusive marketing period.102 PhRMA companies are maximizing their 
opportunities under these provisions.103 
 
 97. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28 and 35 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA also influences 
the patent process, since Hatch-Waxman extends the patent for half of the period that a 
drug is undergoing clinical trials, plus the full amount of time spent in the FDA approval 
process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, 156 (2000).  
 98. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000). 
 99. Id. § 355(j). 
 100. Id. §§ 360aa-360ee. 
 101. Id. § 355a. 
 102. The term “exclusive marketing period” means the actual period during which a 
pharmaceutical company sells an FDA-approved drug in the United States without direct 
competition. The legal sources of this period include patent law, non-patent “exclusive 
marketing” rights granted by the FDA under Hatch-Waxman, the use of litigation and 
agreements to forestall competitive entry, and the evergreening of patents through filings 
for new uses and formulations. 
 103. For example, the number of putative orphan drugs qualifying for tax credits and 
extended exclusive marketing periods has soared as companies have narrowly defined 
markets to remain under the 200,000-person threshold. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug 
Policy: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 692, 704-06 (1993) (noting that the FDA 
designated AZT as an orphan drug in 1987 and half of AIDS drugs as of August 1991 were 
designated as orphans); John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the 
Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (noting that the FDA designated early AIDS drugs such 
as AZT, and other best-selling drugs such as EPO and Taxol as orphan drugs). The tax 
expenditure on the Orphan Drug Act is now $200 million per year, not including the cost 
of the grant of market exclusivity. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FYS 2004-2008 (Joint Committee Print 2003). Public Citizen notes the 
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The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was the first major piece of legislation to 
link patent law and FDA regulations in this way. The Act regulates patent 
expiry and generic entry following patent expiration, directly addressing 
the balance between innovation and access.104 The United States is now 
exporting portions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to other countries through 
bilateral free trade agreements.105 
After a patent or exclusive marketing period expires,106 competition by 
generic drugs is not automatic. Generic drugs must receive FDA approval 
as well, albeit under an abbreviated process. The generic entry process can 
take some time, particularly if existing data on safety and efficacy cannot 
be used or if the manufacturing processes are complex. PhRMA companies 
have resorted to strategic litigation and collusive agreements to lengthen 
effective exclusive marketing periods.107 These abuses prompted 
amendments to Hatch-Waxman in 2003.108 PhRMA companies are already 
responding with new tactics to keep generic drugs off the market by 
denying the generic companies an adequate financial return for the 
expensive generic approval process.109 
 
inefficiency of the incentive mechanism: Pediatric tests cost only $3.9 million per drug on 
average, but the six-month patent extension can result in huge financial rewards exceeding 
$1 billion. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE OTHER DRUG WAR II: DRUG 
COMPANIES USE AN ARMY OF 623 LOBBYISTS TO KEEP PROFITS UP 4 (2002). The FDA estimates 
the total cost of the pediatric testing initiative from 2001 to 2021 to be $14 billion, 
approximately equal to the proposed five year AIDS program. FDA, THE PEDIATRIC 
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: STATUS REPORT TO CONGRESS (2001). 
 104. See, e.g., Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST 585 (2003). Philipson and Mechoulan describe 
this balance in the language of economics: “Appropriate policy must simultaneously solve the 
externality problem ex-post and the R&D problem ex-ante.” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra 
note 30, at 12 (emphasis in original). 
 105. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, supra note 73, §17.9.6. 
 106. By the late 1990s, the U.S. pharmaceutical exclusive marketing period was 
approximately fourteen years. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 45-48. If 
someone undertakes to update this figure, care should be taken to account for all of the 
factors affecting effective exclusive rights. 
 107. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 13-23 (2002). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), tit. IX (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) 
and uncodified). The Congressional Research Service prepared a summary of the Act which 
provides some guidance on Congress’s intent in amending Hatch-Waxman. See Cong. 
Research Serv., Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, Bill Summary 
and Status, S.1, 108th Cong. (June 13, 2003).  
 109. Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic To Ding Generics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, 
at B1. 
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D. The Heuristic of Globally Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents110  
1. Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Knowledge 
The goal of IP laws should be to maximize nonrival access to 
pharmaceutical knowledge, with just enough legal support for the 
appropriation of rents to protect socially optimal R&D. Since 
pharmaceutical knowledge is nonrival, it should be disseminated in the 
widest possible fashion at the lowest possible cost for the greatest possible 
benefit to global public health. This Article describes this condition as 
“nonrival access.” 
The pharmaceutical industry has borrowed language from the world 
of physical property to attack nonrival access. They call nonrival access 
“theft” or “piracy.” At best, nonrival users are characterized as “free 
riders.”111 These terms are inappropriate since nonrival use of 
pharmaceutical knowledge does not cause anything to be lost,112 so long as 
the socially optimal level of appropriation for R&D is still achieved. In a 
world of excessive rents, we should call it theft (or, in some cases, 
genocide) to deny nonrival access to low income populations. 
For the pharmaceutical industry, the globally optimal level of 
appropriation through rents113 must be sufficient to fund the socially 
 
 110. Once again, the broader term rents is used here in lieu of patent rents in order to 
encompass the various mechanisms beyond patent law which facilitate appropriation, as 
described supra Section I.C. The use of the term patent rents is meant to signify only the 
narrow meaning of patent-based appropriation. 
 111. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 19-29 (piracy); LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 
3-16 (property and free riding); STERK, supra note 20, at 24-25 (analogies to tangible 
property). 
 112. Cf. Selling Life-Saving Drugs to Poorer Countries: At What Cost?, Research at Penn 
(Nov. 6, 2002), at http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?504&hlt. 
 113. The economic analysis of socially optimal patents has been undertaken by Nordhaus 
and Scherer. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH & WELFARE, supra note 36, at 70-92; Nordhaus, 
The Optimum Life of a Patent, supra note 36, at 428; Scherer, Optimal Patent Life, supra note 36, 
at 422. Scherer argues that shortening patent life will reduce R&D only for the most 
marginal inventions, particularly in industries with nonpatent barriers to entry and post 
innovation pricing discipline. Scherer, Optimal Patent Life, supra note 36, at 426. The 
pharmaceutical research industry contains both conditions. Nordhaus concluded that a 
fixed patent life was not optimal, but given that requirement, the length of the life should 
err to a longer rather than a shorter period. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent, supra 
note 36, at 428. Philipson and Mechoulan cover the same territory when they argue that 
“[a]ppropriate policy must simultaneously solve the externality problem ex-post and the R&D 
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optimal level of R&D. Optimization must balance concerns of cost, quality, 
and access, looking for the greatest net gain to global public welfare. 
Excessive rents harm human health without advancing socially optimal 
R&D. Society must decide when the best level of appropriation has been 
reached.114 
Maximizing R&D at all costs should not be our objective. Resources 
devoted to R&D are not available for other uses.115 Uwe Reinhardt puts it 
this way: “Year after year, the last dollar spent on drug research and 
development (R&D) should yield society as much benefit as it would have 
yielded if it had been spent to produce other goods or services.”116 
We should also avoid the assumption that all R&D targets are equally 
valuable. Some innovations are more valuable than others. Companies 
allocate research funds in response to price signals from commercial 
pharmaceutical markets. As a result, Americans now have a third drug for 
erectile dysfunction,117 and funds for neglected disease innovation are 
literally going to the dogs,118 but malaria and AIDS vaccines are not 
 
problem ex-ante.” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 12, 12-15. Recently, 
Christopher Yoo undertook a nuanced review of copyright law which covers some of the 
same terrain as my approach, but with assumptions of copyright market entry and 
substitutability which do not apply to pharmaceutical patents. See Christopher S. Yoo, 
Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004). 
 114. Philipson and Mechoulan make a similar point in the language of economics: 
“Under external effects in consumption, rewards to innovation should not be guided by 
potential consumer surplus, as under private goods, but the entire social surplus that includes 
benefits to non-consumers as well as consumers . . . .” PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 
30, at 2. 
 115. Currently the United States spends more than fifteen percent of its GDP on health 
care. Robert Pear, Health Spending Rises to Record 15% of Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at 
A16. Perhaps we can agree that increasing pharmaceutical R&D to twenty percent or fifty 
percent of GDP would be excessive. 
 116. Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical Market, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 107 (2004). 
 117. Viagra (sildenafil) was approved by the FDA in 1998. First Oral Therapy for Erectile 
Dysfunction, 28 FDA MEDICAL BULL. 1 (1998), http://www.fda.gov/medbull/summer98/ 
erectile.html. Levitra (vardenafil) was approved in August 2003. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA 
Approves New Drug for Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction in Men (Aug. 19, 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01249.html. Cialis (tadalafil) was 
approved in November 2003. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA Approves Third Drug To Treat Erectile 
Dysfunction (Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS 
01265.html. 
 118. In 1999, the FDA approved two drugs to treat canine Cognitive Dysfunction 
Syndrome, also known as separation anxiety in dogs. FDA, Talk Paper, FDA Approves First 
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available.119 
You get the sense that ships are passing in the night on this issue. 
James Love estimates the static global deadweight loss on pharmaceutical 
patents at over $400 billion per year,120 and Larry Lessig implores us not to 
allow IP law to be perverted while a holocaust devastates millions in the 
developing world.121 Meanwhile Joseph DiMasi and Henry Grabowski 
suggest that the “dynamic benefits created by patents on pharmaceuticals 
can, and almost surely do, swamp in significance their short-run 
inefficiencies.”122 Yet, in a major study, the Congressional Budget Office 
conceded that no one knows whether current levels of pharmaceutical 
R&D are optimal.123 This is the pressing question. 
2. Globally Sub-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents 
Globally sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents would stifle the production 
of pharmaceutical knowledge, creating a generational equity issue. The 
present group of patients might benefit from sub-optimal pharmaceutical 
rents because such rents result in innovative treatments that are cheaper 
and thus more accessible, but future quality would be compromised. 
Pharmaceutical companies would invest less when creating inappropriable 
knowledge. This is the nightmare scenario portrayed by PhRMA 
companies when they argue that constraints on their ability to appropriate 
rents will squelch innovation. 
 
Behavioral Drugs for Dogs (Jan. 5, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/ 
ans00934.html. Perhaps soon a drug will be developed for erectile dysfunction in dogs. 
 119. For an introduction to donor efforts led by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to 
stimulate development of a malaria vaccine, see Malaria Vaccine Initiative, at http://www. 
malariavaccine.org.  
 120. James Love, supra note 33, at 2. 
 121. Lawrence Lessig, The International Information Society, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 33, 36-
37 (2004).  
 122. JOSEPH A. DIMASI & HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, PATENTS AND R&D INCENTIVES: COMMENTS 
ON THE HUBBARD AND LOVE TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCING PHARMACEUTICAL R&D 2 
(2004) (citation omitted), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission 
3.pdf. DiMasi and Grabowski cite the 2003 study by Philipson and Mechoulan, but that 
study assumes sub-optimality rather than proves it. See PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 
30. 
 123. The 1998 study by the Congressional Budget Office states: “No one knows whether 
that amount of investment in R&D is over or under the optimal level.” CBO, INCREASED 
COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 48. 
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3. Globally Supra-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents 
Globally supra-optimal pharmaceutical rents are rarely recognized as a 
potential problem by PhRMA companies. By definition, supra-optimal 
pharmaceutical rents are not necessary to fund R&D; they simply harm 
consumers by raising prices and restricting access without providing the 
counterbalancing benefits of future innovation. 
i. Are Supra-Optimal Pharmaceutical Rents Possible? 
One economist reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article suggested 
that pharmaceutical rents cannot be supra-optimal because PhRMA 
companies have not fully appropriated all consumer surplus associated 
with their products.124 This is another way of saying that PhRMA companies 
have not yet achieved first-degree differential pricing (or Ramsey Optimal 
Pricing). While Ramsey Optimal Pricing would maximize the sales and 
profits of PhRMA companies, it does not respond to the distributional 
balance between innovation and access. Nor does it address the quality of 
research undertaken with the surplus so completely extracted from 
consumers. In a market beset with profound agency problems and 
information disparities, it is absurd to assume that consumers will purchase 
pharmaceuticals at the cost-effective price. Given what we know about 
pharmaceutical markets, it is at least equally likely that PhRMA companies 
will stimulate demand which varies from optimal therapeutic need, while 
neglecting less lucrative markets. 
This critique also fails to account for important negative externalities. 
PhRMA companies have failed to get the right pills to the right people at 
the right price. If another regime would result in greater global welfare 
(improved therapeutic outcomes) without damage to dynamic innovation 
incentives, then it should be preferred even if it reduces pharmaceutical 
rents slightly.  
Consider the vast global gains in welfare which would result if nonrival 
access could be accomplished without diminishing the incentive to 
innovate. The opportunity cost of failing to do so is staggering. The net 
gains to global social welfare would be very significant, even if nonrival 
access came at the cost of a modest slice of innovation. It is in this sense 
that pharmaceutical rents may be supra-optimal. 
 
 124. I thank Aidan Hollis for this comment. My criticisms are not directed at him. 
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ii. Are Pharmaceutical Rents Supra-Optimal? 
Some empirical evidence suggests that PhRMA companies earn well 
above market rates of return, one possible indicator of supra-optimal 
pharmaceutical rents.125 The industry’s long-term profits are four times the 
rate of the Fortune 500.126 Analysis of IRS data from 1990 to 1996 
demonstrates that the drug industry’s after-tax profits are more than triple 
the rate for all industries.127 
Calculating optimal pharmaceutical rents must account for other 
sources of public funding for R&D, such as government grants, direct 
government expenditures, foundation donors, and tax incentives. The 
industry receives substantial tax incentives, resulting in an effective U.S. 
federal income tax rate of 16.2%, compared with 27.3% generally.128 
The ways in which PhRMA companies currently opt to expend their 
cash flows may also indicate supra-optimality. The pharmaceutical industry 
currently spends more on sales and marketing than on R&D.129 Large 
marketing expenses are not proof that pharmaceutical rents are supra-
optimal, but merely indicate that the industry believes the return on 
investment in marketing is greater than alternative investments such as 
R&D. If the industry holds a relatively low view of the value of an additional 
 
 125. The barriers to this calculation are both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical 
front, internal company data are not generally available to researchers. Studies by DiMasi, 
Hansen, and Grabowski rely on self-reported PhRMA company data rather than a truly 
objective data set. DiMasi et al., supra note 29. IRS data shows extraordinary profits and low 
taxation but is protected against public disclosure by the Internal Revenue Code. See GARY 
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL TAXATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY FROM 1990 TO 
1996 (1999). Accurate pricing data is unavailable outside of the companies. CBO, 
INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at 20. On the theoretical front, useful questions are 
posed by Reinhardt, supra note 116; and William S. Comanor, Political Economy of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1178, 1182-86 (1986). 
 126. DAVID H. KRELING ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: A 
CHARTBOOK UPDATE exhibit 32 (2001). The judgment of the equity markets is significant, 
even under a weak form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. 
 127. GUENTHER, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. KRELING ET AL., supra note 126, exhibit 30 (noting that the top ten major 
pharmaceutical manufactures in 2000 spent 34.4% of their revenues on “marketing, 
general and administrative” expenses and 13.7% on “research and development.”). But see 
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 HEALTH AFF. 136 (2001) 
(suggesting that not all SG&A expenses are truly marketing). With deference to Reinhardt, 
the differential is large enough to suggest that R&D receives less than marketing, absent 
more specific and verifiable data. 
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dollar of R&D investment, then perhaps society would be better served 
with that additional dollar being used to provide life-saving access to 
medicines. 
Some scholars, including proponents of the anti-commons 
movement,130 suggest that the neo-classical link between patents and 
innovation is overstated, particularly for industries marked by cumulative 
innovation131 such as genetics.132 If so, optimal rents may be lower than 
previously expected. 
The most important data required to resolve this question are in the 
hands of the pharmaceutical industry and are not available in a reliable 
form to independent researchers.133 This fact alone is a compelling reason 
to demand transparency. It certainly seems plausible to presume that 
supra-optimal rents are currently being collected. The burden of coming 
forward with contrary evidence should be placed on the parties controlling 
the relevant information: the PhRMA companies. 
4. Implications of Global Optimality 
Pending the resolution of the empirical issue, the concept of globally 
optimal pharmaceutical rents is useful as a heuristic tool. The following 
Subsections outline several implications which follow from applying this 
tool to pharmaceutical markets. 
 
 130. The leading article is Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). For a recent 
study on the importance of maintaining a scientific commons, see J.H. Reichman & Paul F. 
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist 
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003). 
 131. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1857 (2003). While Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky list “pharmacology” as one such 
industry, they do not make that case convincingly in the article. If PhRMA companies are 
eager to publish and forego patents, it is a nascent trend. 
 132. The work of Tim Hubbard and James Love is particularly interesting in this regard. 
Hubbard & Love, supra note 27. 
 133. See supra note 125. Pharmaceutical pricing and profitability data are notoriously 
opaque and misleading. SCHNEIDER, supra note 4; Gardiner Harris, Drug Companies Settle 7 
Suits for $1.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at 8 (“Drug companies have paid a total of 
$1.6 billion since 2001 to settle seven suits brought by whistle-blowers that accused them of 
marketing fraud and overbilling Medicare and Medicaid . . . .”). Some researchers suggest 
that increased pricing opacity is necessary to sustain differential pricing for low income 
countries. DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12, at 16-20. I suggest that transparency will better 
serve global public health. 
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i. Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Innovation 
Patented pharmaceuticals can be delivered at marginal cost of 
production to low income populations without harming innovation. The 
majority of AIDS patients in low income countries are quite poor and are 
not part of the global market for patented drugs. Supplying their needs is a 
humanitarian response, and pharmaceutical companies do not actually 
lose viable commercial markets as a result.134 These non-market patients 
could receive unlicensed or royalty-free drugs without impacting the cash 
flow of PhRMA companies.135 
Even if global pharmaceutical rents are currently sub-optimal, 
unlicensed or royalty-free production should still be allowed so long as it 
does not replace any commercial market, and thus does no financial harm 
to the patent owner.136 Certainly if global pharmaceutical rents are now 
supra-optimal, PhRMA companies could bear the expenses of monitoring 
and enforcing differential pricing without harming innovation. Supra-
optimality also permits expansion of differential pricing programs to 
middle income markets, even with some displacement of commercial 
markets. The magnitude of expense and market loss that could be 
tolerated would depend on the amount by which pharmaceutical rents are 
supra-optimal. 
a. The Need for a Credible Threat of Compulsory Licensing 
OECD members with monopsonistic public sector purchasing of 
pharmaceuticals can negotiate or impose domestic second-degree 
differential pricing to meet local needs. For developing countries, which 
often lack a significant publicly financed pharmaceutical sector, 
 
 134. See John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, 23 HEALTH AFF. 146, 
148 (2004). 
 135. Frederic M. Scherer recently made a similar point when he argued for allowing free 
riding by developing countries on pharmaceutical patents. F.M. Scherer, A Note on Global 
Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1141 (2004) [hereinafter Scherer, 
Global Welfare]. 
 136. Philipson and Mechoulan criticize this position, but their stance is undermined if 
global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal. PHILIPSON & MECHOULAN, supra note 30, at 
19-20. Even if one assumes sub-optimality, differential pricing for ARVs does not reduce 
R&D incentives if cash flows to the innovators are untouched. Philipson and Mechoulan’s 
argument thus collapses to a complaint that differential pricing does not improve upon 
status quo R&D incentives. If the effect in innovation is positive or neutral, the health gains 
(positive externalities) from increased access should drive policy. 
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compulsory licensing, or at least the credible threat thereof, may be 
required. 
At the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, WTO members 
agreed to the Doha Declaration as an interpretation of TRIPS.137 The Doha 
Declaration allows WTO Members to take measures to “protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”138 
Specifically, WTO Members may compel licensure to protect public health, 
without limitation to AIDS or any particular disease.139 
Sovereign threats of such compulsory licenses, public pressure from 
NGOs, and actual competition from generic140 companies persuaded 
PhRMA companies and the United States to embrace differential pricing 
of antiretroviral (ARV) medications for a number of poor countries 
combating HIV/AIDS. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and others 
consider the threat and use of compulsory licenses to have been essential 
in convincing companies to establish meaningful differential pricing 
 
 137. Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32. The legal status of the Doha Declaration is 
discussed in James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002); 
and in CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 5 (WHO, Health Econ. and Drugs, EDM Series No. 12, 
2002), http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm [hereinafter CORREA, IMPLICA-
TIONS OF DOHA]. The legal status of the Cancun General Council Decision is a joint 
commitment by WTO Members to abide by its terms in good faith. Press Release, European 
Comm’n, EU Strongly Welcomes WTO Deal on Generic Medicines, IP/03/1189 (Sept. 1, 
2003) [hereinafter EU, Cancun]. (The EU uses the phrase “Perez Motta text” to describe 
the Cancun General Council Decision.) Practically speaking, it would be virtually 
impossible to prevail at DSB on a provision contrary to the Cancun General Council 
Decision. The legal status of both Doha and Cancun are expected to be clarified in a 
planned 2004 amendment to TRIPS. General Council, World Trade Org., Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Decision of the 
General Council, WT/L/540, ¶ 11 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Cancun General Council 
Decision]; see also Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 7. 
 138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f); Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, 
¶ 4. 
 139. Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 5; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 40-41. 
 140. This Article is generally focused on generics of controversial legal status, sometimes 
referred to as “unlicensed” generics (i.e., a copy of a patented pill made by a manufacturer 
that has not been authorized by the originator company). This terminology can be 
confusing in light of the role of compulsory licenses and the questionable need for 
licensing in some situations. It is simply important to keep in mind that we are not speaking 
simply of generics for off-patent products, but the more complex market for generics of 
drugs that may be subject to patents in the United States or elsewhere. 
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programs.141 PhRMA companies strongly resisted both significant price 
reductions as well as generic ARV drugs, citing both TRIPS and domestic 
IP legislation.142 
Several examples illustrate the effectiveness of the credible threat of 
generic production. Brazil’s threat to issue a compulsory license, coupled 
with its non-recognition of pharmaceutical patents prior to the adoption of 
TRIPS, permitted the distribution of free ARVs within Brazil.143 In January 
2001, the United States requested a WTO panel against Brazil to prevent 
Brazilian “local manufacture” of ARVs.144 Under international pressure, the 
United States withdrew the panel request on June 25, 2001, in the months 
leading up to the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha.145 
 
 141. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES: PROCUREMENT OF 
ANTIRETROVIRAL MEDICINES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 7, 9, 42 (2003), 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/procurementreport.pdf [hereinafter MSF, 
SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES] (report prepared by MSF at the request of the WHO); Marleen 
Boelaert et al., Letter to the Editor, 287 JAMA 840, 840 (2002) (“This impressive discount 
offered by the companies to developing countries was not merely due to public outcry, but 
mostly as a response to competition by generic drugs.”). 
 142. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141; Judy Rein, International Governance 
Through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 379, 
394-404 (2001); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
481, 491-96 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, TRIPS]; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 30-33. 
 143. U.K. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 43 (2002); JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE 
HASENZAHL, UNCTAD, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA 
AND THE USA 2 (Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 5, 2003); 
Jorge Bermudez, Expanding Access to Essential Medicines in Brazil: Recent Economic Regulation, 
Policy-Making and Lessons Learnt, in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, 178, 193 (2002). 
 144. Permanent Mission of the United States, Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001),  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/Req4EstabPanel.html. Executive Order 13155 
had specifically reserved to the United States the right to seek such a panel. Exec. Order 
No. 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30521, 30522 (May 10, 2000) (“This order does not prohibit the 
United States Government from invoking the dispute settlement procedures of the World 
Trade Organization to examine whether any such law or policy is consistent with 
[TRIPS].”). For an overview of the Brazilian and South African situations by the 
Congressional Research Service, see JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIV/AIDS 
DRUGS, PATENTS AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 13-17 (2001) [hereinafter 
THOMAS, CRS REPORT].  
 145. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 2 & n.6; THOMAS, CRS REPORT, 
supra note 144, at 15; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 38-47.  
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Indeed, even the United States has resorted to this tactic in recent 
years: During the anthrax scare, threats of compulsory licensing of 
ciprofloxacin were instrumental in securing a lower price from Bayer,146 
and compulsory licensing remains an important remedy in litigation.147 
 Finally, voluntary no-royalty licenses, such as Merck’s recent grant to 
South African-Indian company Thembalami Pharmaceuticals,148 must be 
viewed in the context of South Africa’s compulsory licensing law. That is, 
such licenses can be seen as responses to the looming threat of compulsory 
licensing.149  
 
 146. Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees To Slash Prices for Cipro Drug, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
25, 2001, at A3 (“The agreement comes after a high-stakes threat by Tommy Thompson, 
HHS secretary, to break Bayer’s patent for Cipro if he didn’t get the price he wanted.”). 
The U.S. compulsory license statutes are 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000) (patents necessary for the 
nation’s food supply); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (copyrights to certain musical works); 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 (2000) (patents); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (patents developed through the use 
of government research funding under the Bayh-Dole Act); and 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) 
(atomic energy). The U.S. compulsory license statutes do not contain the restrictions 
required by Article 31 of TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31. For an 
authoritative review of United States and Canadian experience with compulsory licensure, 
see REICHMAN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 143, at 19-22. 
 147. Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Forcing Firms To Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust, Presentation at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (May 10, 2004). 
 148. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. Grants License for HIV/AIDS 
Drug Efavirenz to South African Company, Thembalami Pharmaceuticals in Effort To 
Accelerate Access to Life-Saving Treatment (July 14, 2004), http://www.pressmethod.com/ 
releasestorage/5003645.htm. 
 149. South Africa passed a compulsory licensing law in 1997, Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997 (Republic of South Africa). The 
government was promptly sued by PhRMA companies. The U.S. government suspended 
bilateral economic assistance to South Africa as punishment for defending the suit. 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-153 (1999) (suspending appropriation of all bilateral economic 
assistance to South Africa, including AIDS/HIV programs, until steps are taken to repeal 
section 15(c) of South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 
No. 90 of 1997). Many commentators have written about the case and the U.S. trade 
pressure exerted upon South Africa. See, e.g., Lissett Ferreira, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS 
Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1133, 1155 (2002); Rein, supra note 142, at 400-02; ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 30-31. 
Doha paragraph 4 discourages Members from exerting bilateral pressure which hinders the 
exercise of TRIPS and Doha rights. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 12. 
The U.S. government and PhRMA companies relented under great pressure in April 2001, 
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Although threats of compulsory licensing may lead to differential 
pricing, it is worth noting that reliance on voluntary price discrimination 
to achieve marginal-cost distribution to low income populations has proven 
very disappointing. Over the past five years there have been many 
announcements of dramatic price cuts or voluntary programs, yet these 
announcements have not resulted in much actual treatment in 2004.150 
Each PhRMA company creates idiosyncratic policies specifying which 
countries qualify for differential pricing on any particular drug. Many of 
these policies are limited to sub-Saharan Africa or specific low income 
countries, thereby excluding AIDS crises in Asia, the former Soviet states, 
Latin America, or most of the Caribbean. Transaction costs are high when 
essential access discounts are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Company 
policies vary by the status of the purchaser (e.g., NGO, IGO, government, 
private buyer).   
Voluntary programs of differential pricing also fail to achieve 
differential pricing at the marginal cost of production, which is absolutely 
necessary for nonrival access. Voluntary negotiations kept ARV prices 
unnecessarily high for years and delayed effective treatment for millions of 
dying people. The Médecins sans Frontières pricing guide confirms that 
most voluntary differential pricing programs continue to price significantly 
above generic levels,151 a practice generally followed in the United States 
 
shortly before Doha. Editorial, South Africa’s Moral Victory, 357 THE LANCET 1303 (2001); 
THOMAS, CRS REPORT, supra note 144, at 16. 
 150. See, for example, the correspondence concerning access to Pfizer’s Diflucan 
Donation Program, announced with great fanfare several years ago, but apparently still 
unavailable on the ground in the Dominican Republic. E-mail from Eugene Schiff, Agua 
Buena, to Joseph Saba, Axios (Sept. 20, 2004) (on file with author). A five company group 
negotiated with five UN agencies for a year in 2000 and 2001 without tangible success. Each 
company ended up negotiating access deals with each individual country. Paul Blustein & 
Barton Gellman, HIV Drug Prices Cut for Poorer Countries; Other Firms May Follow Merck’s Lead, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2001, at A1. 
 151. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING 
GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (6th ed. 2004), 
http://www.accessmed-msf.org [hereinafter MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB]. Merck makes 
Stocrin (efavirenz, EFV) 600 mg available in Columbia for US$767 per year. Id. at 9. The 
lowest cost generic provider is Hetero of India at US$347 per year. Id. at 12, 22. Merck 
matches the generic price only in Low Human Development Index (HDI) countries and 
Medium HDI countries with adult HIV prevalence of one percent or greater. Id. at 12. The 
distinction is lost on very poor persons living with HIV/AIDS in a Medium HDI country 
with prevalence under one percent, such as Columbia. 
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after generic market entry.152 
Voluntary differential pricing should be extended to target 
populations in a larger group of countries. If pharmaceutical rents are 
supra-optimal, loss of some elite markets will not harm innovation. Even if 
pharmaceutical rents are sub-optimal, additional countries can receive 
differential pricing if they undertake serious measures to segment and 
protect the local elite market.153 As the AIDS epidemic expands in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, access must be expanded to regions beyond sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Given the apparent limitations of the efficacy of voluntary pricing, it is 
important that compulsory licensing be more than a threat—that it be a 
viable way for countries to introduce generic competition. However, lack of 
manufacturing capacity in the lowest income countries limits the 
practicability of domestic production of generic pharmaceuticals. The 
TRIPS Agreement seemingly restricts compulsory licenses predominantly 
to domestic use, effectively preventing exports.154 Since many countries do 
not have domestic pharmaceutical production capacity, the no-export rule 
prevents many countries from delivering low-cost ARVs to HIV/AIDS 
patients.155 For example, compulsory licenses are arguably not useful to 
Malawi absent the opportunity to import from other countries, such as 
Brazil, India, or South Africa. The ensuing debate was energetic, leading 
up to the Cancun WTO meeting in 2003. 
Immediately prior to the Cancun meeting, on August 30, 2003, the 
United States conceded the point. Under the Cancun General Council 
Decision, the WTO now permits exports of compulsory licensed drugs to 
the poorest countries—an important development if compulsory licensing 
is to be a meaningful option for countries without manufacturing 
capacity.156 The Cancun General Council Decision established a WTO 
notification process for cross-border compulsory licenses: The TRIPS 
Council must be notified, but WTO approval is not required.157 In May 
2004, Canada amended the Canadian Patent Law to permit compulsory 
 
 152. CBO, INCREASED COMPETITION, supra note 65, at xiii. 
 153. See infra Part II. 
 154. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f). 
 155. See Doha Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 32, ¶ 6. 
 156. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137; EU, Cancun, supra note 137. While 
the Cancun General Council Decision has the potential to positively impact access, it has 
not yet had an effect on drug availability. See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 157. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 2; see also EU, Cancun, supra note 
137 (noting that WTO approval is not required). 
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licenses for certain drug exports to needy nations.158 As of September 2004, 
no WTO Member has notified the TRIPS Council.159   
Phil Thorpe’s study on TRIPS implementation recently found that 
most developing countries have not taken advantage of the flexibilities and 
exceptions permitted under TRIPS.160 He does not explore the reasons 
behind this failure, but two are likely. First, many countries may lack the 
impartial technical assistance needed to implement these provisions, 
including restrictions on “new use” patents, Bolar provisions, and 
international exhaustion rules. When the World Intellectual Property 
Association has provided assistance, developing countries have found 
WIPO’s agenda to be IP maximalist rather than aimed at taking full 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities.161 Second, the TRIPS-plus162 offensive of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the “Special 301” reports from 
that same office are frequently used to bluster countries into modifying 
 
 158. The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act, House of Commons, 3d Sess., 37th 
Parliament, 52-53 Eliz. II, 2004 (Bill C-9) (received Royal Assent on 14 May 2004) 
[hereinafter Canadian Bill C-9]. The law created a positive list of drugs eligible for 
compulsory licensure, a procedural hurdle not required by the WTO. Id. Sched. 1. France 
and Noway have recently followed suit. Law. N. 2004-800, Aug. 6, 2004, J.O, Aug. 7, 2004, p. 
18 (Fr); Regulations Amending the Patent Regulations (In Accordance With the Decision 
of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003, Paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a)), Royal Decree 
of 14 May, 2004 (Nor.), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health [hereinafter Norwegian 
Compulsory License Regulation]. Norway does not have a significant pharmaceutical 
sector, so the impact of the regulation is modest. Id. ¶ 7 (official explanation of the 
regulation). Canada is more likely to actually export, but the Canadian law is more 
restrictive than the Norwegian. See CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, GLOBAL ACCESS TO 
TREATMENT: CANADA’S BILL C-9 AND THE COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR 
EXPORT TO COUNTRIES IN NEED (2004), http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/ 
cts/patent-amend/billC-9flyer300604.pdf. The Norwegian regulations are far less 
restrictive. 
 159. The WTO has established a web page to announce notifications under Doha and 
Cancun, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm. None are 
posted as of September 28, 2004. 
 160. THORPE, supra note 32, at 1. 
 161. Public comments by the official delegations from several non-OECD countries at 
the Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Future of WIPO Workshop, Geneva (Sept. 13, 2004) 
(the author was present); see also Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipo 
declaration.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004) (“The WIPO technical assistance programs must 
be fundamentally reformed.”). 
 162. “TRIPS Plus” refers to provisions which exceed the floors established under the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
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domestic law to the liking of U.S. owners of IP. WTO Members should have 
a realistic opportunity to implement the flexibilities bargained for in 
TRIPS, including compulsory licensure, unhindered by unilateral U.S. 
interests. 
b. Compulsory Licensing Need Not Harm Optimal Innovation 
Assuming that production for compulsory licensure is limited to non-
commercial markets, production by a third party does not add any 
marginal cost to the innovator and, thus, will not impede innovation.163 If 
global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal, then compulsory licenses 
without royalties can be utilized without loss of innovation incentives. The 
burden of proof of sub-optimality should be on the innovator companies 
seeking a royalty, and the royalty rate in conditions of sub-optimality 
should balance innovation and access goals. In all cases, such nonrival use 
by low income populations should be viewed as an opportunity rather than 
a problem.164 
A free rider problem may emerge if compulsory licensure decisions 
are evaluated solely at the domestic level. Each country may rationally 
choose to shirk its share of R&D costs, the same free rider problem 
afflicting innovation generally. Some form of global coordination may be 
required to address the negative externality.165 Second-degree price 
discrimination such as price controls or other domestic rules affecting the 
ability of companies to appropriate rents also raise global coordination 
issues, which are now being negotiated in U.S. bilateral free trade 
agreements.166 
 
 163. This result holds without regard for whether rents are currently supra- or sub-
optimal. Critiques of compulsory licenses by Merges and others are not applicable here 
because the goal is not the initiation of efficient bargaining around a rule, but the provision 
of essential medicines at marginal cost without harming innovation. See Robert P. Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that compulsory licenses in digital media are less efficient 
than private contractual efforts). 
 164. Scherer, Global Welfare, supra note 135, at 1141. 
 165. This is particularly true amongst the OECD, where free riding has the greatest 
potential to affect global rents. See infra Section II.B. 
 166. BUDDHIMA LOKUGE & THOMAS FAUNCE, TRADE DISPUTES AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
BENEFITS SCHEME: CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITIES, NON-VIOLATION NULLIFICATION DISPUTES AND 
THE AUSTRALIA US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 8-9 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Informal Working Paper, 
Sept. 2004) (on file with author). 
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ii. Dysfunctional Pharmaceutical Arbitrage 
The second implication of global optimality concerns dysfunctional 
pharmaceutical arbitrage. The form of pharmaceutical arbitrage which is 
most likely to reduce rents is diversion from charitable non-commercial 
markets into high income markets.167 If global pharmaceutical rents are 
sub-optimal (or made sub-optimal thereby), this arbitrage may be labeled 
dysfunctional. The EU recognizes that its attempts to support differential 
pricing for essential medicines depend in part upon blocking arbitrage 
into high income markets.168 
It is important to note the limited scope of the case against 
dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage. It does not apply to generic drugs 
because protecting the generic company’s profits will not create incentives 
for innovative R&D, and thus arbitrage restrictions on generic drugs are 
not supportable on innovation grounds.169 
Restrictions are also inappropriate between and to low income 
markets, so long as commercial markets are not replaced. Arbitrage 
restrictions could be lifted on sales to and within low and medium income 
countries. Outside of high income markets, the international exhaustion 
rule should always apply, as there is no proven innovation-based warrant 
for denying nonrival access. 
Some level of arbitrage to recent immigrants to high income countries 
might be tolerable. Very little money is at stake for PhRMA companies and 
the likely high income country consumers of smuggled African drugs 
might well be at the margins of the country’s health care system. Recent 
immigrants may not be full market participants either, despite their 
physical location in a high income country. The well-publicized 
confiscation of thirty-six thousand packages of African AIDS medications 
in the Netherlands in October 2002 might fit this profile.170 Even if the 
 
 167. Parallel trade from poor countries to rich countries is incompatible with differential 
pricing of essential medicines. See DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12 (noting that parallel 
trade defeats the objectives of differential pricing); David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, 
Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 
193 (1994). 
 168. DG TRADE, supra note 42, at 2. 
 169. Restrictions might be appropriate on other grounds, such as safety. If a generic 
drug has not been approved in a market, importing it would not be arbitrage. For 
unpatented or generic products, no innovation-based case for banning parallel trade can be 
offered. 
 170. DUKES, supra note 84, at 50 n.1. For surprising details on this case, see infra notes 
313-323 and accompanying text. 
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patients are market participants, receiving familiar medications from 
home, in their native language, might well be the best medical practice. In 
the United States, the uniform use of English labels in a multicultural 
society is not a culturally competent practice for recent immigrants lacking 
good English skills. 
Arbitrage controls may be unnecessary between and within high 
income markets if pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal. Put another 
way, parallel trade in patented pharmaceuticals within high income 
markets may be permitted.171 If rents are sub-optimal, the domestic 
exhaustion rule should apply in high income markets, forbidding parallel 
imports into such countries and raising pharmaceutical rents. Otherwise, 
the international exhaustion rule should apply to sales between high 
income markets on free trade principles since consumers will benefit while 
innovation incentives remain intact. 
iii. Domestic Pharmaceutical Arbitrage 
The current TRIPS approach is tied to state sovereignty, affecting legal 
regimes along national political boundaries. TRIPS aggregates customers 
into country-level markets, reflecting both transaction costs and the 
political realities of sovereignty. This state-centric system is not surprising, 
given that only states are WTO Members, but the process suffers from both 
over-inclusion and under-inclusion. 
Over-inclusion occurs when an entire country is granted an exception, 
extension, or flexibility under TRIPS, even though some people within 
these low or middle income countries can afford to pay high income 
market prices for drugs. Even in the poorest countries, an elite cadre of 
individuals control enough wealth to afford these drugs. In middle income 
countries such as India, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, China, and 
Argentina, these markets are significant and growing.172 The elites in low 
 
 171. Pharmaceutical arbitrage within high income markets is the subject of Section II.B 
on Canadian-U.S. pharmaceutical arbitrage. 
 172. In its 2001 submission to the United States Trade Representative, PhRMA claimed 
that $260 million was lost annually due to unlicensed generic drug products in Argentina. 
Sell, TRIPS, supra note 142, at 496 n.55 (citing PHARM. RESEARCH MFRS. OF AM., NATIONAL 
TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2001)). In 2003, the pharmaceutical 
industry’s estimate ballooned to $600 million and was included in the 2003 National Trade 
Estimate Report without any apparent verification from outside of the industry. U.S. OFFICE 
OF TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE 
BARRIERS, ARGENTINA 6 (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_ 
Publications/2003/2003_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file997_6178.pdf. The estimate was 
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and middle income countries are actually part of the high income market 
and should be expected to participate in this market on normal 
commercial terms.173 
Theory suggests that providing low-cost AIDS drugs to impoverished 
South Africans might make it more difficult to charge full price to wealthy 
or middle class South Africans, but apparently PhRMA companies 
effectively segment these markets,174 much as they do in the United 
 
dropped from the 2004 National Trade Estimate Report. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, 
ARGENTINA (2004), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/ 
2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file568_4735.pdf. 
 173. Pharmaceutical companies may currently prefer to keep the small full-priced elite 
market in developing countries rather than risk arbitrage. FREDERICK M. SCHERER & 
JAYASHREE WATAL, WHO COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS FOR 
ACCESS TO PATENTED MEDICINES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001) [hereinafter SCHERER & 
WATAL, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS]; Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents Under the Microscope, 
in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, 81, 93 (suggesting drug companies 
profit from elite households in Argentina, Brazil, India, and China); W. Duncan Reekie, The 
Development Trilemma and the South African Response, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 167-68 (showing that the top twenty percent of South Africans 
enjoy a per capita GNP of $27,699, comparable to OECD levels and are therefore a 
significant market for drug companies); World Health Organization-World Trade 
Organization, Differential Pricing and the Financing of Essential Drugs, in ECONOMICS OF 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 213 (recognizing elite drug markets in developing 
nations); Patricia Danzon & Michael Furukawa, Prices and Availability of Pharmaceuticals: 
Evidence from Nine Countries exhibit 8 (undated presentation), at http:// 
hc.wharton.upenn.edu/danzon/index.htm (showing that prices normalized by national 
income in Chile and Mexico are at 528% and 529% of the U.S. prices, which I interpret to 
mean that drug purchasers in Chile and Mexico must have personal incomes far in excess 
of the national average). In their public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, PhRMA companies acknowledge the growing middle class markets in the 
developing world. Merck & Co, Inc., SEC Form 10-k, at 14 (filed Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 
Merck, SEC Form 10-k]. PhRMA companies have recognized the potential of these markets 
for some time. Foreign Trade Practices (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations, and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 196 (1985) 
(statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, PhRMA President). 
 174. In South Africa, the NGO and public sector price for a triple therapy regime 
(ZDV/3TC+NVP) was US$400 per person year while the private sector price in South Africa 
was US$2007. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 37. A recent WHO survey 
found significant variations in prices of essential medications within most countries 
surveyed. Jeanne Madden, Basic Results That the WHO/HAI Survey Offers Country-Level 
Investigators, 33 ESSENTIAL DRUG MONITOR 15 (2003). Significant domestic price variations 
indicate that various legal and market-based segmentation approaches were apparently 
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States.175 The persistence of domestic differential pricing, even in the face 
of extensive donor programs, is a testament to the effectiveness of market 
segmentation by PhRMA companies and the apparent weakness of actual 
pharmaceutical arbitrage pressure. Possible mechanisms are brand 
campaigns with trademarks, differential pricing by payor, and domestic 
legal restrictions on arbitrage.176 
Under-inclusion occurs when a middle income country does not 
qualify for exceptions or flexibilities, or is discouraged from taking 
advantage of them, despite the needs of some desperately poor citizens 
therein.177 The state-centric system lays responsibility for low income 
patients on the middle and high income countries in which they reside. 
Here we see a weakness of any system of defining market segments by state 
political borders rather than actual health needs or ability to afford 
medicines. It also illustrates the arbitrary categories of development and 
the difficulties a country might face when it ‘graduates’ to a higher 
category. 
Accommodations (such as nonrival access to low income populations) 
may be offered to middle income countries without damaging innovation, 
so long as domestic price discrimination legal structures are successfully 
maintained.178 Again, if global pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal, 
PhRMA companies could bear the loss of some elite markets without 
harming innovation. 
A simple estimate in the case of HIV drugs may be useful: PhRMA 
would likely not suffer significant lost profit if all sales of HIV products in 
 
functioning. 
 175. See W. VA. PHARM. COST MGMT. COUNCIL, REFERENCE PRICING SUBCOMMITTEE 2-3, app. 
A-1, A-2 (2004) (demonstrating significant price discrimination within West Virginia 
between prescription drug prices under Medicaid, private payors, the Public Health 
Service’s 340b program, and the Federal Supply Schedule, as well as Canadian and 
Australian prices) [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA REPORT], http://www.wvc.state.wv.us/got/ 
pharmacycouncil/default.cfm.  
 176. Within the U.S. market, internal diversion is illegal in many cases. See Heather Won 
Tesoriero & Gary Fields, FBI, FDA Investigates Big Drug Wholesaler, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003, 
at B1 (reporting alleged diversion from discounted hospital markets to higher-priced 
secondary markets).  
 177. See, e.g., Letter to Jong-Wook Lee, Director General, World Health Organization, 
and Peter Piot, Executive Director, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (Apr. 5, 
2004),   http://www.aidsinfonyc.org/tag/activism/UNltrOnPriceReductions.html 
(discussing the plight of lower middle income countries such as Egypt, Ukraine, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, and Panama where ARVs are priced at unaffordable levels).  
 178. For a discussion of these legal structures, see supra Section I.C. 
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every low and middle income country dropped to zero. GlaxoSmithKline, 
the largest participant in the market for HIV drugs, reports sales in three 
geographic regions: the United States, Europe, and “International.” This 
latter category includes high income countries such as Japan, Canada and 
Australia, as well as low and middle income countries in Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Even so, total international HIV drug 
sales in 2003 were only £155 million,179 in a year in which gross profit was 
£17.2 billion and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses 
were £7.5 billion. Actual profits from ARV sales in both low and middle 
income markets are likely to be negligible to GSK’s global profits and 
R&D, particularly if elite markets in these countries remain commercial. 
iv. Optimizing Subsidies 
Another form of optimization creates subsidies to achieve particular 
goals. Push subsidies include tax credits for R&D, general research grants 
such as those distributed by the United States’s National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), and the orphan drug tax credit. Pull subsidies directly 
address the issue of the appropriation of rents; such mechanisms include 
the patent system, exclusive marketing periods for orphan and pediatric 
drugs, and donor purchase commitments for development of a specific 
pharmaceutical, such as an AIDS or malaria vaccine180 or antidotes to 
bioterrorism.181 
The heuristic suggests three implications. First, for drugs or conditions 
with sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents, government intervention should 
increase pharmaceutical rents toward optimal levels. For example, 
subsidies are essential for neglected diseases, where the target population 
cannot afford any commercial price for therapy. Second, subsidies can be 
limited to drugs with sub-optimal pharmaceutical rents without harming 
innovation. Scarce subsidies should not be directed to drugs with strong 
commercial potential, but should be reserved for neglected diseases. 
 
 179. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 61-63. 
 180. Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 82-85 
(2002). For a recent example, see Press Release, Inst. for OneWorld Health, Institute for 
OneWorld Health Receives Gates Foundation Grant to Fund Development of Malaria 
Vaccine (July 13, 2004), http://www.oneworldhealth.org/media/details.php?prID=76. 
 181. The Congressional Research Service indicates that “guaranteeing a market through 
contract authority” is an aspect of President Bush’s Project BioShield to develop bioterror 
countermeasures. FRANK GOTTRON, PROJECT BIOSHIELD 1 (Cong. Research Serv. Report for 
Congress, RS21507, 2003). The proposed size of the pull subsidy for bioterror 
countermeasures is $5.593 billion through FY 2013. Id. at 3. 
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Finally, for patented drugs with supra-optimal pharmaceutical rents, the 
government may intervene to achieve other goals, such as improved 
nonrival access, without undermining R&D innovation. 
Applying these implications to recent policy proposals is instructive. 
Frederic M. Scherer and Jayashree Watal have proposed expanding U.S. 
tax incentives for donating pharmaceuticals to poor countries,182 but this 
additional push subsidy is warranted only if pharmaceutical rents are sub-
optimal. Likewise, the U.S. Congress on September 23, 2004 authorized 
$7.6 billion to extend the expiring R&D tax credit for another eighteen 
months without targeting specific disease conditions.183 Proposals for 
indiscriminate tax credits are unsupported absent evidence of sub-
optimality of global pharmaceutical rents. 
v. National Drug Regulation and WHO Prequalification 
National regimes for testing the safety and efficacy of patented drugs 
are inefficient, duplicating scientific work and wasting resources 
unnecessarily. Each New Chemical Entity (NCE) requires clearance by the 
FDA in the United States and parallel regulatory authorities in every 
country where the drug will be sold. Prior to the establishment of the 
EMEA,184 some estimates put the cost of duplicative NDRA processes within 
the EU at £500 million per year.185 NDRA rules also delay the launch of 
innovative drugs in many countries.186 A “reference” approval process 
would reduce duplicative costs and speed market entry of 
pharmaceuticals.187 
 
 182. SCHERER & WATAL, POST-TRIPS OPTIONS, supra note 173. 
 183. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §301(1), 118 Stat. 
1166 (2004) (conference report approved by House and Senate, Sept. 23, 2004); Rob Wells 
& Maya Jackson Randall, Tax-Cut Bill Aids Firms; Research Credit Extended, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
27, 2004, at A5. 
 184. Council Regulation 2309/93, O.J. (L 214), as amended by Commission Regulation 
649/98 O.J. (L 88) 7.  
 185. ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 493-94 (citing various sources). 
 186. See PATRICIA M. DANZON ET AL., IMPACT OF PRICE REGULATION ON THE LAUNCH DELAY 
OF NEW DRUGS: EVIDENCE FROM TWENTY-FIVE MAJOR MARKETS IN THE 1990S (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9874, 2003). This study collects data on launch delay 
and concludes that in addition to difficulties with the drug approval process, many 
companies delay applications to enter some smaller markets due to fears of pharmaceutical 
arbitrage. If global rents are supra-optimal, this industry practice is reprehensible, as it 
voluntarily withholds important drugs from patients. 
 187. Many NDRAs practice a form of reference approval when they require, as a 
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A reference approval system requires at least four provisions. First, 
safety and efficacy testing would be referenced against approval in certain 
benchmark countries. For example, if a compound was approved as safe 
and efficacious by either the U.S. FDA or the EU’s EMEA, then it could 
automatically be deemed to meet standards in the target country. Second, 
WHO prequalification (or a similar process) would be deemed to satisfy 
other domestic NDRA requirements, such as bioequivalence for generic 
entry and good manufacturing practices. Third, IP rights and drug 
marketing approvals should also be de-linked. IP rights would still be 
enforceable under domestic law and TRIPS, but NDRA approval should 
proceed apace. Finally, in categories of strong local collective preference 
(such as RU-486), the NDRA may retain a veto. 
The United States opposes the first three of these elements, without an 
innovation warrant. Expansion of the WHO prequalification process is a 
clear example. WHO Prequalification is clearly useful in many regions, 
with many different companies producing generic ARVs under unknown 
conditions.188 In the 2004 World Health Assembly, the United States 
pushed to remove the word “strengthening” from the WHO HIV/AIDS 
Resolution concerning prequalification.189 The word was retained in the 
final document,190 but the United States continues to marginalize the 
prequalification process in PEPFAR.191 The United States also implicitly 
opposed reference approvals in various free trade agreements, on the 
ground that the rights of data exclusivity must be protected.192 The recent 
 
condition of application for marketing approval, prior marketing approval in either the 
United States., the EU, or Japan. My suggestion is that NDRAs could consider extending the 
practice for all of the biological aspects of the marketing approval process, retaining only 
the right to veto based on a collective preference, as well as approval of the labeling. 
 188. AM. FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH, TREAT ASIA SPECIAL REPORT: EXPANDED AVAILABILITY 
OF HIV/AIDS DRUGS IN ASIA CREATES URGENT NEED FOR TRAINED DOCTORS 4 (2004), 
http://www.amfAR.org/treatment/news/TADoc7.pdf [hereinafter AmfAR]. 
 189. Compare World Health Org., A57/A/Conf.Paper No. 3 Rev. 1(May 20, 2004), with 
Rev.2 (May 21, 2004).  
 190. Scaling up Treatment and Care Within a Coordinated and Comprehensive Response to 
HIV/AIDS, World Health Assembly, 57th Ass., Agenda Item 12.1, at 3, WHO Doc. WHA57.14 
(May 22, 2004) [hereinafter World Health Assembly, Scaling up Treatment]. 
 191. Marilyn Chase, Generic AIDS Pill Gets Acceptance, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2004, at B3. 
 192. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, MSF BRIEFING NOTE, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AT RISK ACROSS 
THE GLOBE: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
4-6 (2004), http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/ftabriefingenglish.pdf [herinafter 
MSF, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS]; DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER U.N. OFFICE, REGIONAL AND 
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS 
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Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Australia requires linkage between drug 
approval and patent status for the first time, exporting a portion of Hatch-
Waxman to Australia.193 
Resources are also wasted in the generic entry process. NDRAs should 
not require generic applicants to repeat any clinical studies without a clear 
benefit to public health.194 Generic companies also expend resources to 
reverse-engineer patented drugs. Reverse-engineering in this case is a 
wasteful effort and needlessly delays launch in low income countries by 
several years.195 The United States’s TRIPS-plus proposals to extend data 
exclusivity to five or ten years196 will further increase costs and delay generic 
entry. If pharmaceutical rents are already supra-optimal, all of this is a 
social loss. Taking unnecessary costs out of the NDRA system makes R&D 
more efficient, lowers the threshold for cost-effective innovation, and 
delivers innovative drugs to patients more quickly. 
vi. Price Controls 
This Article is agnostic on the question of the desirability of 
pharmaceutical price controls generally. The purpose of this Section is to 
describe what form price controls should (or should not) take if policy 
makers choose to adopt them. 
The heuristic suggests five conclusions about pharmaceutical price 
controls. It confirms three relatively uncontroversial points: (1) price 
 
(FTAA) 16-18 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UN OFFICE]. 
 193. M. Kevin Outterson, Free Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 260-61 (2004); 
Ken J. Harvey et al., Will the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 256-59 (2004). 
 194. PhRMA companies withhold much of this data as trade secrets or seek “data 
exclusivity” to block generic entry, but when a patent is set to expire there is no innovation 
warrant to delay generic entry, unless all generic entry is premature. 
 195. Watal reports a lag of about two years for generic pharmaceuticals reverse-
engineered in India. Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy 
Options for India Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 23 WORLD ECON. 733-52 (2000). 
 196. MSF, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 192, at 4-6; OXFAM INT’L, UNDERMINING 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISONS OF FIVE US FTA’S 13-15 (Oxfam Briefing Note, 2004); 
VIVAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UN OFFICE, supra note 192, at 16-18. The United States is currently 
pressuring Israel to accept five to ten years of data exclusivity, a threat targeting Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, one of the world’s largest producers of generic medicines, based in Israel. 
Teva Opposes 10-Year Data Exclusivity Provision for Israel, 21 GENERIC LINE, May 5, 2004, 2004 
WL 65711471; Hadas Manor, US to Israel: Grant 5-Year Exclusivity for Ethical Drugs, GLOBES 
(Israel), (July 1, 2004), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=810543 
&fid=942. 
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controls should exclude generic products; (2) developing country 
differential prices should not be used in high income country external 
reference pricing systems; and (3) price controls should be stable over 
long periods of time. The last two conclusions are likely to meet more 
controversy: (4) optimization of rents is preferable to price-fixing and 
reference pricing; and (5) PhRMA company data should be more 
transparent on a global basis. 
First, generic pharmaceutical products must be excluded from price 
controls. The special case for government intervention in pharmaceutical 
prices derives from the monopoly market power granted by the state to 
patented drugs. Generic products do not generate patent rents, and thus 
should be exempt.197 
Second, virtual forms of dysfunctional arbitrage must be blocked. High 
income markets should not utilize developing country differential prices as 
an external reference price within these countries.198 At present, this is not 
a problem, as it appears that no high income country uses donor prices in 
its reference pricing system. 
Third, price controls must be stable over long periods of time. 
Pharmaceutical research requires long lead times before marketing. 
Companies should receive accurate ex ante pricing signals that are 
reliable. Otherwise, companies will discount the current price signals for 
the political risk of more onerous price controls. 
Fourth, the heuristic prefers optimization over price-fixing and 
 
 197. Internal reference pricing systems may refer to generic prices within the therapeutic 
class, but generics themselves should not be reimbursed under an internal reference 
pricing system. Inclusion is not warranted, and may actually keep the generic prices 
artificially high. No pro-innovation goal is served by artificially high generic prices, other 
than a very indirect and inefficient subsidy of the innovator companies. 
 198. F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, The Economics of TRIPS Options for Access to Medicines, 
in ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 32, 48-49 (arguing for a ban on 
external reference pricing which uses prices in low income nations). Just like physical 
arbitrage, this practice should be restricted only when it flows from poor to rich nations. 
External reference pricing within high income countries, or within low and middle income 
countries does not undermine differential pricing for the poor. But see Scherer & Watal, 
supra, at 49 (suggesting preventing parallel exports from any price-controlled country). 
Danzon and Towse address the external reference pricing problem by suggesting increased 
pricing obscurity and opacity so that the rock-bottom prices are not “directly observable.” 
DANZON & TOWSE, supra note 12, at 6, 16-17. Their solution is vigorously rejected by 
Médecins sans Frontières, which has been very active in negotiating price discounts and 
distributing ARVs in sub-Saharan Africa. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151; MSF, 
SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 7. 
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reference pricing. In this context, the policy goal should be to take the 
widest possible advantage of nonrival access, limited only by setting the 
minimum level of rents necessary to ensure optimal R&D. Any 
modifications to the strength of the power to appropriate rents must be 
evaluated in this light, whether it falls in the domain of IP law, contract, 
market regulation, national drug regulation, or trade agreements. 
By contrast, price-fixing implies a price level without considering these 
other issues. Reference pricing schemes also may proceed automatically. 
By contrast, the reimbursement systems in Australia and the United 
Kingdom illustrate two different optimization approaches which support 
innovation. 
In Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), each new drug 
must be approved under an economic evaluation process if governmental 
reimbursement is desired. The company must submit a dossier to the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) proposing a price 
for the drug and supporting the economic efficiency of that price, given 
the drug’s clinical advantages over existing therapies. In other words, 
Australia pays for value: Highly innovative drugs receive a much higher 
price; me-too drugs are priced with the lowest-cost equivalent. The 
incentives are obvious.199 
The United Kingdom’s National Institute of Clinical Effectiveness 
(NICE) also performs economic evaluation of drugs, but targets a drug 
company’s UK return on investment for its drug portfolio to the FTSE 100 
London stock market index. One can argue about transfer pricing games 
and whether the FTSE 100 is an appropriate target, but the overall 
structure of the program is designed to support a reasonable return on 
R&D investment.200 
Finally, greater transparency is warranted. Although biological data 
from clinical trials is generally applicable worldwide, many NDRAs accept 
confidentiality restrictions on data submitted for marketing approval and 
 
 199. LOKUGE & FAUNCE, supra note 166, at 7-8; SANJOY ROY, W. VA. PHARM. COST MGMT. 
COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL REFERENCE PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT: 
ANALYSIS OF THE AUSTRALIAN PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME 12-23 (2004), 
http://www.wvc.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/default.cfm. 
 200. JOAN-RAMON BORRELL, PRICES OF MEDICINES: A CASE-STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE 
RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 22 (Univ. of Barcelona Working 
Paper, 1997) (finding the regulation largely ineffective in controlling UK medicine prices); 
SARAH F. JAGGAR, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-30, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: 
SPENDING CONTROLS IN FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 69-77 (1994) (France, Germany, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom). 
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reimbursement, needlessly reinventing the wheel each time. These 
unnecessary costs raise rents without social benefit. The economic 
evaluation studies submitted to the Australian PBAC would be very helpful 
in formulary and reimbursement decisions worldwide.201 Further, if certain 
forms of price controls are adopted, optimizing pharmaceutical rents will 
require accurate global data on pharmaceutical pricing, profitability, and 
innovation. This information is not currently available to independent 
researchers, forcing policy makers to rely on the DiMasi study of secret and 
unverified industry data.202 It strains credulity to base important 
pharmaceutical policy decisions on secret industry data, unavailable for 
study by other researchers. 
vii. Free Riders 
The heuristic has additional implications for the free rider problem in 
pharmaceutical innovation. If the free rider is a low income country (or 
low income person), we can consider the situation either a gift or harmless 
nonrival use.203 Free riding by high income countries is a more complicated 
problem. 
Most high income countries have created direct or indirect 
governmental reimbursement of prescription drugs. One cannot expect 
governments to passively accept third degree differential pricing dictated 
by the drug companies. Nor do governments accept Ramsey Optimal 
Pricing based upon the government’s ability to pay. Governmental 
resources are too scarce to completely resist the monopsony power, with 
the possible (temporary) exception of the United States.204 
Acting solely in the national interest, governments may negotiate for 
the lowest possible prices, unconcerned about the possible negative global 
 
 201. Outterson, supra note 193, at 260-61. 
 202. DiMasi et al., supra note 29. The R&D expenditure data source for this study was a 
“confidential survey” returned from ten PhRMA companies, id. at 152, 156, as well as 
unverified PhRMA aggregate data, id. at 179. 
 203. Scherer, Global Welfare, supra note 135, at 1141. 
 204. The federal government is prohibited from exercising monopsony powers in the 
new Medicare Part D drug benefit. Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 Stat 2066 (to be codified at § 
1808(c)(1)(C) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 139b-9). However, the United States is 
not entirely immune to rate-setting inclinations in health care. Almost every other major 
health care good or service purchased by Medicare or Medicaid is subject to rate-setting, 
including the services of physicians, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, and home 
health agencies. 
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effects on innovation. PhRMA companies may respond by raising prices in 
uncontrolled markets. The United States is the largest such market. Put 
bluntly, high income countries with price controls are said to be free riders 
on American innovation.205 
Whether the free rider thesis is true empirically is an open question.206 
Perhaps the crusade against the scourge of low-priced drugs is misplaced. 
Perhaps American prices are supra-optimal, and Canadian prices are 
optimal.207 Other countries may make up for their lower prices with higher 
volumes, eliminating the free rider problem. In many EU countries, drug 
prices are lower but account for a higher percentage of health expenditure 
than in the United States.208 It may be unfair to label such countries as free 
riders. Empirical doubts are also raised when the United States tolerates 
significant domestic free riders without apparent harm. Canadian prices 
are similar to the Federal Supply Schedule. Some Medicaid rebates and the 
U.S. Public Health Service’s 340b program get better deals than Australia 
or Canada.209 Before one picks up stones to cast, check the glazing at home. 
PhRMA companies act as if the empirical question is beyond doubt, 
proceeding apace to the solution phase. Answering these questions 
properly requires transparent access to confidential company data. In any 
event, free riding is an innovation problem only if global pharmaceutical 
rents are sub-optimal. 
The current PhRMA company solution is to use U.S. free trade 
agreements to raise drug prices outside of the United States.210 To this end, 
 
 205. U.S. Editorial, Lower US Prices Through Higher International Prices, 9 PHARMA PRICING & 
REIMBURSEMENT 222 (2004). 
 206. Kevin Outterson, Free Trade Against Free Riders?, 9 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT 
254-55 (2004). 
 207. I thank Professor Jim Friedberg for this suggestion. The free rider hypothesis 
assumes a joint sunk cost, but another possibility is that lower-priced countries such as 
Canada are efficiently avoiding waste. One empirical study suggests that PhRMA companies 
still make sufficient profits on Canadian sales, undercutting the free rider hypothesis. SAGER 
& SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 1. 
 208. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2004, tbl.14 (2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,2340,en_2825_495642_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(noting that Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK have higher total 
expenditures on pharmaceuticals as a percentage of total expenditure on health as 
compared to the United States).  
 209. WEST VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 175, app. A-2, A-2 (comparing Medicaid, private 
payor, 340b, Canadian, FSS, and Australian data).  
 210. Peter Drahos & David Henry, The Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the United 
States: Undermines Australian Public Health and Protects U.S. Interests in Pharmaceuticals, 328 
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USTR recently created the post of Assistant United States Trade 
Representative for Pharmaceutical Policy. Bilateral treaties are an awkward 
response to this global coordination problem. USTR may succeed in 
raising drug prices in the least appropriate places. The greatest success will 
be found in the poorest countries, or other smaller countries desperately 
seeking preferential access to the U.S. market.211 Small, poor countries 
offered a free trade deal with the United States may well agree to 
provisions which undermine health in order to serve commercial interests. 
But these small and generally poor markets can make very little 
contribution to the global fight against pharmaceutical free riders. The 
U.S. stance should be the opposite: Low income markets are the best 
targets for the enlightened policy of nonrival access. 
If the USTR’s solution is to be significant for innovation, it must 
involve the EU and Japan, but the USTR will find them better positioned 
to resist bilateral U.S. pressure to modify sensitive domestic health policy. 
Nor is there any guarantee that increased prices abroad will result in lower 
prices in the United States. A strategy which depends upon offending 
America’s best trading partners should be preceded by proof that 
innovation and access will be improved. The ultimate free riders are 
counterfeiters, not governments, and any strategy to increase global 
pharmaceutical prices will increase the opportunity for counterfeits.212 
 
BRIT. MED. J. 1271-72 (2004); Elizabeth Becker, Drug Industry Seeks To Sway Prices Overseas, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at A5; Elizabeth Becker & Robert Pear, Trade Pact May Undercut 
Importing of Inexpensive Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004, at A1; Marilyn Werber Serafini, Drug 
Prices: A New Tack, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 2004, at 1177 (“So [House Speaker] Hastert and 
[Senator] Kyl championed the novel idea that the key to lowering U.S. prescription drug 
prices is to persuade foreign governments to raise their prices. . . .The idea of trying to level 
the international playing field on prescription drug pricing originated with the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. But Hastert and Kyl played significant roles last fall in persuading 
the Bush administration to embrace this strategy. . . .The result was the United States’ first 
free-trade agreement that included modest concessions on pharmaceutical price 
controls.”); Marilyn Werber Serafini, The Other Drug War, NAT’L J., Mar. 20, 2004, at 871-72; 
Mark B. McClellan, Speech Before the First International Colloquium on Generic Medicine 
(Sept.  25,  2003),  http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html.  
 McClellan’s speech was widely reported. See, e.g., Christopher Bowe & Geoff Dyer, Americans 
Lured by Lower Prices, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at 17 (“The rhetoric intensified in September 
when Mark McClellan, then head of the FDA, attacked European drug price controls and 
said other rich nations should pay more of the development cost for drugs.”). 
 211. Witness the TRIPS-plus provisions in negotiated or pending FTAs with Morocco, 
Singapore, Jordan, Israel, Central America (CAFTA), and the Western Hemisphere 
(FTAA). See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 212. Aidan Hollis may well be the first to make this connection to counterfeiting explicit. 
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Other forms of global coordination should be considered, such as James 
Love and Tim Hubbard’s Global R&D Treaty.213 The R&D Treaty would 
serve as a global coordination mechanism amongst the high income 
countries, while permitting prices to decline to marginal manufacturing 
costs since R&D would no longer be recovered through the price 
mechanism. At lower price levels, access is greatly improved and the 
opportunity for counterfeits diminishes. 
viii. Neglected and Global Diseases 
a. Neglected Disease Innovation Does Not Require Increased 
Appropriation of Pharmaceutical Rents in Low Income Countries 
Jean Lanjouw and Alan Sykes each support the enactment of IP laws in 
low income countries to encourage the development of local markets for 
treating neglected diseases.214 Lanjouw cites empirical results from India 
suggesting that implementation of TRIPS is encouraging the largest Indian 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D for new chemical entities 
(NCEs),215 but those NCEs are either me-too generics or target global 
diseases.216 Sykes argues that the huge disease burden in the developing 
 
Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation (July 2, 2004) 
(discussing prizes based upon therapeutic value) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) [hereinafter Hollis, Efficient Reward System]. See infra Subsection II.A.2 for a 
description of counterfeits.  
 213. JAMES LOVE, FROM TRIPS TO RIPS: A BETTER TRADE FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT 
INNOVATION IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to 
HIV/AIDS Care in Developing Countries, 2003); Hubbard, supra note 13; Love, supra note 
13. 
 214. JEAN O. LANJOUW, A PATENT POLICY PROPOSAL FOR GLOBAL DISEASES 4 (The Brookings 
Institution, Working paper No. 84, 2001) (on file with author); Sykes, supra note 25, at 58-
62.  
 215. JEAN O. LANJOUW, THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN 
INDIA: ‘HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR AND SUFFERING?’ (1998), http://papers. 
nber.org/papers/wb366. 
 216. Hannah E. Kettler & Rajiv Modi, Building Local Research and Development Capacity for 
the Prevention and Cure of Neglected Diseases: The Case of India, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
742, 744-45 (2001) (finding that Indian companies are likely to target the largest markets, 
i.e., for global diseases rather than neglected diseases). A decade after the signing of TRIPS, 
a leading Indian pharmaceutical company reports that indeed its R&D budgets are growing 
rapidly, from 2.7% of sales in 2000 to 7.6% in 2003 and a projected 10% in 2004, but the 
primary output are generic pharmaceuticals. Adam Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories: 
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world should stimulate markets if patents were available. He thus looks to 
use IP laws to extract a greater portion of consumer surplus from the 
developing poor, in order to strengthen the incentives to innovate.217 
Surely this burden should be imposed on the world’s poorest people only 
as a last resort. We should not demand the widow’s mite in order to fund 
PhRMA. 
 Moreover, strong IP laws in low income countries are simply and 
unfortunately insufficient to create new markets for neglected disease 
drugs. If most patients in such countries are unable to purchase neglected 
disease drugs in commercial quantities and prices, the offer of patent 
protection will not stimulate R&D.218 An exclusive offer to sell drugs at a 
loss is not valuable.219 Profit-maximizing Indian drug companies will focus 
 
Driving Growth 17-25 (Bear Stearns Healthcare Conference, Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories]. The primary new drug application 
filed by the company is amlodipine maleate, which is the salt version of an innovative drug, 
Norvasc. The NDA is being opposed in federal court by the innovator company. Id. at 20. 
Of the eight NCEs in the company’s pipeline, seven will treat global diseases such as 
diabetes, cancer, metabolic disorders, and cardiovascular disease. The eighth is an anti-
infective drug, also for global diseases, but with more applicability in developing countries. 
Id. at 27. These are hardly the type of innovations that Lanjouw hoped for, and in fact this 
activity could hurt global innovation by reducing expected rents to innovator companies 
through early generic entry by aggressive Indian companies. 
 217. Sykes, supra note 25, at 61-62. Notably, Sykes has critiqued F.M. Scherer on the 
question of the net value of IP laws for developing countries. 
 218. The relative size of the commercial and non-commercial markets is important here. 
The growth of India and China’s middle and upper classes one day will be sufficient to 
support commercial pricing of innovative drugs for conditions endemic only to the 
developing world. PhRMA companies do recognize a growing middle class market in these 
nations. Merck, SEC Form 10-k, supra note 173, at 14 (“In recent years, the Company has 
been expanding its operations in countries located in Latin America, the Middle East, 
Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific where changes in government policies and 
economic conditions are making it possible for the Company to earn fair returns. Business 
in these developing areas, while sometimes less stable, offers important opportunities for 
growth over time.”). 
 219. Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 
WISC. INT’L L.J. 563, 574 (2002) (casting doubt on the efficacy of patents to improve R&D 
on neglected drugs); see Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 742 (noting that Indian 
pharmaceutical companies will still require financial incentives to research and develop 
drugs for neglected diseases). A recent study of neglected vaccine projects found patent 
incentives to be completely ineffective. JASON C. HSU & EDUARDO S. SCHWARTZ, A MODEL OF 
R&D VALUATION AND THE DESIGN OF RESEARCH INCENTIVES 37, 43-45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10041, 2003). 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS V:1 (2005) 
246 
on their best economic opportunities;220 neglected disease drugs will not be 
at the top of that list.221 The leading Indian drug companies derive most of 
their profits from sales in the United States and other high income 
markets.222 Nor are strong IP laws important to develop indigenous 
manufacturing capacity. The absence of pharmaceutical patents in India 
was the proximate cause of India’s vibrant generic pharmaceutical sector. 
Implementation of TRIPS and restrictions on PEPFAR procurement will 
hinder this path of development.223 
Developing non-OEDC pharmaceutical R&D capacity has the potential 
to improve the efficiency of global research. Non-OECD PhRMA 
companies may have significantly lower cost structures, enabling R&D on 
disease markets with less market potential. Cipla, Ltd. and other Indian 
pharmaceutical companies pay their India-based chemists and investigators 
a fraction of the prevailing OECD pharmaceutical company research 
wages. These companies may also be better poised to understand and 
respond to the developing market and less likely to discount the actual 
market size due to unfamiliarity. Network effects and sunk costs are also 
present in pharmaceutical sales and marketing: While OECD companies 
have invested in marketing systems in OECD countries, emerging 
companies may invest in regional markets heretofore overlooked by OECD 
 
 220. Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 745. For the leading Indian pharmaceutical 
company, in early 2004 only a negligible percentage of sales were of New Chemical Entities 
(NCEs). Most sales were either active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs, i.e. intermediate 
ingredients for drugs) to the United States and Europe or branded (generic) formulations 
sold in India and other similar markets. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, supra note 216, at 
9-10. 
 221. Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain Cockburn, New Pills for Poor People?: Empirical Evidence After 
GATT, 29 WORLD DEV. 265, 265-89 (2001) (finding in 1998 survey of Indian drug firms that 
only 16% of the firms’ R&D targeted developing country markets). In fiscal year 2002-2003, 
Cipla’s major innovative introduction was TIOVA, a long-acting bronchodilator for Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), a global disease. Cipla also launched a new 
generic ARV Fixed Dose Combination (FDC). CIPLA, SIXTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 2002-
2003, at 5 [hereinafter CIPLA 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 222. See, e.g., CIPLA 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 7 (“During the year, 
Cipla’s strategic alliances with leading generic companies in the USA and Europe were 
expanded to include additional products and projects. Currently, there are nearly 50 such 
projects in various stages of development in the USA alone.”); Rasul Bailay, Cipla May Find 
Right Rx for Success: Indian Drug Firm Partners with Peers in U.S. To Crack No. 1 Market for 
Generics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at A15. For Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, the U.S. market 
accounted for fifty-seven percent of 2003 gross margin. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, 
supra note 216, at 11.  
 223. On PEPFAR procurement, see infra Subsection II.B.1.  
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companies224 and invest in process developments to lower production 
costs.225 
Most neglected disease conditions lack a market not because of the 
absence of IP rights in low income countries but because of the poverty of 
the patients. Perhaps the best description of a neglected disease drug is 
that market-based innovation is unlikely because the target population will 
require the drug or vaccine to be distributed at or below the lowest 
possible marginal cost of production. Any such drug will require non-
market funding for innovation and distribution, with or without IP 
regimes. 
Michael Kremer’s model of a donor purchase commitment is a 
prominent example of a non-market mechanism,226 attracting many 
commentators on the proper design of such a prize.227 Prize systems and 
donor purchase commitments do not require IP laws in low income 
countries. The donor may reference the patent law of some country (such 
as the United States), without requiring the target populations to have any 
IP laws at all. The appropriate incentives are in place so long as the donor 
is bound to a credible commitment to act as if they are bound by the IP 
laws of a reference country such as the United States. This process would 
create a “reference” or “virtual” IP regime. This is a significant point, not 
well developed by supporters of TRIPS implementation in low income 
countries. Virtual IP regimes would achieve all of the claimed advantages 
of TRIPS implementation in low income countries for prizes, without the 
blocking effects of local IP laws. 
 
 224. India, Russia, China, Brazil, Mexico, Africa, and other markets are major markets 
for Indian companies such as Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories. Levitt, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, 
supra note 216, at 17; see also Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 743 (describing the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 225. Kettler & Modi, supra note 216, at 743-45. But Kettler and Modi do not assume an 
Indian comparative advantage in cost. 
 226. Michael Kremer has thoughtfully analyzed and articulated the donor purchase 
commitment model. Michael Kremer, Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part I: Rationale & 
Part II: Design Issues, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 35-109 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001). 
 227. See, e.g., Hollis, Efficient Reward System, supra note 212; Michael Abramowicz, 
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (concluding that 
optional reward systems are superior to IP rights systems). 
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b. Global Disease Innovation Does Not Require Increased 
Appropriation of  Pharmaceutical Rents in Low Income Countries 
The neglected disease debate tends to overlook the fact that the 
chronic conditions of the high income and low income worlds are 
converging.228 Global diseases229—conditions which affect patients in both 
rich and poor countries—include cancer and cardiovascular disease,230 as 
well as AIDS.231 
 
 228. Non-communicable disease accounts for forty-seven percent of the global burden of 
disease. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY ON DIET, PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND 
HEALTH (May 22, 2004). Cancer and cardiovascular disease are the second and third largest 
causes of death in developing countries. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003 
(2003). Stephen Leeder et al., A RACE AGAINST TIME: THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR 
DISEASE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 12-15 (2004) (“In 1998, non-communicable diseases 
were responsible for 59% of total global mortality and 43% of the global burden of disease. 
Importantly, 78% of [non-communicable disease] deaths were borne by low- and middle 
income countries, as was 85% of the NCD burden of disease . . . nearly 50% of deaths 
worldwide were due to CVD, diabetes, cancer and chronic lung disease.”). PhRMA agrees 
with this position when it argues that the current “Western oriented” R&D program actually 
includes diseases endemic to the entire world, such as cancer and CVD. Response of the 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry to the Interim Report of the Task Force on Access 
to Essential Medicines (Feb. 1, 2004), reprinted in DUKES, supra note 84, app. 2, at 7-8. 
 229. Herein, the term global disease refers to conditions for which a therapeutic market 
exists in high income countries, and the condition is also endemic to the low or middle 
income world. The definition of global disease is not static. Malaria was once a global 
disease, but is now largely eradicated in high income countries, rendering it neglected. 
Diseases may also move in the opposite direction. Increased international mobility is likely 
to further blur the epidemiological effect of political borders, causing neglected diseases to 
migrate into the global disease category. The eastward expansion of the EU is importing 
additional infectious disease threats into the EU, requiring enhanced public health 
responses to tuberculosis and AIDS. Richard J. Coker et al., Health-care System Frailties and 
Public Health Control of Communicable Disease on the European Union’s New Eastern Border, 363 
THE LANCET 1389-92 (2004). 
 230. Carlos Correa interprets the Doha Declaration to include global diseases such as 
asthma and cancer. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at 5. Others ask why 
diseases such as cancer and diabetes are not covered by Doha. Julian Fleet, U.N. Approach to 
Access to Essential AIDS Medications, Intellectual Property Law and the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 17 
EMORY INT’L L. J. 451, 465 (2003). 
 231. North America and Western Europe account for less than two million of the thirty-
four to forty-six million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2003. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS 
EPIDEMIC UPDATE 37 (2003) [hereinafter UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE]. While 
AIDS is a global disease, at least two market failures plague public health. First, one strain of 
AIDS (Type A) is largely confined to the developing world, and thus receives less research 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
 PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE 
249 
As an example of crossover potential of global diseases, consider the 
WHO Prequalification Project. The WHO has requested prequalification 
dossiers on four cancer drugs (vinblastine, etoposide, bleomycin and 
vincristine)232 and two have been prequalified.233 These drugs are all related 
to the treatment of AIDS-related cancers and are off-patent in the United 
States.234 For the treatment of TB, the WHO prequalified non-licensed 
generic forms of patented ciprofloxacin from India and Spain.235 But these 
drugs may be used to treat conditions other than TB and AIDS related 
cancers.236 The Doha Declaration was not limited to these three diseases, 
despite U.S. efforts to narrow the exception.237 
To the pharmaceutical industry, extending nonrival access to global 
disease drugs outside of AIDS, malaria, and TB opens Pandora’s Box. 
Roger Bate acknowledges that the United States negotiated to limit 
flexibilities to twenty two diseases, keeping “lifestyle complaints and major 
western diseases” off the table.238 Nonrival access should not be limited to 
these three diseases, or narrow “on label” uses, but should be extended to 
any global disease, on the basis of global disease burden and public health 
need. Furthermore, this extension will not adversely affect innovation. The 
most important proposition about global diseases is that a robust level of 
 
attention. Second, pediatric AIDS is also primarily a developing country issue, including the 
debates over the use of Nevirapine and the absence of pediatric formulations of most AIDS 
drugs. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING 
GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (4th ed. 2003) (“Children 
living with HIV/AIDS are one of the most neglected populations: pediatric formulations 
are lacking and/or formulations do not meet children’s and caregivers’ needs . . . 
unpleasant tasting syrup, tablets too big to swallow, need to refrigerate some products, 
unbreakable tablets, lack of fixed dose combinations, and non-adapted dosages. For 
example there are currently no combinations for paediatric use.”).  
 232. WORLD HEATH ORG., ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTICS OF ACCEPTABLE 
QUALITY, PROCUREMENT QUALITY AND SOURCING PROJECT (15th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WHO 
HIV/AIDS PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed.], http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/. 
 233. Those two drugs are vinblastine and vincristine. WHO HIV/AIDS 
PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed., supra note 232. 
 234. FDA ORANGE BOOK (Oct. 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm. 
 235. WHO HIV/AIDS PREQUALIFICATION, 15th ed., supra note 232. 
 236. According to the FDA label, vincristine is indicated in acute leukemia, Hodgkin’s 
disease, non-Hodgkin’s malignant lymphomas, rhabdomyosarcoma, neuroblastoma, and 
Wilms’ tumor. Ciprofloxacin is a widely used antibiotic. 
 237. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, at vii, 15-16 (discussing the 
definition of emergency); ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 39-42. 
 238. Roger Bate, Entire IP System Could Easily Fall, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 18, 2003, at 
10. 
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innovation is assured by high income markets alone. A few hundred 
thousand early AIDS cases in the United States (and government funding) 
were sufficient to encourage successful research programs.239 Likewise, 
aggressive research programs are underway to treat most or all of the 
chronic conditions endemic in the high income countries. Since global 
disease knowledge is nonrival, it can be offered to low income populations 
without detriment. With innovation assured, IP law can stand aside and 
permit nonrival access for the poor. 
Together, these implications suggest a new approach to the 
innovation-access conundrum, calling for a radical re-evaluation of the role 
of TRIPS and other laws to encourage nonrival access, with substantial 
potential gains in global public health. 
II. THE PRAXIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE 
In Part II of this Article, the theory of pharmaceutical arbitrage will be 
placed in two different contexts: the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa and 
prescription drug importation from Canada to the United States. 
Certain forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are dysfunctional—for 
example, diversion of differentially priced ARVs from sub-Saharan 
countries into high income countries. Other forms of arbitrage benefit 
consumers without damaging optimal innovation. The desirability of 
Canadian-U.S. pharmaceutical arbitrage hinges on whether global 
pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal or not and whether one credits the 
safety of Canadian sourced drugs. If global pharmaceutical rents are supra-
optimal and safety concerns properly addressed, then U.S. consumers are 
needlessly overcharged for patented drugs, and many unnecessarily suffer 
negative health outcomes from restricted access. 
A. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage of AIDS Drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
PhRMA companies have been reluctant to make patented ARV drugs 
available on a nonrival basis in sub-Saharan Africa. Fear of pharmaceutical 
arbitrage and undermining IP laws are the purported causes of this 
reluctance. Delayed treatment has been the proximate cause of the death 
of millions. Applying the theory of pharmaceutical arbitrage to AIDS may 
transcend the competing goals of innovation and access, by improving 
access while supporting optimal R&D. 
 
 239. Indeed, many early AIDS-related drugs qualified for orphan drug status in the 
United States when the expected U.S. market was fewer than 200,000 persons. Salbu, supra 
note 103, at 703-07. 
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1. Financial Constraints Limit Access to AIDS Drugs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Globally, AIDS is not under control, with approximately forty million 
persons living with HIV/AIDS worldwide.240 Ninety-five percent live outside 
of North America and Western Europe. Two-thirds of infected persons, 
new infections, and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa.241 An estimated 5.5 
million people in developing countries need ARV treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, but only five percent of those currently receive it; in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2003, only one percent of the people who need ARV 
therapy actually receive it.242 Large scale roll-out of ARV therapy in low 
income countries is now a major global public health goal.243 
Purchasing AIDS drugs at U.S. prices is not an option for the vast 
majority of these people. The per capita annual cost of a popular first-line 
ARV in the United States is $7215,244 and the recently introduced Fuzeon 
(enfuvirtide) costs $20,000 per year.245 The annual per capita health 
expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa averages $29.30246 and range from $12 
 
 240. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 231, at 2. While much progress 
has been made, AIDS is not fully under control in high income countries. In 2003, 66,000 
to 94,000 persons were newly infected with HIV in North America and Western Europe. Id. 
at 38. But these numbers are quite small when compared to sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
health and longevity of the U.S. patients have improved. Id. at 28-30 (“AIDS mortality 
continues to drop, thanks to the widespread availability of antiretroviral treatment.”). 
 241. UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 231, at 38; Robert Greener, 
UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS and Absorptive Capacity (Kaiser Family Foundation HealthCast, Jan. 29, 
2004) (2003 data) [hereinafter Greener, UNAIDS], http://www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1066.  
 242. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 2, 5; UN To Seek $6 Billion To 
Fight AIDS in Third World, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2003.  
 243. INST. OF MED., SCALING UP TREATMENT FOR THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC: CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES (2004); World Health Assembly, Scaling up Treatment, supra note 190. 
 244. Sixty tablets of Combivir cost $592.99. Drugstore.com, at http://www.drugstore.com 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
 245. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Medical Dilemma: Costly New Drug for AIDS Means Some Go Without, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at A1. Fuzeon is the first fusion inhibitor treatment for HIV, 
developed at Duke University. Ironically, high cost has forced the North Carolina AIDS 
assistance project to strictly ration the number of residents who can receive the treatment. 
Duke University: North Carolina Firm’s New AIDS Drug Development On Hold, U-WIRE, Jan. 22, 
2004, 2004 WL 59460572 (“Steve Sherman, director of North Carolina’s ADAP, said the 
program set a cap for 25 state residents to be eligible for Fuzeon treatment at any one time, 
creating a system of rationing medical care.”). Other states such as Alabama have decided 
the cost is too high to cover the drug at all, despite its effectiveness. Fuhrmans, supra. 
 246. WORLD BANK, 2004 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2004) (citing 2001 data). 
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(Malawi) to $253 (South Africa).247 Radically reducing the price of AIDS 
medications for the poor is thus a necessary condition to extending ARV 
treatments to millions of afflicted persons worldwide.248 Indeed, for many 
patients, the drugs must be free. Recognizing the important public health 
issues, Brazil,249 India,250 South Africa,251 and China252 produce generic ARVs 
for the poor, provoking conflicts between human rights and IP rights. 
The European Commission has embraced voluntary “tiered 
[differential] pricing as the principal means of rendering essential 
medicines affordable . . . to the poorest populations.”253 Differential pricing 
is possible because of relatively low marginal costs of production. Most 
patented drugs can be produced relatively cheaply, absent R&D cost 
recovery. The primary variable expenses are direct manufacturing costs, 
which are a small fraction of the retail prices of patented ARVs. A high 
ratio of retail prices to direct manufacturing costs enables a company to 
sell at highly differentiated prices without selling below marginal cost.254 
 
 247. Id.; see also Markus Haacker, Providing Health Care to HIV Patients in Southern Africa, in 
ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 242, 244. After adjustments for 
purchasing power parity, Haacker’s figures rise to $44.8 (Malawi) and $552.3 (South 
Africa). 
 248. Funds for ARVs and drugs to treat opportunistic infections are scarce. UNAIDS 
estimates these needs at approximately thirty-seven percent of the total $10.7 billion which 
should be spent on HIV/AIDS in 2005 for a comprehensive response. Total unmet financial 
need in 2005 is projected at approximately five billion dollars. Greener, UNAIDS, supra 
note 241. If these drugs were available at a much lower cost, resources could be redeployed 
to prevention and other unmet priorities. 
 249. ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 32-33. 
 250. Mark Schoofs, Clinton Program Would Help Poor Nations Get AIDS Drugs, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2003, at B1 (Indian and South African drug companies); see also CIPLA 2002-2003 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 7 (“In HIV/AIDS care, the Company continued its 
pioneering role in making available a range of antiretroviral drugs including unique 
combination products. These were made available at reasonable prices not only in India but 
also in other parts of the world.”). 
 251. Schoofs, supra note 250 (Indian and South African drug companies); ‘t Hoen, supra 
note 7, at 30-31 (describing South Africa’s efforts to provide royalty-free ARVs to its 
population and the legal and political challenges to those actions by the United States and 
PhRMA companies). 
 252. Jim Yardley, China Begins Giving Free H.I.V./AIDS Drugs to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2003, at A3. 
 253. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 2.2. Low income countries targeted for essential 
medications by the EU had a per capita income of less than $765 in 2000. 
 254. SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 7 (roughly estimating marginal U.S. 
manufacturing and distribution costs for prescription drugs to be 9.9%). 
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While the public does not know the true marginal manufacturing costs 
of most patented drugs, differential pricing and generic production 
provide useful proxies.255 Differential pricing ratios currently exceed 30:1 
in ARV drugs, implying marginal costs of production in the range of 3 to 
4%. For example, in November 2003, a daily dose of GlaxoSmithKline’s 
best selling combination ARV drug Combivir256 costs about $19.76 per day 
or $7215 per year by mail order in the United States.257 In sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2003, GlaxoSmithKline sells Combivir to health agencies at ninety 
cents per day or $329 per year,258 and has announced a new non-profit 
price of sixty-five cents per day.259 Even this low price may not reflect 
GlaxoSmithKline’s marginal cost, because Cipla sells a generic form of 
Combivir to governments and nonprofit agencies at thirty-three cents per 
day or $197.10 per year.260 The differential pricing ratio for Combivir is 
 
 255. Compulsory licensure enables ex-factory pricing closer to true marginal 
manufacturing cost, particularly if the tender process is competitive. Generic competition 
pierces the pricing veil, accelerates differential pricing toward true marginal production 
costs, and does not rely on public disclosure of confidential financial information from the 
companies. Given the endemic opacity of all PhRMA data on costs, perhaps the best way to 
calculate marginal cost is through compulsory licensure. PhRMA simply asserts that “there 
is no guarantee that generic companies will price at marginal cost.” Response of the 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry to the Interim Report of the Task Force on Access 
to Essential Medicines, supra note 228, reprinted in DUKES, supra note 84, app. 2, at 27. 
Absent the patent monopoly, generic companies in a competitive environment will certainly 
price much closer to marginal cost than PhRMA companies. 
 256. Combivir is a fixed dose combination (FDC) of 300 mg zidovudine (ZDV or AZT) 
and 150 mg of lamivudine (3TC). MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 13. The 
best clinical FDC also adds a NNRTI. Gregory K. Robbins et al., Comparison of Sequential 
Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2003); 
Robert W. Shafer et al., Comparison of Four-Drug Regimens and Pairs of Sequential Three-Drug 
Regimens as Initial Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2304 (2003). 
 257. Calculation of the U.S. price comes from Drugstore.com, at 
http://www.drugstore.com (sixty tablets of Combivir for $592.99, taken twice per day) (last 
visited July 7, 2004). 
 257. ‘t Hoen, supra note 7, at 32-33. 
 258. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 13. 
 259. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 4, http://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
 260. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15. GSK itself also issued a voluntary 
license to Aspen Pharmacare for production of generic Combivir. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 
2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, supra note 259, at 29. Aspen’s price is not yet listed in the 
pricing guide. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15. 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS V:1 (2005) 
254 
approximately 35:1.261 This ratio is likely to increase: MSF aims for an 
annual per patient cost of fifty to one hundred dollars in the near future.262 
The organization notes that achieving the lowest possible price is an 
urgent necessity: “If you have the option of spending $200 per person per 
year or $600 per person per year, and you’re electing to spend $600, that 
means you’re treating one person when you could be treating three.”263 
Triomune is Cipla’s brand name for the most important triple-drug 
therapy fixed dose combination (FDC) for sub-Saharan Africa, containing 
nevirapine (NVP), stavudine (d4T), and lamivudine (3TC). Triomune is 
produced as a generic by Cipla Ltd. and sold for sixty-seven cents per day 
or US$244 per year.264 As of July 2004, Triomune is not available in a 
licensed FDC form, a rare inversion in which a generic is a sole-source 
supplier.265 The patents for nevirapine, stavudine, and lamivudine are held 
by different companies,266 and they are apparently unable to conclude a 
cross-licensing agreement. Triomune’s components, taken as six separate 
pills per day, cost about $936 per month in the United States, a ratio 
exceeding 46:1.267 
High differential pricing ratios are not limited to ARVs. Ciprofloxacin 
is available in generic form in Africa at $0.0189 per 500 mg tablet;268 in the 
U.S. retail market it sells for about five dollars a pill,269 a ratio of 264:1. A 
high ratio is not necessarily a bad thing; in fact, if nonrival access is truly 
 
 261. The numerator is $7215, and the denominator is $204. 
 262. MSF, SURMOUNTING CHALLENGES, supra note 141, at 9. As of 2004, the WHO 3 x 5 
program estimates the per person per year cost for first-line drugs at US$304. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2004: CHANGING HISTORY 30 (2004). 
 263. Ellen Nakashima & David Brown, U.S. Rule on AIDS Drugs Criticized: Ban on Using Aid 
To Buy Foreign Generics Hinders Treatment, Experts Say, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A12 
(quoting Rachel Cohen of MSF). 
 264. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 15. 
 265. UNICEF-UNAIDS-MSF, SOURCES AND PRICES OF SELECTED MEDICINES AND 
DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS 18 (2004) (NVP + D4T + 3TC fixed dose 
combination not available in the US).  
 266. FDA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 234.  
 267. Epivir (lamivudine) costs about $9 per day or $270 per month; Zerit (stavudine) 
costs about $10.51 per day or $316 per month; Viramune (nevirapine) costs about $11.67 
per day or $350 per month. All data is in U.S. dollars and is taken from 
http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 8, 2004). The ratio numerator is $936, and the 
denominator is $20. 
 268. Management Sciences for Health, International Drug Price Indicator Guide, at 
http://erc.msh.org/dmpguide/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
 269. Drugstore.com, at http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 8, 2004). 
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provided to the world’s poorest communities, one would expect to find 
very large differential pricing rations. 
2. IP Laws Hinder Delivery of ARVs in sub-Saharan Africa 
In a widely-cited 2001 study, Attaran and Gillespie-White demonstrated 
the relative paucity of ARV patents in many sub-Saharan countries.270 This 
article has been widely interpreted to claim that patents do not hinder 
ARV access in sub-Saharan Africa.271 Attaran published a follow-on report 
in Health Affairs in 2004, again suggesting that patents have not been the 
major hindrance to ARV access.272 This conclusion is not warranted from 
the data. 
ARVs were available in the high income countries for many years 
before the developing world first began to receive treatment.273 As recently 
 
 270. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access 
to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1186 (2001). After the manuscript was submitted, 
Merck gave a $25,000 grant. Several critical letters to the editor were printed in the next 
volume of the journal. Boelaert et al., supra note 141, at 840-41; Eric Goemaere et al., Letter 
to the Editor, 287 JAMA 841 (2002); Michael J. Selgelid & Udo Schuklenk, Letter to the 
Editor, 287 JAMA 842 (2002) (“In the world of politics the carefully qualified conclusions of 
Attaran and Gillespie-White are likely to be misrepresented by pharmaceutical industry 
lobbyists claiming that ‘it has been shown that patents do not matter,’ with the aim of 
blocking proposed TRIPS agreement amendments that weaken pharmaceutical patent 
protection in developing countries.”). In their reply to these letters, Attaran and Gillespie-
White do not make the broad claim that patent laws are no barrier to ARVs in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but merely suggest that where patents exist, other alternatives can be pursued, such 
as voluntary licensure or switching to another therapy. Where patents do not exist, they call 
for generic production, ignoring the industrial infrastructure issue described above. Amir 
Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, In Reply, 287 JAMA 842-43 (2002); see also Amir Attaran, How 
Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries?, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 155 (2004). 
 271. LANJOUW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, at 11-12 (“[I]ndustry uses this fact 
[the Attaran & Gillespie-White study] to stress that patents in the poorest countries are not 
impeding access to drugs.”); see also, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patents, Patients and Developing 
Countries: Access, Innovation and the Political Dimensions of Trade Policy, in ECONOMICS OF 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, supra note 3, at 100, 106 n.10. Bale is the head of the international 
PhRMA company trade association. 
 272. Attaran, supra note 270, at 156 (“Briefly, I find that patents for essential medicines 
are uncommon in poor countries and cannot readily explain why access to those medicines 
is often lacking, suggesting that poverty, not patents, imposes the greater limitation on 
access.”). 
 273. Combination therapy was available in the United States from December 1995 with 
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as 2002, no person in the developing world had received ARVs through 
official donor support from any country or multilateral institution.274 When 
MSF and Partners In Health independently began ARV treatment in 
Thailand, South Africa, and Haiti in 2000 and 2001, some were puzzled at 
their attempts, due to costs per patient exceeding $10,000 to $15,000 for 
patented drugs.275 Access to AIDS medications was discussed at the highest 
levels at the WHO as early as 1991,276 and at the International AIDS 
Conference in Durban in 2000.277 Thirteen years later, in 2004, the world is 
just beginning to scale-up toward universal provision of ARVs, and it is still 
expected to take a long time to achieve. Precious years were lost because 
the drugs were too expensive for the developing world, and they were too 
expensive because of patent protection and fears of arbitrage.278 Millions 
 
the approval of the first protease inhibitors, Invirase (SQV) on December 7, 1995 and 
Crixivan (IDV) and Norvir (r) in early 1996. Lamivudine was approved for marketing in the 
United States on November 17, 1995. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control was well aware 
of the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa no later than the mid-1980s. RANDY SHILTS, 
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 49, 193, 392-93, 460 
(1988) (“Equatorial Africans faced death on the scale of the Holocaust.”) (citing Dr. Don 
Francis, CDC AIDS Research, June 1984). 
 274. African HIV/AIDS Crisis: Pursuing Both Treatment and Prevention: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Subcomm. on African Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement 
of Jeffrey D. Sachs). 
 275. As of December 2000, the World Bank still considered ARV treatment in poor 
countries to be “cost-ineffective.” See Barton Gellman, An Unequal Calculus of Life and Death; 
As Millions Perished in Pandemic, Firms Debated Access to Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at 
A1 [hereinafter Gellman, Unequal Calculus]. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Esther Kaplan, Time’s Up, THE NATION, July 22, 2004, at 30, 30 (“It’s been four years 
since the International AIDS Conference was first held in the developing world, in Durban, 
South Africa, where the activist demand for universal treatment access was catapulted onto 
the world stage. Then, the idea of treating the millions of HIV-infected people worldwide 
was considered farfetched. . . .The official policy of wealthy nations was to focus on 
prevention and leave the millions already infected to die.”). 
 278. JOAN-RAMON BORRELL & JAYASHREE WATAL, IMPACT OF PATENTS ON ACCESS TO 
HIV/AIDS DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Center for Int’l Dev., Harvard Univ., CID 
Working Paper No. 92, 2002) (finding that a significant increase in ARV uptake would have 
resulted absent patents). This paper provides a static analysis which ignores the innovation 
question and does not model subsidized ARV markets. Had it done so, it might have 
demonstrated that patents have a much larger negative impact. Barton Gellman, A Turning 
Point That Left Millions Behind; Drug Discounts Benefit Few While Protecting Pharmaceutical 
Companies’ Profits, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2000, at A1 (“For a decade, makers of AIDS 
medications had rejected the idea of lowering prices in poor countries for fear of eroding 
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have died, untreated, for the principle of IP law. 
Attaran defends his conclusions by identifying many sub-Saharan 
countries wherein patents had not been filed for some ARVs. This fact is 
both misleading and irrelevant because the sub-Saharan countries where 
patents have not been filed did not possess the domestic industrial base to 
manufacture ARVs.279 Throughout almost all of 2004, only one company 
was producing generic ARVs in Africa—South Africa’s Aspen 
Pharmacare.280 As one might expect, Attaran finds Aspen’s home market, 
South Africa, to be effectively covered by patent filings.  
With South Africa stymied, generic ARVs would have to be imported 
into sub-Saharan Africa from elsewhere, such as Brazil or India. Brazil was 
sued to block this practice,281 and India has faced a U.S.-requested WTO 
dispute resolution on its implementation of TRIPS for pharmaceuticals,282 
as well as U.S. “Special 301” threats.283 The USTR frequently used the 
Special 301 watch list to discipline countries attempting to produce 
generics, even if legal under domestic law or TRIPS.284  
The mere possibility of a patent filing is likely to act as a deterrent to 
the filing of generic drug applications and the creation of generic 
manufacturing capacity in sub-Saharan Africa, since the innovator could 
undercut the generic company’s market investment by tying them up in 
litigation. Unfortunately, the intended lessons of the United States’s 
attacks on Brazil, South Africa, and India were not lost on other 
developing countries: All but three of Africa’s least developed countries 
have implemented laws for pharmaceutical patents as of 2004, despite the 
 
profits in rich ones.”). 
 279. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF DOHA, supra note 137, annex 2. 
 280. Wendell Roelf, Aids Drugs Are Available—But Are There Enough?, MAIL & GUARDIAN, 
May 17, 2004. Thembalami Pharmaceuticals in South Africa is a joint venture with Indian 
producer Ranbaxy, importing the APIs from India. In July 2004, Archy Pharmaceuticals 
Limited commissioned the creation of a pharmaceutical plant in Nigeria to produce ARVs. 
Godwin Haruna, First HIV/AIDS Drug Plant Takes Off, THIS DAY (Lagos), July 28, 2004, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200407280351.html. By contrast, Asia has twenty-seven 
companies producing generic ARVs in eight countries. AMFAR, supra note 188, at 4. 
 281. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.  
 282. World Trade Org., India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); World Trade Org., India-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 283. U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2004), 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Special_
301/asset_upload_file16_5995.pdf. 
 284. Sell, TRIPS, supra note 142, at 492. 
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flexibility granted by the Doha Declaration to delay implementation until 
2016.285  
Procurement policies by donors also undercut Attaran’s argument. All 
of the AIDS/HIV drugs on the WHO Prequalification list are produced 
either in high income countries or in India,286 countries now covered by 
TRIPS.287 USTR and President’s Emergency Plan For HIV/AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) also hinder procurement of generic ARVs by multilateral and 
official donors.288 
The patent thicket effectively covers all sources of ARVs for Africa, 
forming an effective deterrent to ARV commercialization by generic 
companies, even in the absence of a formal patent filing in every sub-
Saharan country. Even today, treatment with generic ARVs occurs by either 
complying with TRIPS flexibilities, or by (temporary) forbearance by the 
United States and PhRMA. Perhaps Attaran and Gillespie-White should say 
that patent law should not be used to delay access any longer. If so, we are 
in agreement. But it is historical revisionism of the foulest kind to claim 
that patents did not matter over the last decade for access to cheap ARV 
therapy in Africa. 
3. Achieving Both Nonrival Access and Optimal Innovation 
Next I present my proposals for maximizing public health while 
optimizing innovation, in light of the urgent problem of access illustrated 
by this case study. Nonrival access is embraced, whether through voluntary 
differential pricing or compulsory licensure for low and middle income 
markets. Dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage from low income markets 
to high income markets is forbidden, but is not found to be a significant 
empirical problem. Much more troubling is the threat of counterfeit 
drugs. All other forms of pharmaceutical arbitrage are encouraged as a 
means to lower consumer prices. Finally, PEPFAR is critiqued, particularly 
 
 285. THORPE, supra note 32, at 1. 
 286. WHO, HIV/AIDS Prequalification, 15th ed., supra note 232.  
 287. See supra notes 137-139  and accompanying text. As of January 1, 2005, concessions 
under TRIPS will be largely limited to the thirty poorest members of the WTO, excluding 
middle income countries such as Mexico, India, China, and Brazil. Only a few countries 
have notified the TRIPS Council of their intent to delay full TRIPS implementation until 
the January 1, 2005 deadline, namely Argentina, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Jordan, Uruguay, 
Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Indeed, all but three least developed countries in 
Africa have already adopted pharmaceutical patents, many years prior to the 2016 deadline. 
THORPE, supra note 32, at 1. 
 288. See infra Subsection II.A.3.iv. 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
 PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE 
259 
for its procurement and supply chain policies which are based upon a fear 
of pharmaceutical arbitrage. 
i. Streamline Compulsory Licensure 
Compulsory licenses are difficult to administer under TRIPS. The 
procedures under Article 31 are time-consuming and expensive. The first 
two national laws implementing the Cancun General Council Decision 
require the grant of compulsory licenses in both the importing and 
exporting countries when patents have been filed.289 The Canadian version 
requires a good faith effort to negotiate a voluntary license “on reasonable 
terms and conditions” before applying for a compulsory license, following 
the general language of TRIPS Article 31(b).290 Requirements like these 
raise transaction costs and may allow pharmaceutical companies to delay 
the process for many months or years. This process is wasteful, particularly 
when duplicated in multiple countries.291 Good faith negotiations are not 
required in two circumstances: public non-commercial use, and “national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”292 Both exceptions 
fit the AIDS crisis, and the former is broad enough to encompass nonrival 
access for global diseases. 
Absent the credible threat of compulsory licensure, PhRMA 
companies have few economic reasons to cooperate with differential 
pricing, particularly for global diseases outside of the media glare of AIDS. 
This is not an academic exercise, as annual preventable deaths in low and 
middle income countries now number in the millions. The process must 
be simpler and faster for nonrival access to medicines. 
At this time, no compulsory license has been issued under the Cancun 
General Council Decision (i.e., involving import or export), and only a 
handful of countries have issued any TRIPS-compliant compulsory licenses. 
Malaysia issued a compulsory license to Cipla Ltd. in February 2004 for 
importation.293 As of May 2004, compulsory licenses have also been issued 
by Cameroon, Mozambique, and the Philippines.294  
 
 289. See, e.g., Norwegian Compulsory License Regulation, supra note 158, § 108; 
Canadian Bill C-9, supra note 158, § 21.04 (3)(d)(i)(B).  
 290. Canadian Bill C-9, supra note 158, § 21.04 (3)(c)(i). 
 291. Blustein & Gellman, supra note 150. 
 292. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(b). 
 293. Cipla Gets Malaysian Nod for AIDS Drugs: In a Trailblazing Move, Malaysia Has Issued a 
Compulsory License, BUS. STANDARD, Feb. 26 2004, at A6. 
 294. Statement of the Representative of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the GRULAC 
countries, WHO Executive Board Meeting (May 25, 2004).  
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For most countries, compulsory licensing is not yet a principal 
mechanism for introducing generic competition and protecting public 
health. Many companies are engaged in cross-border sales of generic 
ARVs, without currently necessitating the Cancun process.295 For example, 
Brazil, as permitted by its national patent laws, has been producing a 
number of generic ARVs for both domestic purposes and aid projects to 
Africa.296 Taking another approach, Thailand simply ruled Bristol-Myers’s 
didanosine patent invalid on public health grounds.297 
These various tactics have led to significant generic production of at 
least first-line ARVs, although much of the market remains in a grey area 
outside of the compulsory licensing regime established by Doha. 298 A more 
streamlined process for compulsory licensing could bring this market in 
from the grey. Moreover, it could be particularly helpful with regard to 
second-line ARVs, where there is still inadequate availability of generics. 
For example, no FDC containing the second-line drug efavirenz is 
currently available.299 The medical need for such second-line ARV therapy 
in the low and middle income countries is significant and growing. The 
WTO (and the USTR) should make the ARV production and export 
process more rational, not more difficult. A more streamlined approach to 
compulsory licensing would provide a well-defined mechanism that might 
encourage greater participation in these potential markets.  
 
 295. Most are not prequalified by the WHO: The amfAR July 2004 report notes the 
difficulties with twenty-seven companies in eight countries in Asia producing generic ARVs, 
and only one of them (Cipla Ltd.) operating with WHO Prequalification. AMFAR, supra note 
188, at 4. 
 296. Médecins sans Frontières, Brazilian Generic Drugs in South Africa—Background 
(Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=F8557436-9B60-4D00-
BC5F0476D8B7A5E1. 
 297. Gov’t Pharm. Org. v. Bristol-Myers, Thailand Central Intellectual Property Court, 
Oct. 2002.  
 298. MSF, UNTANGLING THE WEB, supra note 151, at 5-7. 
 299. Id. at 6. This may be because of pressures applied to potential source countries—
such as India and Thailand—by the USTR under the Special 301 process. U.S. TRADE REP., 
2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, 217-220 (2004) 
(India); id. at 463-65 (Thailand). The United States and Thailand are negotiating a free 
trade agreement with TRIPS-plus provisions. See Thai Free Trade Agreement Watch 
Website, at http://www.ftawatch.org (last visited Sept. 2003); see also Marwaan Macan-
Markar, Thailand-U.S.: Freer Trade Weakens Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE 
NEWS AGENCY, May 21, 2004, http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=23849. 
Fortunately, despite trade-related pressures, Thailand is now preparing a generic FDC as a 
second-line therapy, containing efavirenz, lopinavir and ritonavir.  
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ii. Dysfunctional Pharmaceutical Arbitrage of AIDS Drugs 
a. Dysfunctional Arbitrage Is Rarely Observed 
International arbitrage certainly seems to pose a plausible risk to 
pharmaceutical companies. The consumer retail price of a kilogram of the 
active ingredients in Combivir300 is about $20,000 in the United States, but 
sells for as little as $612 in Hyderabad and sub-Saharan Africa.301 This price 
differential is equal to about twenty-five times the average per capita 
income in the lowest income countries. Neo-classical economic theory 
predicts that entrepreneurs302 will divert these drugs from the poor and 
export them to wealthy countries where they will fetch higher prices. 
Domestic arbitrage occurs within the United States at much lower 
thresholds.303 Since the great majority of the world’s AIDS patients are in 
poorer countries, if only a small percentage were diverted, significant 
volumes of ARVs could flow into high income country markets.304 
 
 300. Combivir is GlaxoSmithKline’s best selling ARV drug, and the company holds a 
forty-five percent global market share in HIV/AIDS drugs. See Gautam Naik, Glaxo’s HIV 
Drugs Come Under Pressure: Competition, Calls for Price Cuts Weakens Company’s Dominance of 
Maturing Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B3; GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL 
REPORT, Form 20-F, at 63, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
(total of all HIV sales). 
 301. The active ingredients in Combivir total 450 mg per tablet. A kilogram of active 
ingredients will create approximately 2222 tablets. The retail price of 2222 tablets of 
Combivir in the U.S. retail market exceeds $20,000. See Drugstore.com, at 
http://www.drugstore.com (last visited July 9, 2004).  
 302. Or smugglers, depending upon your perspective. 
 303. See infra Subsection II.B.2. Jackie Judd, Senior Fellow with the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, Interview with Gilbert M. Gaul and Mary Pat Flaherty, Interview with 
Washington Post Reporters on Drug Safety Articles (Oct. 24, 2003), 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/hcast_index.cfm?display=detail&hc=1004 
(describing significant arbitrage diversion within the U.S. market taking advantage of 
relatively modest price differentials). 
 304. The United States is a likely target market. The EU may not be as vulnerable to 
diversion because most of its citizens are covered by a third party prescription drug benefit 
and are not as price sensitive. DG TRADE, supra note 42, § 3.3. This conclusion might be true 
for ultimate consumers, but European intermediaries such as parallel traders could seek 
arbitrage earnings from this trade. The available evidence suggests that European parallel 
traders are closely scrutinized and do not knowingly participate in illegal diversions. See, e.g., 
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (July 31, 2003), 2003 WL 
21729286. 
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Further, criminal organizations might be attracted to the profits to be 
found in dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage. The pricing ratios 
operating in the illegal cocaine market are broadly similar to ARV pricing 
ratios. The U.S. wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine ranges from 
$13,000 to $25,000,305 comparable to the U.S. retail value of a kilogram of 
the active ingredients in Combivir.306 The U.S. retail price of a gram of 
cocaine is about $100.307 The retail price of cocaine in Columbia is between 
three dollars and five dollars per gram,308 yielding a ratio of about 25:1.309 
Since ARV arbitrage offers potentially higher profits than cocaine 
trafficking, one might expect criminal enterprises to enter the ARV 
business, especially since the risk of apprehension and punishment are so 
severe for cocaine trafficking, but relatively modest for prescription drug 
counterfeiting.310 
Given these facts, it would be striking if dysfunctional ARV arbitrage 
did not occur. And yet reality appears to depart from the neo-classical 
economic model, for there is quite limited evidence of dysfunctional 
arbitrage. It is notable that generic drugs have been produced in India for 
decades without apparently infiltrating or undermining Western markets.311 
As of April 2002, both the European Commission and the pharmaceutical 
companies acknowledged that pharmaceutical arbitrage from poor 
countries into high income countries was “still largely theoretical.”312 Only 
 
 305. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/01020/index.html (2000 data). Retail prices per 
gram are significantly higher, particularly for smaller quantities. 
 306. See supra note 301. 
 307. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, TRENDS IN COCAINE PRICES (1981-2000) 
(price per gram for purchase of one to ten grams). The UK price for a gram in similar lots 
is around £50. Independent Drug Monitoring Unit Ltd., UK Drug Prices 2002, 
http://www.idmu.co.uk/prices02.htm. 
 308. This figure is from a hopelessly anecdotal source, a travel journal of an American 
using drugs in Columbia. David Ashley, Cocaine in Columbia (June 14, 2000), at 
http://www.erowid.org/experiences/exp.php?ID=1796 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
 309. The numerator is $100 per gram and the denominator is $4 per gram. 
 310. ALLIANCE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, PROVING THE CONNECTION: LINKS 
BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND ORGANISED CRIME 7-8 (2002), http://www.a-
cg.com/index2.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
 311. One would expect that over the past twenty years there would have been some 
significant reported court cases on illegal imports of Indian and other unlicensed generics 
if the problem were widespread. Andrew Farlow of Oxford finds little evidence of diversion. 
Andrew Farlow, Costs of Monopoly Pricing Under Patent Protection, Presentation at 
Columbia University slide 19 (Dec. 4, 2003).  
 312. DG TRADE, supra note 42, at § 3.3. 
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six months later, GlaxoSmithKline, the patent holder for several important 
AIDS drugs, brought the sensational charge that 36,000 packages of 
HIV/AIDS medicines worth approximately US$18 million were found to 
have been diverted from West Africa to the EU.313 GlaxoSmithKline sued 
several participants in the transactions, including a legal parallel trader in 
pharmaceuticals, Dowelhurst Ltd, for trademark infringement.314 
The Dowelhurst case unearthed several remarkable facts which 
undercut the public relations spin that Glaxo had put on the case. First, 
ninety-nine percent of the packages handled by Dowelhurst were not part 
of Glaxo’s charitable access initiative for Africa, but were ordinary 
commercial sales to Africa, at prices approximating EU prices.315 The 
Deputy Judge expressed keen displeasure upon finally understanding this 
point, as he had been led to believe that all of the packages were destined 
for charitable access programs.316 Second, 99% of the packages had been 
sold within Europe, to addresses in France, and probably never made the 
trip to Africa.317 The alleged diversions occurred in Europe, not in Africa. I 
say alleged diversions, because the case makes clear that the resale of the 
drugs was not proscribed by contract.318 Third, by placing the packages into 
commerce within Europe, Glaxo exhausted its IP rights within Europe.319 
Finally, Glaxo sold the packages without any attempt to label them as 
ineligible for sale or reimportation into the EU. They were packaged in 
French, with EMEA license codes and nothing was done to indicate they 
 
 313. There were a number of media reports from three continents in October 2002. See, 
e.g., Sarah Boseley & Rory Carroll, Profiteers Resell Africa’s Cheap Aids Drugs, THE GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 4, 2002, at P1; see also DUKES, supra note 84, at 50 & n.1. 
 314. Glaxo Group Ltd v. Dowelhurst Ltd, [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (July 31, 2003), 2003 WL 
21729286. 
 315. Id. ¶ 36. 
 316. Id. ¶ 46. The Deputy Judge imposed over ninety percent of the litigation costs on 
Glaxo, in part because he felt misled. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2003] 
E.W.H.C. 3060 (High Ct., Ch. Div. 2003), ¶¶ 10, 17. 
 317. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004] E.T.M.R. 39 (2003), ¶¶ 66-76. Only 
one percent of the packages had actually been sold to a buyer in Africa, namely the 
packages involved in the access program. 
 318. Id. ¶ 39. 
 319. Id. ¶¶ 66-76. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Deputy Judge’s rulings on 
summary judgment, permitting the trial to proceed on the question of compliance with EU 
rules for pharmaceutical parallel trade. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Dowelhurst Ltd., [2004] 
E.W.C.A. Civ. 290 (App. Ct., Civ. Div., 2004). Specifically, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
exhaustion rule on 100% of the packages rather than just 99%. Id. ¶¶ 30-40. 
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were destined for a charitable access program.320 Legal European parallel 
traders were led to believe the drugs had been lawfully placed into 
European commerce. Indeed, the defendant suggested that Glaxo did so 
deliberately in order to generate the resulting publicity.321 Within three 
weeks of the Glaxo diversion story, the European Commission announced 
plans to issue a regulation to curb such diversions.322 The 2003 Council 
Regulation promptly required many modifications to packages and pills 
destined for essential access programs.323 
The only other major media report of diversion of essential access 
drugs was in Forbes in April 2004, noting allegations of diversion in 
Indonesia, Chile, and Lebanon.324 This story parroted PhRMA’s spin on the 
2002 Glaxo case in Europe, but failed to mention any of the facts from the 
Dowelhurst case discussed above. The source of the report in Indonesia 
was a survey in Jakarta by a respected local health group, which found 
many donated drugs being either sold on the black market in Jakarta or 
available in the public health clinics for a price in excess of the statutory 
maximum.325 This is a simple case of local corruption, and there is no 
evidence that the drugs were leaving the immediate market. This situation 
might be regrettable, but it is not dysfunctional arbitrage; it does not 
replace commercial markets in the high income countries. Similar local 
diversions occur in the United States.326 The reports from Chile and 
Lebanon are sourced exclusively from local affiliates of PhRMA. Neither 
report was substantiated; nor do they suggest dysfunctional arbitrage as 
opposed to local movement of drugs within low or medium income 
countries. In sum, empirical evidence to date does not indicate a sizable 
 
 320. Glaxo Group Ltd, [2004] E.T.M.R. at ¶¶ 46-50. 
 321. Id. ¶¶ 51-53. 
 322. EU/WTO – Plan to Curb Illicit Medicines Trade, EUR. REP., Oct. 26, 2002. 
 323. At present, the European Union Council Regulation only applies to “tiered price” 
pharmaceutical exports to seventy-six listed developing and least-developed countries and 
to “HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and related opportunistic diseases” (a limitation which 
should be amended following Cancun). The European Union defines a “tiered price” 
pharmaceutical as being offered to the poor for either direct manufacturing cost plus no 
more than fifteen percent or at less than twenty-five percent of the OECD weighted average 
ex-factory price. Council Regulation 953/2003 To Avoid Trade Diversion into the European 
Union of Certain Key Medicines, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 135/6) art. 3(a) [hereinafter Council 
Regulation 953/2003].  
 324. Richard C. Morais, “Pssst . . . Wanna Buy Some Augmentin?,” FORBES 2000, Apr. 12, 
2004, http://forbes.com/forbes/2004/0412/112_print.html. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Judd, supra note 303. 
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arbitrage market in ARVs from low income countries into the high income 
countries. 
b. Measures To Hinder Dysfunctional Arbitrage 
Possible reasons for the dearth of empirical evidence of dysfunctional 
pharmaceutical arbitrage include moral and legal sanctions within high 
income market countries. The impact of these norms is significant in 
pharmaceutical arbitrage markets. When pharmaceutical arbitrage is 
unmistakably legal, it flourishes, even at low differential pricing ratios. For 
example, the EU follows the “community exhaustion” rule, permitting 
parallel trade in patented and trademarked products within the European 
Economic Area. Differential pricing ratios of less than 2:1 have been 
sufficient to create a multi-billion euro legal arbitrage market within the 
EU,327 subject to complex rules on repackaging and trademark 
infringement devised by the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice.328 In the European Union, illegal pharmaceutical 
arbitrage is rarely observed.329 
Canada provides a contrasting example. Pharmaceutical arbitrage 
from Canada to the United States operated for years under legal 
ambiguity. Proponents touted the enhanced consumer access. The pricing 
differential is less than 2:1, but the arbitrage market now is in the range of 
$600 million to $1.1 billion a year.330 
So the first imperative is to prevent any legal or moral uncertainty 
concerning dysfunctional arbitrage. At a minimum, diversion of drugs 
intended for the poor to high income country markets should be clearly 
illegal. The European Union, for example, promptly moved in this 
direction following media reports of the Glaxo diversion.331 The United 
States should follow suit. 
The second task is to modify the product to resist substitutability. The 
 
 327. PETER WEST & JAMES MAHON, BENEFITS TO PAYERS AND PATIENTS FROM PARALLEL TRADE 
(York Health Econ. Consortium, Working Paper, 2003) (estimating direct savings of  631 
million in 2002 from legal pharmaceutical arbitrage (parallel trade) within the EU) 
(funded by a grant from European parallel traders). But see KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 54, at 
15-16 (finding meager benefits to consumers from parallel pharmaceutical trade) (funded 
by an unrestricted grant from Johnson & Johnson). 
 328. For a recent discussion, see Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., [2004] 
E.T.M.R. 65 (2004), 2004 WL 343819, at ¶¶ 3-17. 
 329. See supra Subsection II.A.1.  
 330. See infra Subsection II.B.2.  
 331. See Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, art. 7.  
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pharmaceutical manufacturing process could be altered to create multiple 
versions of any prescription drug, distinguished by radically different 
colors, shapes, names, sizes, and packaging. Markets must be segmented 
into commercial and charitable markets, and never the twain shall meet. 
The Cancun General Council Decision addresses this issue: Exporting 
countries must clearly identify the products through labeling or marking 
and through special coloring or shaping.332 The EU Council Regulation 
follows this tact.333 GlaxoSmithKline and others are complying, altering 
both the packaging and the color of the product.334 These steps will 
eliminate the flow of improperly diverted essential access medicines 
through legal distribution channels such as parallel traders and 
distribution companies. 
Third, the manufacturer also has the responsibility to deliver the 
essential medicines to a reputable supply chain located outside of the 
United States or European Union, in order to avoid domestic exhaustion. 
Fourth, consumers in high income markets can be persuaded to resist 
substitution. Advertising could be directed to commercial market 
consumers, warning them never to take the red pills with labels in Swahili. 
This should not be an implicit safety warning that “those pills may not be 
safe,” since Africans will be told exactly the opposite: “The red pills are safe 
and effective.”335 Advertising should describe diversion as a moral and legal 
issue: High income patients who take pills intended for impoverished 
Africans are stealing from the poor.336 Under the European Union Council 
Regulation, all covered pharmaceuticals exported from the European 
Union will bear a special logo identifying the product as destined for the 
poor.337 In addition, domestic law within the high income countries should 
criminalize the practice. 
The final front for anti-diversion measures is the borders of the high 
income countries. Pharmaceutical arbitrage may become dysfunctional 
 
 332. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 2(b). 
 333. See Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, art. 7, ¶ 10. While the Council 
Regulation addresses importation in luggage for personal use, similar to the U.S. personal 
importation rule, it does not address (but probably covers) Internet sales. Id. art.10, ¶ 13,. 
Seized product may be used for humanitarian purposes. Id. ¶14. 
 334. GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Form 20-F, at 29. 
 335. Vertical product differentiation based on quality is common in some products 
(regular versus premium gasoline), but is probably untenable in pharmaceuticals. 
 336. If the arbitraged drugs were voluntarily sold rather than stolen, then the moral 
claim weakens. 
 337. Council Regulation 953/2003, supra note 323, 2003 O.J at art. 7. The logo is found 
in Annex V of the regulation. 
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only when diversion occurs from low or middle income markets to high 
income markets. Trade among or between low and middle income markets 
is not dysfunctional.338 Thus, the key moment to control dysfunctional 
arbitrage is at the border of high income countries, not at the border of 
the exporting country. These protections can be put into place 
immediately by high income countries and do not depend upon reaching 
a multilateral agreement at the WTO. Furthermore, the high income 
countries possess the resources and infrastructure to make interdiction a 
reality. Indeed, the absence of observed dysfunctional arbitrage may well 
be a result of the border controls over the entry of drugs that many high 
income countries enjoy. 
c. Low and Middle Income Markets Should Not Bear the Burden of 
Anti-Diversion Measures 
The most striking aspect of these anti-diversion measures is that the 
responsibility for all of them logically rests upon the manufacturers and 
high income markets. None of the five measures require expenditure by 
low or medium income countries. Nevertheless, when PhRMA companies 
finally agreed to significant differential pricing of ARVs in low income 
countries, they insisted on strong anti-diversion protections and burden-
sharing by the recipient countries.339 The Cancun General Council 
Decision requires importing countries to implement reasonable measures 
to prevent diversion and re-exportation. “Reasonable” measures must be 
“within their means” and “proportionate to their administrative capacities 
and the risk of trade diversion.”340 Under Cancun, developing and least 
developed countries inappropriately bear these costs even if global 
pharmaceutical rents are supra-optimal.341 
Minor diversions at the clinic or patient level should not be an 
international enforcement focus. Given the difficulty in setting up a source 
collection system, it is unlikely that small batches or individual blister packs 
without packaging will filter back to high income country markets in 
significant quantities. Minor local diversions are likely to remain in the 
region and may well be re-sold to other poor patients outside of the 
 
 338. See supra Subsection II.A.2.iii.  
 339. Gellman, supra note 150. 
 340. Cancun General Council Decision, supra note 137, ¶ 4. 
 341. If global rents are supra-optimal, these costs could be borne by the PhRMA 
companies without harming innovation. Placing the burden on countries with annual per 
capita health budgets of $100 or less is exceedingly unfair. 
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current distribution system.342 This is not a best-case result, but preventing 
this arbitrage is not an enforcement priority. The priority should be to 
address weaknesses in the supply chain that allow large batches to be 
diverted in a single transaction. The risk may be greatest while the product 
is still outside of the recipient country.343 
Finally, the heuristic suggests that some level of dysfunctional arbitrage 
may be tolerable from an innovation point of view. So long as commercial 
markets are not replaced, the practice will not harm innovation. Modest 
leakage from commercial markets may reduce rents, but will not harm 
innovation if overall rents remains supra-optimal. 
iii. Counterfeit Drugs 
In the debates over essential medicines, care must be taken to 
distinguish arbitrage from counterfeiting. The term “counterfeit” is often 
loosely applied in a manner which conflates several categories of 
products:344 safe and effective drugs that have entered the United States 
improperly, drugs that are intended to be legitimate but are “sub-standard” 
in some way, and those that are blatant attempts to defraud consumers by 
selling fake drugs.345 While all these types of products may raise concerns 
for consumers,346 I focus my analysis here on the third, narrow category—
 
 342. This appears to be the case in Jakarta. See generally Morais, supra note 324. 
 343. Both conditions were present in the Glaxo case. 
 344. See Prescription for Danger: Counterfeit Drug Trade Grows, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 2, 2001, 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/31/health/main327265.shtml (“There is no 
single definition for counterfeit drugs. The may contain dangerous substitutes instead of 
the real ingredients. Or they may be much like ‘the real thing’—only expired, or not 
approved for sale in the [United States].”).  
 345. For discussion of the FDA’s definition, see Examining the Implications of Drug 
Importation: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of 
William K. Hubbard, U.S. FDA Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning), 
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/importeddrugs0714.html. See also Heather Won Tesoriero, 
Fake-Drug Sites Keep a Step Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D4 (describing generic 
versions which were substituted for brand name drugs still patented in the United States as 
“counterfeits”); Options for Safe and Effective Prescription Drug Importation: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Mark 
McClellan, Commissioner of the FDA), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1105&wit_id=3132 (discussing “unapproved, imported pharmaceuticals” 
and “unsafe and illegal drugs” along with “ineffective, counterfeit” drugs).    
 346. See FDA, COUNTERFEIT DRUG TASK FORCE INTERIM REPORT 5-7 (2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim_report.html (noting that 
counterfeit drugs may “pose significant public health and safety concerns,” as they “may 
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products which do not contain the proper active ingredient (for example, 
where the counterfeit is essentially a placebo product). These “non-
functional” counterfeits merit special consideration because of the 
particular incentives for, and dangers of, their production.347   
Empirical evidence suggests that virtually none of the internationally 
arbitraged drugs arriving in the United States are non-functional 
counterfeits; their importation is most likely to simply violate technical 
restrictions on parallel importation, FDA approval or labeling, or other 
laws.348 Instead, most of the blatantly fake or nonfunctional counterfeit 
drugs in the United States have domestic origins or domestic networks.349 
While the FDA still considers it a relatively rare practice,350 it is nevertheless 
growing rapidly in the United States and in other high income markets.351 
In 2000, the estimated value of EU pharmaceutical counterfeiting was 
 
contain only inactive ingredients, incorrect ingredients, improper dosages, sub-potent or 
super-potent ingredients, or be contaminated.”); EUROPEAN FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & 
ASS’NS, INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF TRADE MARK RIGHTS 7 (2001) (describing the range 
of products that may be considered counterfeit by the WHO and the European 
pharmaceutical trade association and corresponding concerns).   
 347. My point is not to argue whose definition is “right,” but to demonstrate the analysis 
which is possible when focusing on this narrower category. In copyright and trademark 
practice, a “counterfeit” or “pirated” copy is one that was manufactured by an unlicensed 
source, but such copies are likely to be as functional as the genuine article: A counterfeit 
Gucci purse might nevertheless be a fully functional and stylish purse. In pharmaceuticals, 
non-functional counterfeits are, arguably, particularly likely. See infra note 353 and 
accompanying text. 
 348. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams 
Continue To Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments (Jan. 27, 
2004) (mentioning many categories of unapproved drugs but never indicating that any of 
them contained no active ingredient). 
 349. Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, U.S. Prescription Drug System Under Attack: 
Multibillion-Dollar Shadow Market Is Growing Stronger, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A1. 
 350. FDA, supra note 346, at 3. 
 351. The FDA estimates that pharmaceutical counterfeiting has increased four-fold in 
the past few years. See, e.g., Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Anti-Counterfeit Steps 
Drugmakers Sought; Legislators’ Goal Is To Halt Illegal Sales, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2004, at A11; 
Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Miami Man Charged with Selling Counterfeit Lipitor, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at E1; Mary Pat Flaherty & Gilbert M. Gaul, Lax System Allows 
Criminals To Invade the Supply Chain, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2003, at A1. These articles were 
part of a series of articles on counterfeit drugs by Mary Pat Flaherty and Gilbert M. Gaul 
that ran in the Washington Post during Fall 2003/Winter 2004. The Wall Street Journal has also 
covered the story. E.g., Anna Wilde Mathews & Heather Won Tesoriero, Murky Channels: 
Bogus Medicines Put Spotlight on World of Drug Distributors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2003, at A1. 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS V:1 (2005) 
270 
more than 1.5 billion Euros. The United Kingdom-based Anti-
Counterfeiting Group estimated in 2003 that 5.8% of pharmaceutical 
company annual revenue is lost due to counterfeiting.352 If true, 
counterfeiting is a major threat not only to public health, but also to 
innovation, far outstripping the limited potential damage from 
dysfunctional pharmaceutical arbitrage. 
Criminal enterprises are currently involved in pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting.353 Counterfeiting opportunities may explain the absence of 
criminal ARV arbitrage. In the illegal, nonprescription drug market, 
counterfeiting is a difficult practice: If users do not get high, the product 
will not sell, particularly in sales between repeat players. In prescription 
drugs, however, the opportunity for counterfeiting is much greater. 
Patients are often unable to tell whether a counterfeit pill contains the 
correct active ingredients. It may take weeks or months to notice that 
therapy is failing, and the cause of failure may not be linked with the 
counterfeits. Counterfeits may be introduced into legitimate supply chains, 
diluting therapy while making the counterfeiting more difficult to observe 
and trace. These information characteristics enable the criminal seller of 
counterfeit prescription drugs to act as if the transactions were discrete, 
rather than repeating. 
While obtaining arbitraged ARVs might be possible, obtaining them in 
sufficient quantities would require a procurement team in the field (e.g., 
sub-Saharan Africa), with multiple diversions against alerted supply chains, 
followed by repackaging and illegal reverse supply chains back to high 
income country markets. Counterfeiting is arguably easier than diverting 
pills from Africa: Drugs labeled and packaged to look like the authentic 
licensed product (rather than distinguishable pills in packaging labeled for 
essential medicine programs) can be introduced into high income country 
supply chains directly. Counterfeiting dispenses with many costs. The per-
pill cost to produce a placebo without active ingredients may be far 
cheaper than covert diversion and procurement, re-coloration, 
repackaging, and transportation. Finally, it is unlikely that anyone would 
bother to counterfeit a cheap generic drug. Expensive, patented drugs are 
the targets of counterfeiters; cheap generics are not.354 A criminal is 
 
 352. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING GROUP, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT COUNTERFEITING 
14, http://www.a-cg.com/docs/why_you_should_care.pdf (last modified June 22, 2004). 
 353. ALLIANCE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING & PIRACY, supra note 310, at 2 (“This document 
provides clear and unambiguous evidence of organised crime controlling, exploiting and 
benefiting from intellectual property fraud. It is on the increase.”). 
 354. The examples of counterfeits in most media and FDA reports are of expensive 
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unlikely to counterfeit a pill and sell it as aspirin or Triomune, when it 
could be sold as Lipitor or Fuzeon. When low-cost generics are available on 
a nonrival basis, the threat of counterfeits recedes. 
Counterfeits, not dysfunctional arbitrage, are the more immanent 
danger to both public health and PhRMA innovation. Counterfeiting will 
remain an issue so long as the actual product has a high value relative to 
the cost of manufacturing a plausible placebo. Taking all R&D cost 
recovery out of the price system will greatly reduce counterfeiting pressure, 
but so long as a placebo can be made for a fraction of the value of the 
actual pill, counterfeiting will remain an issue. The Hubbard-Love R&D 
Treaty thus would wipe out much of the current incentives to counterfeit, 
by removing R&D cost recovery from the retail sales price.355 Likewise, 
nonrival access in low and middle income countries would create the same 
conditions. 
Additional anti-counterfeit measures in high income countries should 
include a pedigree system of tracing drugs from the manufacturer to the 
consumer. A pedigree system (or the European system of parallel traders 
giving notice of intent to trade) would also hinder arbitrage by making 
product movement transparent to the manufacturer. Most importantly, 
routine market sampling for counterfeits must be introduced, and sources 
of counterfeit drugs aggressively traced by law enforcement.356 
iv. Implications for PEPFAR 
When the Bush Administration established PEPFAR, it chose to largely 
bypass existing multilateral institutions such as the Global Fund. PEPFAR 
calls for only 6.3% of the $15 billion to be placed with the Global Fund, 
with the remainder devoted to unilateral U.S. efforts.357 This move reflects 
the Bush Administration’s penchant for unilateralism, even in the world of 
AIDS. 
The Global Fund’s procurement and supply management guidelines 
prioritize lowest price, assured quality, and legal compliance.358 Grant 
 
patented drugs such as Lipitor, Epogen, Zyprexa, and Serostim. See Leila Abboud et al., 
Fakes in the Medicine Chest; As Drug Counterfeiting Rises, FDA May Propose Changes in Sales, 
Distribution Network, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B1. 
 355. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 356. Some steps towards an anti-counterfeiting policy are being taken by the FDA. FDA, 
supra note 346, at 18-22. 
 357. THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF: U.S. FIVE-YEAR GLOBAL 
HIV/AIDS STRATEGY 16 (2004).  
 358. THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, & MALARIA, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL 
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recipients retain flexibility in how they balance cost, quality, and access in 
the local context. For example, a recipient country could choose to rely on 
the WHO prequalification process as the quality mechanism on ARV 
drugs, or it could choose to impose different standards based on local 
collective preferences. Similar choices may be made between branded 
drugs and generics. 
One way to understand PEPFAR is that it inverts the Global Fund’s 
ARV procurement priorities and strikes a different balance between access 
and innovation. PEPFAR gives first priority to legal compliance (and 
highest quality) rather than lowest effective cost, shunning generics.359 
PEPFAR requires approval by a “stringent regulatory authority” before 
procurement, meaning the NDRAs from the United States, EU, and Japan 
(the ICH), and possibly Canada.360 Critics attacked these standards as 
inappropriate barriers to rapid roll-out. On May 16, 2004 PEPFAR 
announced a new “fast track” FDA certification for generic ARVs, rather 
than following the WHO pre-certification process.361 PEPFAR will impose 
“all FDA standards for drug safety, efficacy, and quality,”362 even though 
existing studies have proven the efficacy of ARV treatment with generics.363 
 
FUND’S POLICIES ON PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT (2004), http://www.theglobal 
fund.org/pdf/guidelines/pp_guidelines_procurement_supplymanagement_en.pdf. 
 359. From the beginning, PEPFAR guidance to its field offices prohibited acquisition of 
cheaper generic FDCs. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-784, U.S. AIDS COORDINATOR 
ADDRESSING SOME KEY CHALLENGES TO EXPANDING TREATMENT, BUT OTHERS REMAIN 37 
(2004). A cynic might view “highest quality” as merely a stalking horse for “highest price.” 
 360. Id. at 19-37. 
 361. Tommy G. Thompson & Randall L. Tobias, HHS Proposes Rapid Process of Fixed 
Dose Combination and Co-Packaged Products: Joint Statement Issued by HHS Secretary 
Thompson and U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator Tobias (May 16, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/32503.htm; see also Gautam Naik et al., Viral 
Strain: In AIDS Fight, Ambitious Goals Meet Hard Realities - Millions of Ill in Poor Nations Fail To 
Get Drugs as Funds, Medical Systems Fall Short, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at A1; Sarah Lueck & 
Michael M. Phillips, U.S. Awards Grants in AIDS Battle: Disbursement Is First Part of a $10 Billion 
Pledge; Generics Issue Is Unresolved, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2004, at D5 (raising unresolved 
questions about whether the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator will procure 
generic AIDS drugs at the lowest possible price). 
 362. HIV/AIDS Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations 
of the Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Randall L. Tobias, U.S. 
Global AIDS Coordinator), http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm? 
id=221702. 
 363. S. PUJARI ET AL., SAFETY AND LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF GENERIC FIXED-DOSE 
FORMULATIONS OF NEVIRAPINE-BASED HAART AMONGST ANTIRETROVIRAL-NAÏVE HIV-INFECTED 
PATIENTS IN INDIA (2003) (background document for WHO meeting on Fixed Dose 
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PEPFAR is also creating its own supply chain management system, 
independent of The Global Fund.364 These efforts are duplicative and will 
inevitably raise costs and delay treatment.365 Amazingly, the United States 
funds both programs and remains the largest donor to The Global Fund.366 
Three aspects of PEPFAR are worthy of detailed discussion. PEPFAR 
erects hurdles to procurement of generic ARVs in order to steer additional 
volume at higher prices to PhRMA companies. It establishes a separate 
supply chain, permitting the United States to maximize protection against 
diversion and arbitrage.367 And, finally, it controls quality hoping to delay 
the onset of resistance. My recommendations to PEPFAR’s administrators 
are as follows: 
a. Purchase Generics 
The first goal is not legitimate on innovation grounds, since donor 
programs do not replace existing commercial markets for ARVs. PEPFAR’s 
unilateralism is not needed for innovation, but imposes American notions 
of the appropriate quality-access balance upon desperately poor countries. 
Innovation does not require ignoring their collective preferences for low 
cost treatment under WHO prequalification. PEPFAR appears to operate 
in the mode of many bilateral aid projects, as a subsidy for domestic 
exports. The PEPFAR legislation requires fifty-five percent of the U.S. 
contribution to be used in treatment, and seventy-five percent of that 
amount (or 41.25% of the total) to be spent on ARVs for fiscal years 2006 
through 2008.368 Blocking generic ARVs will funnel $6.18 billion dollars in 
 
Combinations for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria); Christian Laurent et al., 
Effectiveness and Safety of a Generic Fixed-Dose Combination of Nevirapine, Stavudine, and 
Lamivudine in HIV-1-Infected Adults in Cameroon: Open-Label Multicentre Trial, 364 THE LANCET 
29 (2004); Gregory K. Robbins et al., Comparison of Sequential Three-Drug Regimens as Initial 
Therapy for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293 (2003); Robert W. Shafer et al., 
Comparison of Four-Drug Regimens and Pairs of Sequential Three-Drug Regimens as Initial Therapy 
for HIV-1 Infection, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2304 (2003).  
 364. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., DRAFT STATEMENT OF WORK PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT—
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF 
(2004). 
 365. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359; Mark Schoofs, At Zimbabwe 
Clinic, Wait Is Long and U.S. Drug Cupboard Is Bare, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at A8. 
 366. See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS & MALARIA, ANNUAL REPORT 
2003 (2003). 
 367. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 364, at 6. 
 368. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 
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additional ARV sales to PhRMA companies,369 at a price much higher than 
generics.370 PEPFAR’s stand also diverts those unit sales away from 
companies such as Cipla, another move advantageous to PhRMA 
companies. 
b. Do Not Create Duplicate Supply Chains 
The heuristic tells us that the second goal may be legitimate: Avoid 
arbitrage from donor programs to high-income markets. But the analysis is 
not so simplistic. PEPFAR costs are very significant, including both 
duplicated program expenses and indirect costs from delayed and 
constrained treatment. PEPFAR is devoting special multi-billion dollar 
efforts to minimize drug diversion within the recipient countries.371 These 
costs should be balanced against the benefits of averted arbitrage. Most 
arbitrage is not harmful to innovation, and modest levels of dysfunctional 
arbitrage may be tolerable, particularly in conditions of supra-optimality.372 
c. Generic FDCs Delay Resistance 
PEPFAR’s final goal is quality, together with the fear of 
mismanagement, leading to resistance. This is an important question. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that another parallel AIDS relief system will 
hinder the uniform management of the disease. A parallel system further 
complicates treatment in the field and confuses providers. Resistance must 
be managed globally. Furthermore, if PEPFAR’s primary goal is the 
avoidance of resistance, it should not erect barriers to Triomune and other 
FDCs, which are the first-line treatments most effective in preventing the 
emergence of resistant strains, but which are only available as generic in 
FDC form. PEPFAR’s insistence on U.S. FDA standards will delay the 
procurement of FDCs. If PEPFAR requires the same standards on anti-
malarial FDCs (Fixed-done Artesunate Combination Therapy or FACT), 
the most effective treatment for managing malarial resistance will be 
unnecessarily delayed,373 despite the fact that WHO has already 
 
Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 403 (2003), 117 Stat. 711. 
 369. 41.25% of $15 billion. 
 370. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359, at 20; Ellen Nakashima & David 
Brown, U.S. Rule on AIDS Drugs Criticized: Ban on Using Aid To Buy Foreign Generics Hinders 
Treatment, Experts Say, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A12 (quoting Rachel Cohen of MSF). 
 371. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 359, at 44. 
 372. See supra Subsection II.A.3.ii. 
 373. For a description of the effort to create FDCs for malaria in Africa and Latin 
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prequalified a FACT.374 
B. Pharmaceutical Arbitrage from Canada 
Pharmaceutical arbitrage is not just an issue in low and middle income 
countries; millions of U.S. residents are importing cheaper patented drugs 
from Canada and elsewhere—the so-called “Boston Tea Party of the 21st 
Century.”375 Drug imports from Canada should be a textbook example of 
pharmaceutical arbitrage at work, as PhRMA companies scramble to 
protect high-priced U.S. markets. 
For the larger essential medicines debate, the most salient conclusion 
from the following analysis is that pharmaceutical arbitrage will flourish, 
even at relatively low arbitrage ratios below 2:1. Aggressive moves by 
PhRMA companies and the FDA have not succeeded in stopping the 
arbitrage. The key factor is the legal ambiguity and moral support for the 
practice of importing from Canada. Institutions and human behavior 
matter a great deal when neo-classical economic theory is applied in the 
real world. In the narrower context of U.S. drug prices, arbitrage from 
Canada seems unlikely to harm innovation, absent transparent access to 
PhRMA company data to prove the contrary. 
1. The Opportunity for Arbitrage 
Patented drug prices in the United States are generally the highest in 
the world.376 Most other OECD countries have regulatory structures that 
 
America, see Press Release, DNDi, Malaria Patients Enter DNDi Clinical Trials (July 2, 
2004), http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_html/insidearticleListing.asp?CategoryId=166& 
SubCategoryId=167&ArticleId=301&TemplateId=1; and DNDi, Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_html/insidearticleListing.asp?categoryid=164&articleid=
304&templateid=2 (last visited July 18, 2004). 
 374. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACCESS TO ARTEMISININ-BASED COMBINATION ANTIMALARIAL 
DRUGS OF ACCEPTABLE QUALITY (2d ed. 2004), http://mednet3.who.int/prequal/. The 
Artemether/Lumefantrine FDC is manufactured by Novartis. 
 375. Senator Joe Lieberman, Democratic Presidential Debate in Goffstown, New 
Hampshire (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39875-
2004Jan22.html, quoted in Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much for 
Drugs, TIME, Feb. 2, 2004, at 46. 
 376. United States patented prescription drug prices are the highest of any major 
market, with the possible exception of Japan. Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 173, exhibit 
3. Generic drugs, unprotected by patents or exclusive marketing periods, are generally 
priced competitively in the United States. Comparisons of international drug prices should 
not conflate these categories. Danzon and Furukawa fault other studies for excluding 
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significantly limit prices for patented pharmaceuticals.377 Canadian price 
controls, including the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board378 help to 
keep Canadian prices significantly lower than U.S. prices for patented 
drugs.379 This significant differential pricing invites consumer arbitrage. 
The first phase of the Canadian-U.S. arbitrage involved individuals 
purchasing drugs while traveling in Canada for other reasons, such as 
vacation or business. This arbitrage was usually limited to people who got 
 
generics since they represent significant volumes in the OECD. Id. at 4. However, generics 
must be excluded when calculating rents or the potential for arbitrage in patented drugs. 
Canadian prices are sixty-four percent of U.S. prices for patented drugs, and somewhat 
higher for generics, yielding a net differential of six percent. Id. exhibit 4; see also Letter 
from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy & Planning, FDA, to Ram 
Kamath & Scott McKibbin, Special Advocates for Prescription Drugs, State of Illinois (Nov. 
6, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hubbard Letter] (noting that generics are 
generally cheaper in the United States compared to Canada). Thus the potential for 
arbitrage lies in the thirty-six percent differential in patented medications, not the six 
percent overall figure. 
 377. See ROTHNIE, supra note 66, at 491 (providing a general, but dated, discussion of EU 
pharmaceutical price controls); see also DANZON ET AL., supra note 186 (noting that 
pharmaceutical companies delay the launch of new drugs in EU countries with strict price 
controls to reduce the risk of parallel trade). 
 378. Since 1988, Canada has regulated patented drug prices through the Patented 
Medicine Prices Review Board, a quasi-judicial board with can bring proceedings against 
PhRMA companies that charge excessively high prices. MARIA BARRADOS ET AL., 1998 REPORT 
OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA ¶ 17.93 (1999), http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca; Robert G. 
Elgie, Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board: New Approaches, Address to Drug 
Industry Association Washington Conference on Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement: What New Variables are at Work? 3-4 (Apr. 16, 1999), 
http://pmprb.com/cmfiles/sp-dia-e14NRL-482003-7465.pdf. The Board has constrained 
some patented drug prices in Canada. BARRADOS ET AL., supra, ¶17.25. Since the creation of 
the Board, patented pharmaceutical prices in Canada have increased only one percent per 
year on average. Elgie, supra, at 6. Nevertheless, Canada’s system is not strictly a price 
control or rate-setting system, but a soft reference price system with a quasi-judicial process. 
BARRADOS ET AL., supra, ¶17.50 -17.56; Elgie, supra, at 6. 
 379. Many surveys have documented the price differential between U.S. and Canadian 
patented pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., RAM KAMATH & SCOTT MCKIBBIN, ILL. OFFICE OF SPECIAL 
ADVOCATE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES 
SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY PURCHASING PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FROM CANADIAN PHARMACIES 79 
(2003) (thirty-nine percent savings on the drugs that Illinois purchases that could be safely 
imported from Canada); Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 173, exhibit 4 (noting that 
patented drugs are thirty-six percent cheaper in Canada compared with the United States); 
Savings Immense on Canadian Drugs, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at A15 (thirty-three percent 
to eighty percent cheaper for the ten most popular drugs). 
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sick while in Canada, or who unexpectedly exhausted their U.S. 
prescriptions while traveling. Marginal transaction costs were negligible for 
those persons already in Canada. 
The second phase was more strategic on the part of consumers. Some 
U.S. consumers noticed the price differentials when filling prescriptions in 
Canada. People living close to the border could make short intentional 
trips to fill lower-cost prescriptions, with a transaction cost of a few dollars 
and a modest amount of time. Bus trips were subsequently organized for 
people living at greater distances, specifically to stock up on patented 
medications. Politicians, particularly those from states near Canada, began 
to sponsor the trips. The transaction costs for these trips were greater—
several hundred dollars and significant time—but for some consumers, the 
cost savings were greater still. As consumers became more accustomed to 
mail order pharmacies, repeat customers could avoid the transaction costs 
of another trip and re-order by mail from Canada. Consumer arbitrage 
began to erode differential pricing between United States and Canadian 
drug prices. 
These early forms of arbitrage were limited in several ways. Only drugs 
for outpatient non-emergency use could easily be substituted. The initial 
buyers were Americans who exhausted their personal drug supplies while 
traveling in Canada. The high transaction costs of travel to Canada limited 
the scope and potential expansion of this market. Information costs were 
also significant. Canadian pharmacies did not significantly advertise in the 
United States during this phase of the market. Knowledge of the arbitrage 
opportunity was largely gained by word of mouth or opportune discovery. 
i. The Internet Enables More Extensive Arbitrage 
The Internet dramatically altered the potential for pharmaceutical 
arbitrage. The transaction cost of importing a prescription from Canada 
dropped to a small fraction of the arbitrage savings.380 Many Canadian 
websites began to compete for the American consumer’s attention. These 
factors multiplied the possible arbitrage market. The potential number of 
buyers for cross-border arbitrage jumped from several million Americans 
living near the Canadian border to the entire wired population of the 
United States. In the last several years, the potential number of buyers 
expanded again, as U.S.-based companies began to facilitate Internet 
ordering of pharmaceuticals for unwired consumers, particularly the 
 
 380. For a patient with annual out of pocket prescription costs of $2000, a reasonable 
amount of search costs can be justified to save thirty percent. 
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elderly. Health insurers and some government officials began to 
encourage consumers to acquire cheaper medicines from Canada. The 
media devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon from 1999, raising 
awareness amongst consumers that arbitrage was an option. A large and 
growing portion of the most valuable market for patented pharmaceutical 
medications is now only a click away from arbitrage. 
If this process continues unchallenged, one would expect institutions 
such as hospitals, nursing homes, and retail pharmacies to begin to source 
from Canada. Payors such as health plans381 and governments382 are now 
following suit. The State of Illinois recently recommended importing 
patented drugs from Canada for its employees and retirees. The State of 
Illinois estimates that $250 million of its prescription drug costs could be 
sourced from Canada,383 with potential savings of $90.7 million per year.384 
Several other states are exploring similar programs.385 These state efforts 
are being blocked by the FDA. 
The current level of arbitrage is already significant in the Canadian 
market. In 2004, the U.S. retail prescription drug market is an estimated 
$207.9 billion.386 In October 2003, an FDA official estimated that three 
million U.S. prescriptions per year were being filled from Canada,387 
 
 381. United States-based PBMs are paying claims today from Canadian pharmacies, 
supporting the patient’s decision to import, KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 13, as 
are some large health plans such as UnitedHealth, Thomas M. Burton, The FDA Begins 
Cracking Down on Cheaper Drugs from Canada, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A1. 
 382. The State of Illinois is aggressively pursuing a plan to import patented medications 
from Canada beginning April 1, 2004, if FDA approval is given. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra 
note 379, at 3, 30. 
 383. Id. at 79-81. 
 384. Id. at 19. This figure is based on the assumption that all employees and retirees will 
participate. 
 385. See, e.g., Fred Frommer, Pawlenty Tries To Win FDA over on Drug Plan, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Jan. 16, 2004 (describing the Minnesota Governor’s attempt to win FDA 
approval for a drug importation plan); Tony Leys, Vilsack Offers Plan on Canadian Drugs, DES 
MOINES REG., Jan. 22, 2004 (describing Iowa’s plan); Katherine M. Skiba, Doyle Makes Case for 
Buying Cheaper Drugs from Canada, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 2004, at 1A. 
 386. Heffler et al., supra note 80, exhibit 1. This number includes only retail sales of 
prescription drugs, excluding purchases of prescription drugs by institutions such as 
hospitals and nursing homes. The all-inclusive number for 2004 is closer to $250 billion. 
SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 4 & n.25. 
 387. Transcript of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 127-28, United States v. Rx 
Depot, Inc., No. 03-CV-0616-EA (M) (N.D. Okla. Oct. 8-9, 2003) (examination of Thomas 
McGinnis, Director of Pharmacy Affairs, FDA) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rx Depot 
Transcript]. 
193 ART_OUTTERSONV5 12/25/2004  4:45 PM 
 PHARMACEUTICAL ARBITRAGE 
279 
yielding an estimated arbitrage market size of $600 to $700 million in 
2003.388 The IMS Health consulting agency estimates US$1.1 billion (in 
U.S. prices) in 2003, an increase of seventy percent over 2002.389 The State 
of Illinois program alone could add $250 million to this market, 
demonstrating the potential for growth. Canadian expenditures on 
prescribed pharmaceuticals in 2002 were CAN$14.573 billion,390 thus the 
arbitrage market is already a significant part of the overall Canadian 
market. 
Unlike ordinarily fleeting opportunities for financial arbitrage, this 
market is not self-correcting. Canadian prices will not increase much, given 
government regulation;391 normal U.S. prices will not fall unless the 
PhRMA companies agree to reduce their monopoly price. If the supply of 
patented drugs in Canada remains sufficient, a permanent arbitrage 
opportunity results and will persist for as long as the patent remains in 
force.392 With negligible transaction and information costs, a fungible 
 
 388. While the average size of U.S.–Canadian prescriptions is unknown, data from the 
State of Illinois describe consumer co-pays of at least $40 per prescription, KAMATH & 
MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 5, implying a retail price of $200 at a twenty percent co-pay. 
Recent Canadian estimates suggest a market of $700 to $800 million per year. Tamsin 
Carlisle, Canada Cools to U.S. Drug Flow: Some Online Pharmacies Aren’t Filling Big Orders Due to 
Fears of Shortages, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at A9; Tony Pugh, Low-Cost Drug Sales to U.S. 
Should Stop, Canadian Group Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at A24. Other recent 
studies have reached similar estimates for the size of the Canadian arbitrage market. SAGER 
& SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 4 ($695 million in 2003, based on IMS data). The largest U.S. 
retail drug store chain, CVS, estimates that U.S. patients spend $3 billion a year outside the 
United States. US HHS Import Task Force Urged To Curb Overseas Pharma Price Controls, PHARMA 
MARKETLETTER, May 17, 2004. By comparison, the domestic U.S. prescription mail order 
market was $20.7 billion in 2001. NIHCM, supra note 63, at 9. 
 389. Morais, supra note 324 (quoting Paul Saatsoglou, IMS Health). 
 390. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., supra note 79, at 66. Precise comparisons with U.S. 
pharmaceutical sales are difficult. The Canadian figures exclude sales to non-Canadians 
(including cross-border Internet sales) but include institutional sales (which are excluded 
from the comparable U.S. statistics). 
 391. PhRMA companies recently announced small price increases permitted by the 
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. Bernard Simon, Curtailing Medicines from Canada, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at W1. These price increases were targeted against drugs in the 
U.S. arbitrage market. PhRMA companies are also attempting to limit the supply of drugs 
provided to Canada to hinder cross-border arbitrage, encouraging shortages and retail 
price increases. Id. Both actions are designed to hinder arbitrage. 
 392. A permanent arbitrage opportunity is also present in the EU parallel market, given 
national price controls and various legal restrictions which keep parallel trade to a 
manageable size. KANAVOS ET AL., supra note 54, at 136 (disproving the price convergence 
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product in abundant supply, and non-responsive pricing, one would 
expect a large portion of the available U.S. market to source from Canada, 
limited only by the capacity of the Canadian market to handle the 
volume.393 
Theoretically, Canadian arbitrage may destroy the differential pricing 
system which kept U.S. drug prices the highest in the world. Erosion of 
differential pricing might shift consumer surplus from producers to 
consumers. American consumers might save many billions of dollars on 
pharmaceuticals, greatly improving financial access. The other side of the 
coin is that PhRMA companies may lose the lion’s share of their worldwide 
profits.394 One unasked question is whether this process will result in sub-
optimal pharmaceutical rents. Supporters of pharmaceutical companies 
simply assume that drug innovation will be hindered. So long as total 
pharmaceutical rents remains supra-optimal, Canadian arbitrage improves 
consumer welfare without harming innovation. 
ii. Regulatory Arbitrage 
A process similar to arbitrage also occurs between regulatory systems. 
Within the United States, if one particular state imposes draconian 
regulations upon businesses, the business owners may vote with their feet 
by relocating to a more attractive regulatory environment. If sufficiently 
important firms relocate, or credibly threaten to do so, then the state may 
reconsider its stance and ameliorate the harsh regulations.395 
 
hypothesis). 
 393. A recent CBO issue brief suggests that the net effect on U.S. prices from Canadian 
arbitrage will be small. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 
REDUCE U.S. DRUG SPENDING? 15 (2004). The CBO assumed that arbitrage supplies would be 
successfully interdicted by PhRMA companies, capping the arbitrage at ten to fifteen 
percent of the U.S. market and assumed no competitive price reductions in the United 
States. Id. at 4-6. Even under the CBO’s pessimistic assumptions, the ten year savings to U.S. 
consumers will be $40 billion. Id. at 8. Put another way, PhRMA’s displaced sales from 
legalizing OECD arbitrage will be $40 billion over ten years. 
 394. Alan Sager and Deborah Socolar dispute this conclusion, claiming that Canadian 
arbitrage need not reduce the profits of PhRMA companies, but their conclusion requires 
that a high percentage of arbitrage purchases actually represent new aggregate demand. 
SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 11, at 1 (“We find that if new prescriptions’ share of imports is 
44.53 percent or more, importing actually increases drug makers’ profits.”). The question 
will turn on whether pharmaceutical demand is relatively inelastic. Id. at 11-13. 
 395. The classic work is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
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A variation of this process is at work in Canadian arbitrage. In the 
United States, pharmaceutical companies have been largely successful in 
blocking the adoption of price controls for their products.396 Other 
nations, such as Canada, have imposed more restrictive regulatory 
measures to reduce prices.397 One perspective on this cross-border 
arbitrage is that some Americans have imported Canada’s pricing 
regulatory system into the United States for outpatient non-emergency 
pharmaceuticals.398 Regulatory arbitrage is at work between the United 
States and Canada. 
Regulatory arbitrage encourages domestic political reaction. 
Constituents’ demands for pharmaceutical arbitrage has led the Congress 
to pass the MEDS Act, which legalizes the process once the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services certifies its safety and cost savings.399 The 
certification proved to be the Achille’s heel, since HHS has refused to issue 
the certification.400 The Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization 
Act of 2003, as passed by the House of Representatives, permitted 
importation from Canada without requiring the Secretary’s approval.401 
The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, also passed by the House, 
permitted imports from twenty-five countries with effective NDRAs.402 The 
 
 396. The industry strongly oppose price controls. See, e.g., Sidney Taurel, Hands Off My 
Industry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at A14. Taurel is President, Chairman, and CEO of Eli 
Lilly. 
 397. Many discussions of Canada’s patented pharmaceutical pricing system wrongly 
assume that it includes mandatory price controls. Canada’s Patented Medication Prices 
Review Board uses soft reference prices and quasi-judicial processes to regulate the ex-
factory prices within Canada. The Board also encourages R&D at a minimum level of ten 
percent of revenues and grants special pricing consideration to breakthrough drugs. 
BARRADOS ET AL., supra note 378, ¶ 17.56; Elgie, supra note 378, at 3-4. Thus, Canada’s 
system is one attempt to optimize the appropriation of rents, striking a balance between 
cost, quality and access, based upon imperfect data. 
 398. The American Enterprise Institute identifies this as a major weakness of proposals to 
permit reimportation from Canada. JOHN E. CALFEE, THE HIGH PRICE OF CHEAP DRUGS 
(2003), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030715_%2315530Calfeegraphics.pdf.  
 399. Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A-35 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 384). 
 400. Sarah Lueck, Senate Supports Wider Importing of Canada Drugs, WALL ST. J., June 23, 
2003, at A10. 
 401. Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong. § 
1121 (2003) (passed in the House on June 27, 2003). Another bill in the 108th Congress 
would have permitted reimportation from the EU as well. Save Our Seniors Act of 2003, 
H.R. 2769, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). 
 402. Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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Senate version of the bill reinstated the certification requirement, 
effectively gutting Canadian importation under the Bush Administration.403 
Most observers would not expect a majority of the U.S. Congress to enact 
Canada’s price regulatory system for the United States; nevertheless, 
existing federal law (if certified by HHS) would achieve a similar result, in 
response to consumer exploitation of arbitrage opportunities.404 
Another example of regulatory arbitrage involves the efforts of U.S. 
psychologists to obtain prescribing authority, currently denied to them 
under U.S. law. Some U.S. psychologists direct their patients to Canadian 
pharmacies, which accept prescriptions written by U.S. psychologists.405 
This practice will provide empirical evidence of the medical efficacy of 
prescriptions by U.S. psychologists, a form of self-directed research. 
In both cases, regulatory arbitrage focuses debate on the comparative 
advantages of alternative systems of regulation. This process should be 
encouraged, as it promotes competitive analysis of regulatory structures 
and allows market participants to influence the debates with diminished 
intermediation by interest groups.406 
 
 403. Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, 21 
U.S.C. § 804 (2000); see also Sarah Lueck, Senate Supports Wider Importing of Canada Drugs, 
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at A10. A subsequent administration could certify safety and cost-
effectiveness and begin importation from Canada without additional Congressional 
legislation. 
 404. Henry J. Aaron, Should Public Policy Seek To Control the Growth of Health Care 
Expenditures?, W3 HEALTH AFF. 28-31 (2003) (“The chances that we will adopt the Canadian 
or French health care systems as a whole are about as good as those that we will join the 
British Commonwealth or adopt French as a second national language. Even adopting 
elements of foreign systems is problematic because important aspects of health care 
financing and delivery are mutually interrelated.”). John Calfee of the American Enterprise 
Institute makes the point that reimportation of pharmaceuticals from Canada is equivalent 
to importing Canadian price controls. CALFEE, supra note 398. 
 405. Linda Temple, Who Gets To Prescribe? Psychologists Send Drug Orders to Canada, Spark a 
Medical Debate, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2003, at D10. 
 406. Alvarez and Trachtman note that regulatory arbitrage may or may not have positive 
effects, depending upon the condition of spillovers (negative externalities). Joel P. 
Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .,” 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 84 
(2002) (citing Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 331 (2000)). In the present case, pharmaceutical regulatory arbitrage is a response 
to the existing free rider problem of national drug price regulation. This response may well 
destabilize the system, and force OECD countries to re-allocate jurisdiction on drug price 
regulation. Efficient re-allocation of jurisdiction is the primary theme in Trachtman’s 
article. Alan O. Sykes remarks that subjecting domestic regulatory systems to the pressures 
of global trade “need not be unfortunate. International regulatory competition may well 
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iii. Virtual Arbitrage 
The closely-related concept of virtual arbitrage involves foregoing the 
actual importation of drugs, but using lower observed prices as an external 
reference price, whether by government regulation or in contract. The 
United States employs a virtual arbitrage system in requiring certain 
discounts for drugs purchased under Medicaid, discounts which reference 
other “best” prices.407 West Virginia recently established a state agency 
which adopted the Federal Supply Schedule as a soft reference price for 
drug purchases by the state.408 If West Virginia succeeds in lowering drug 
prices, many other states will likely follow suit. 
Virtual arbitrage is preferred in any situation where physical arbitrage 
is acceptable. Virtual arbitrage is more efficient than physical arbitrage, 
since resources are not expended in transporting products or in policing 
against diversion.409 Virtual arbitrage is also safer than physical arbitrage 
since the supply chain is not needlessly articulated through intermediaries. 
Just as in physical arbitrage, virtual arbitrage from low income markets into 
high income markets must be blocked if differential pricing is to be 
supported for essential medicines.410 
Without clear data on the optimality of pharmaceutical rents, no 
conclusion can be reached as to whether other forms of virtual arbitrage 
harm innovation. All arbitrage, whether virtual or not, will reduce the 
surplus captured by the patent holder and shift surplus to the consumer 
and the arbitrageur; however it begs the question to assume that arbitrage 
will reduce pharmaceutical rents to a sub-optimal level. One should not 
assume that the externality is negative. It is possible that West Virginia’s use 
of an external reference price retains supra-optimal innovation incentives 
while dramatically lowering the state’s costs and improving access. 
 
drive out foolish and wasteful regulations rather than undermine valuable regulations.” 
ALAN O. SYKES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 17 
(Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 188, 2d Series, 2003). 
 407. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000) (using reference prices to calculate drug prices and drug 
rebates under Medicaid). 
 408. WEST VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 175, at 1-7. 
 409. On the issue of the transaction costs of physical arbitrage, see the comments by 
Harvey E. Bale, Jr., the Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Associations, in Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and 
Product Access and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 637 (1998). 
These claims are hotly disputed by proponents of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., 
WEST & MAHON, supra note 327. 
 410. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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2. Responses to Canadian-U.S. Arbitrage 
The current efforts to hinder Canadian arbitrage include legal 
interdiction, increasing transaction and information costs, and selectively 
controlling drug supplies shipped to Canada. 
i. Reducing Arbitrage Demand 
a. Legal Interdiction 
If transaction costs are raised significantly, at some point the arbitrage 
transaction will become unrewarding and the market pressure on 
differential pricing will abate. For consumers, the transactions must be low-
risk, particularly with regard to the legality of the transaction, eligibility for 
reimbursement from third parties, and the counterparty risk of fraud.411 
In the first two phases of Canadian arbitrage,412 the transactions were 
clearly legal under U.S. and Canadian law. The consumer physically visited 
a Canadian pharmacy, presented a valid prescription, and received the 
product. When returning to the United States, most Americans were not 
searched or questioned about their pharmaceuticals. Even if they had been 
scrutinized, the federal government allowed them to import small amounts 
of pharmaceuticals for personal use.413 
When pharmaceutical arbitrage expanded to mail order and the 
Internet, Canadian pharmacies and their agents emphasized the personal 
use exception. Prior to 2003, federal officials did not vigorously challenge 
this practice. Federal officials did not lack statutory authority to block 
importation through the mails or package delivery services,414 but 
enforcement was uncommon. This lack of enforcement, coupled with the 
claims of legality under the personal use exception, permitted consumers 
to believe that the transaction was legal and the risk of government 
sanction was small. 
 
 411. Virtual arbitrage partially escapes this condition since no additional transportation 
costs are incurred, and safety issues cannot be raised. Other transaction costs may still 
apply, such as the cost of observing prices and legal costs. 
 412. See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 413. FDA, Personal Use Import Policy, http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/pipinfo.htm 
(Apr. 3, 1998). 
 414. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (holding that customs officials 
are permitted to intercept mail for contraband). 
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Beginning in 2003, the enforcement environment changed.415 Federal 
and state officials are currently attacking Internet pharmaceutical arbitrage 
on multiple fronts. The FDA is aggressively enforcing against U.S. 
companies involved in the trade.416 The Customs Department has posted 
clarifications of the personal use exception to discourage importation.417 
Facilitators such as the Discount Prescription Center in West Virginia have 
been challenged by state Boards of Pharmacy as engaged in the unlicensed 
practice of pharmacy.418 The FDA has sued regional facilitators such as Rx 
Depot for assisting in the importation of prescription drugs.419 The FDA 
and state pharmacy investigators have also purchased prescription drugs in 
undercover operations.420 Direct interdiction would include enforcement 
actions against consumers, but arresting grandparents for purchasing 
Canadian Lipitor is not politically viable. 
Canadian arbitrage was born in conditions of legal uncertainty, and 
continues with a zone of legal protection around the consumers. In 
addition, the consumers occupy the moral high ground of gaining access 
to an important drug at market rates. These conditions allowed arbitrage 
to take root and grow. Citizens and governments which would never 
consider importing cocaine are buying Canadian drugs over the Internet. 
b. Raising Information and Transaction Costs 
These enforcement actions, while significant, have not shut down the 
arbitrage trade. From the perspective of arbitrage, the more significant 
 
 415. Thomas M. Burton, The FDA Begins Cracking Down on Cheaper Drugs from Canada, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A1. 
 416. Lolita C. Baldor, FDA: Too Costly To Legalize Drug Imports, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 24, 
2003 (describing confiscations of illegal mail-order drugs in New York); Gardiner Harris 
and Monica Davey, U.S. Steps Up Effort Against Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at C1; 
Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams Continue To Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally 
Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004. 
 417. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Medication/Drugs, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/ 
cgov/travel/alerts/medication_drugs.xml (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
 418. The West Virginia Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding 
enforcement by the West Virginia State Board of Pharmacy against Discount Prescription 
Center, concluding that Discount Prescription Center was not a pharmacy and did not 
violate state law. Becker v. W. Va. Board of Pharm., No. 03-C-1237, slip op. at 11-12 (W. Va. 
Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003).  
 419. Rx Depot was shut down by a preliminary injunction granted by District Court Judge 
Claire V. Eagan on November 6, 2003. United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238 
(N.D. Okla. 2003).  
 420. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 16-40. 
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element is pairing enforcement action with widespread publicity to 
dampen consumer demand. The effect is to increase consumers’ 
transaction costs and deter arbitrage without comprehensive direct 
interdiction. 
Raising information costs may also support product differentiation and 
discourage substitution.421 Pharmaceutical arbitrage occurs when the 
consumer considers the drugs to be substitutable. These consumers are 
generally not trained medical specialists, and are unable to evaluate safety 
or efficacy.422 These consumers are relying on the effectiveness of Health 
Canada’s Therapeutic Product Directorate (TPD), assuming that Canadian 
drugs are generally as safe as U.S. drugs regulated by the FDA. If the safety 
or equivalence of drugs from Canadian Internet pharmacies is in doubt, 
this assumption dissolves and risk-averse consumers are less likely to 
arbitrage. Supporters of importation take the opposite tack. In October, 
2003, the State of Illinois released a major report in support of importing 
patented drugs from Canada. The report concluded that the Canadian 
drug supply was actually more secure than that of the United States.423 
A major component of the assault on pharmaceutical arbitrage has 
been to question safety and equivalence. The FDA has publicly announced 
its lack of confidence in the Internet drug supply chain. Undercover 
operations and enforcement activities have highlighted the seizure of 
mislabeled, counterfeit, or out-of-date drugs.424 Questions have been raised 
as to whether the drugs are produced and transported under FDA 
standards of safety.425 Labeling issues, such as the Canadian label for 
Accutane, have been identified.426 The actual source of arbitraged drugs 
has also been publicly challenged by FDA officials who muse whether the 
drugs actually come from Canada at all; perhaps the true source is 
Thailand or India.427 
 
 421. PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 187-200. 
 422. Raising search costs for these consumers should hinder arbitrage and support 
differential pricing. See PHILIPS, supra note 43, at 187-200.  
 423. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 11-16 (finding Canadian and U.S. systems 
equivalent for most aspects, but finding the Canadian system superior in preventing the 
introduction of counterfeit drugs and incident reporting for internal process errors). 
 424. See, e.g., Recent FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams Continue To Reveal Potentially 
Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004. 
 425. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 16-158. 
 426. Id. at 77 l. 22 (cross-examination of Melvin Frank Szymanski, consumer safety 
officer, FDA).  
 427. Savings Immense on Canadian Drugs, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003 (“It is not an answer 
to this problem to say go buy drugs from Canada, which may be coming from Pakistan and 
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At one level, these accusations prove too much. Counterfeit and 
unsafe drugs are found in the U.S. market generally and are not confined 
to the Internet supply chain.428 The FDA does not want to undermine 
consumer confidence in the U.S. drug supply, but to distinguish the U.S. 
domestic supply from international Internet sources. Thus, the FDA 
opposes all international pharmaceutical arbitrage into the United States. 
c. The Special Case of Reimportation 
Questions about production safety, equivalence, and labeling are 
reduced for a segment of this market known as reimportation. As a matter 
of production efficiency, pharmaceutical companies do not build plants in 
every country of the world. Many are located in the United States, 
including Puerto Rico, where the U.S. government has long encouraged 
pharmaceutical research and production through generous tax incentives 
under Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code.429 Many drugs produced 
in these U.S. plants are both sold into the U.S. market as well as exported 
to nations like Canada. When these drugs make the return trip back to the 
United States, the process is called reimportation. 
Concerns about production safety, equivalence, and labeling of re-
imported drugs should be carefully scrutinized. The Canadian government 
is fully satisfied that these drugs are safe, efficacious, and properly labeled 
for Canadian use. The FDA worries about errors in shipping and handling 
from Canada to the consumer,430 but these questions are relevant to all 
mail order pharmaceuticals and are not endogenous to pharmaceutical 
arbitrage from Canada. The FDA correctly notes that some Canadian 
standards differ from FDA rules and forbids reimportation solely on that 
basis.431 But the FDA has not shown that the Canadian drug supply is less 
safe. Rx Depot was one of the largest facilitators of importing prescription 
drugs from Canada. The FDA sued Rx Depot, demanding that importation 
cease. At the Rx Depot trial in October 2003, the FDA was unable to say 
that Canadian drugs were unsafe or had injured Americans.432 
 
India and China and all those countries we have health concerns about.”) (quoting Sen. 
John B. Breaux, D-La); Hubbard Letter, supra note 376 (noting one instance of a Canadian 
website shipping an Indian drug). 
 428. ‘Lipitor’ Surfaces in Counterfeit Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B8; Daniel Yee, CDC: 
Seniors Prescribed Dangerous Drugs, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 9, 2004. 
 429. Puerto Rico and Possessions Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 936 (2000). 
 430. Rx Depot Transcript, supra note 387, at 29-31. 
 431. Id. at 28, 76-77. 
 432. Id. at 138-41. But see Hubbard Letter, supra note 376 (claiming that Internet sales 
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The most thorough recent analysis of this question concludes that the 
Canadian drug supply is actually safer on balance than that of the United 
States. The State of Illinois report recommends a controlled importation 
system, with extensive safety checks, that results in a high quality drug 
supply at substantial savings.433 The EU has many years of experience with 
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals, without significant safety issues.434 
ii. Reducing Arbitrage Supply 
Each arbitrage transaction lowers the average price. If the supply or 
demand of product available for arbitrage can be limited, the net financial 
impact on the producer will be less severe. In European markets, PhRMA 
companies successfully restrict supply to curb parallel trade.435 Conversely, 
theory suggests that if supply and demand are unlimited, differential 
pricing will disappear and a new equilibrium price will prevail in both 
markets, shifting surplus from the producer to the consumer. 
a. Targeting Canadian Internet Pharmacies 
Pharmaceutical companies have identified Canadian pharmacies that 
sell to the United States market. These pharmacies have been threatened 
with a refusal to deal unless the cross-border sales cease.436 This threat not 
only cuts off the supply for the patented drugs being arbitraged, but it also 
uses the entire product line as a weapon to enforce differential pricing. 
This strategy may not wholly prevent arbitrage. Some doubt the 
effectiveness and legality of attempts to restrict supply to Canada.437 
 
from Canada will be more open to counterfeiting). 
 433. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 1-5. 
 434. WEST & MAHON, supra note 327. 
 435. Janice Haigh, Parallel Trade: What Next?, 9 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT 295, 
297-98 (2004). 
 436. Tamsin Carlisle, Pfizer Pressures Canadian Sellers of Drugs to U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
2004, at A6; Tamsin Carlisle, Some Online Pharmacies Aren’t Filling Big Orders Due to Fears of 
Shortages, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at A9; John O’Connor, Canadians Warn of Rx Shortage, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at 18; Tony Pugh, Low-Cost Drug Sales to U.S. Should Stop, 
Canadian Group Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at 18. Similar restrictions have been 
employed for many years to hinder parallel trade in Europe, Maskus & Ganslandt, supra 
note 55, at 69-70, with limited effectiveness, WEST & MAHON, supra note 327. For the effects 
of the same tactic on a national level, see DANZON ET AL., supra note 186. 
 437. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 22 (“[W]e do not feel the manufacturers[’] 
rhetoric to restrict supply will ever materialize either broadly or consistently, and not at all 
in the Canadian pharmacies that are hybrid—internet and retail—for two reasons. First, 
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Members of Congress have asked the United States Attorney General to 
investigate whether antitrust laws are being violated,438 and traditional 
Canadian pharmacies are complaining about the impact of drug company 
restrictions on their domestic operations.439 
Canadian pharmacies will still be able to purchase drugs for export but 
will be forced to purchase through intermediaries. Expenses and marginal 
cost are likely to rise, but given the significant price differentials between 
the United States and Canada, arbitrage opportunities will remain. 
Perverse effects should also be noted. By cutting off direct supplies to 
exporting pharmacies, the pharmaceutical companies force additional 
intermediaries into the supply chain, which increases safety and handling 
problems, increases inefficiencies, and increases the opportunity for 
spoilage and introduction of counterfeits.440 If the concern is truly for 
patient safety, supply restrictions are a crude and counterproductive tool. 
b. Reducing Demand in the United States with a Medicare 
Prescription Drug Benefit 
Pharmaceutical companies also restrict demand in the United States. 
The current market is mostly non-emergency outpatient drugs. For the 
Medicare population, these drugs have historically not been covered. In 
2003, the U.S. Congress for the first time passed a Medicare prescription 
drug act, as PhRMA reversed its historic opposition and embraced a 
market-based third party reimbursement plan in Medicare for outpatient 
drugs.441 The new Medicare drug benefit will reduce consumer demand for 
 
limiting supply to Canadian pharmacies may risk their Canadian patent protection; second, 
as the Minnesota Attorney General and Illinois Attorney General are currently investigating 
any concerted effort by the pharmaceutical companies to limit supply may violate U.S. 
antitrust laws.”). 
 438. Gardiner Harris, Some in Congress Seek Inquiry over Drug Supply to Canada, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2003, at C2. 
 439. Carlisle, supra note 436; O’Connor, supra note 436; Pugh, supra note 436. 
 440. KAMATH & MCKIBBIN, supra note 379, at 11-18 (explaining that Canada’s drug 
distribution system does not rely on intermediates to the same extent as the U.S. system and 
that increasing reliance on intermediates increases the risk of counterfeit drugs). 
 441. Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.A § 1395, 1395-
1430 (West 2004). This plan also sows the seeds of future government price controls. Once 
the federal government becomes the payor, price increases are directly translated into 
budget issues. Medicare providers such as physicians and hospitals were once paid on a fee-
for-service market basis; after years of budgetary issues, Medicare now imposes price 
controls and rate setting for physician and hospital services. Pharmaceuticals may well 
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arbitrage in an important population and thus support differential pricing. 
3. Implications of Optimality for Canadian-U.S. Arbitrage 
Mindlessly blocking pharmaceutical arbitrage between high income 
countries needlessly sacrifices cost and financial access on the altar of 
quality. Wonder drugs are useless if they are too expensive to be taken as 
prescribed. The government’s regulatory power should not be used to 
force consumers into grey markets. 
The United States should permit functional pharmaceutical arbitrage, 
particularly with countries with NDRAs similar to the FDA. Regulatory 
resources would be devoted to coordination with these governments to 
ensure the integrity of the supply chain. PhRMA companies bemoan this 
approach as destructive of long-term research incentives. This is an overly 
simplistic assessment, for it assumes that pharmaceutical rents would be 
sub-optimal at undifferentiated high income market prices. If, in fact, 
Canadian prices are supra-optimal, then Canada is not free riding on 
American R&D.442 Optimal pharmaceutical rents would be achieved at 
prices between current U.S. and Canadian prices. PhRMA companies 
would be able to compensate for reduced unit prices by increasing volume. 
If Canadian prices currently result in supra-optimal pharmaceutical 
rents, then extending Canadian prices to the United States will do no 
harm to innovation. This astonishing possibility would greatly reduce U.S. 
pharmaceutical access issues without any decline in innovation. Price 
controls in Canada do not appear to have stifled innovation, as Canadian 
pharmaceutical R&D is robust and growing.443 If optimality lies somewhere 
between U.S. and Canadian prices, then U.S. prices could be decreased by 
some amount without harming innovation. Modest levels of arbitrage and 
additional price transparency may achieve this result. 
Finally, the Canadian experience suggests that PhRMA companies will 
react to reduced unit prices by stimulating demand for their products. In 
Canada, despite stable to declining Canadian unit prices for patented 
pharmaceuticals, national drug expenditures per capita have been rising 
 
follow the same trend line. 
 442. See Kevin Outterson, Free Trade Against Free Riders, 9 PHARMA PRICING & 
REIMBURSEMENT 254-55 (2004). 
 443. BARRADOS ET AL., supra note 378, ¶ 17.11 (noting that Canadian drug companies 
agreed to increase R&D to ten percent of sales by the end of 1996). For current data on 
Canadian pharmaceutical R&D, see Rx&D, at http://www.canadapharma.org (the official 
trade association website). 
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by 10.2% annually. 444 Companies increase their profits in declining unit 
price markets by increasing unit sales445 and by developing new drugs.446 If 
profits are stable or increasing, innovation is not harmed. It may be 
possible to reduce prices, increase access and improve human health 
simultaneously—the Holy Grail of health policy. 
The major barrier to empirically proving any of these three conditions 
is the lack of independent and reliable data on actual R&D expenditures 
and profits. Erosion of the high income market internal differential 
pricing system would put the ball in PhRMA companies’ court to 
demonstrate whether the resulting pharmaceutical rents were globally sub-
optimal. For perhaps the first time, these decisions could be made on the 
basis of actual data rather than imprecise estimates and secret company 
data. 
CONCLUSION 
The head of the U.S. global AIDS effort, Ambassador Randall Tobias, 
is the former CEO of Eli Lilly & Co. When asked about the essential 
medicines access issue, he claimed it was “yesterday’s issue” and that “from 
a price point of view, there’s no longer that much difference.”447 I beg to 
differ. Not only are ARVs still not widely available at marginal cost in 
developing countries, but drug pricing remains unaffordable for other 
global diseases such as cancer and heart disease in low and middle income 
markets. The industry prefers to turn off the media spotlight and assume 
that access problems were adequately addressed at Doha and Cancun, or 
will be dealt with by PEPFAR. Meanwhile, global public health catastrophes 
continue to mount. For some of these conditions, we possess effective 
therapies that can be provided on nonrival terms but are withheld from 
the poor because of fears of inadequate pharmaceutical rents. 
Health care public policy should not be chained to innovation; it must 
also champion access, whether in Africa or Akron. The theory and praxis 
of pharmaceutical arbitrage suggests that pharmaceutical access may be 
greatly improved, at a modest cost, without damaging optimal innovation. 
 
 444. CAN. INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., supra note 79, fig.18 (reporting, based on 2002 data, 
the stable to declining Patented Medicine Price Index since the introduction of the 
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board). 
 445. Id. fig.14 (reporting annual growth rate of per capita prescribed drug expenditures 
of 10.2% from 1997-2000). 
 446. Id. at 33-43. 
 447. Robin Wright, A CEO To Direct the AIDS Battle: Former Eli Lilly Chief Comes out of 
Retirement, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2004, at A25. 
